


IOWA COURT RULES

FIFTH EDITION

May 2010 Supplement



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KATHLEEN K. WEST
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE EDITOR

PREFACE

The Fifth Edition of the Iowa Court Rules was published in July 2009 pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5(2). Subsequent updates to the Iowa Court Rules, as ordered by the Supreme Court, are published in electronic format only and include chapters that have been amended or adopted.

The Iowa Court Rules and related court documents are available on the Internet at <http://www.legis.state.ia.us/aspx/CourtRules/pubDateListing.aspx>.

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Citation: The rules shall be cited as follows:

Chapter 1	Iowa R. Civ. P.
Chapter 2	Iowa R. Crim. P.
Chapter 5	Iowa R. Evid.
Chapter 6	Iowa R. App. P.
Chapter 32	Iowa R. of Prof'l Conduct
Chapter 51	Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct

All other rules shall be cited as "Iowa Ct. R."

Supplements: Supplements to the Fifth Edition of the Iowa Court Rules have been issued as follows:

August 2009

September 2009

October 2009

November 2009

December 2009

January 2010

February 2010

March 2010

May 2010

May 2010 Supplement

Changes in this supplement

Rule 22.12..... Amended
Rule 22.22..... Amended

Rule 32:1.12..... Amended
Chapter 51 Adopted

INSTRUCTIONS FOR UPDATING THE IOWA COURT RULES

Replace Chapter 22
Replace Chapter 32
Replace Chapter 51

CHAPTER 22

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CHAPTER 22

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Rule 22.1 Supervision of courts. The supreme court, by and through the chief justice, shall exercise supervisory and administrative control over all trial courts in the state, and over the judges and other personnel thereof, including but not limited to authority to make and issue any order a chief judge may make under rule 22.5, or to modify, amend or revoke any such order or court schedule.
[Report 1969; Court Order November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.2 Recall and transfer of judges. The supreme court by and through the chief justice may at any time order the recall of eligible retired judges for active service, and the transfer of active judges and other court personnel from one judicial district to another to provide a sufficient number of judges to handle the judicial business in all districts promptly and efficiently.
[Report 1969; Court Order November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.3 Selection of chief judges. Not later than December 15 in each odd-numbered year the chief justice, with the approval of the supreme court, shall appoint from the district judges of each district one of their number to serve as chief judge. The judge so appointed shall serve for a two-year term and shall be eligible for reappointment. Vacancies in the office of chief judge shall be filled in the same manner within 30 days after the vacancy occurs. During any period of vacancy the judge of longest service in the district shall be the acting chief judge.
[Report 1969; Court Order October 31, 1997, effective January 24, 1998; October 27, 1999, effective January 3, 2000; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.4 Order appointing chief judge. An order appointing a chief judge shall be filed with the clerk of the supreme court who shall mail a copy to the clerk of the district court in each county in the judicial district. The clerk of the supreme court may mail the copies of the order electronically.
[Report 1969; Court Order November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; April 11, 2007]

Rule 22.5 Duties and powers of chief judges. In addition to their ordinary judicial duties, chief judges shall exercise continuing administrative supervision within their respective districts over all district courts, judges, magistrates, officials and employees thereof for the purposes stated in Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1807. They shall by order fix times and places of holding court and designate the respective presiding judges and magistrates; they shall supervise and direct the performance of all administrative business of their district courts; they may conduct judicial conferences of their district judges, district associate judges, and magistrates to consider, study and plan for improvement of the administration of justice; and may make such administrative orders as necessary. No chief judge shall at any time direct or influence any judge or magistrate in any ruling or decision in any proceeding or matter whatsoever.

The chief judge of a judicial district may appoint from the other district judges an assistant or assistants to serve on a judicial district-wide basis and at the chief judge's pleasure. When so acting, such an assistant shall have those powers and duties given to the chief judge by statute or rule of court which are specified in the order of appointment. Such appointment shall by general order be made a matter of record in each county in the judicial district.
[Report 1969; amendment 1972; amendment 1979; Court Order October 31, 1997, effective January 24, 1998; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.6 Court and trial sessions. Chief judges shall by order provide for the following:

22.6(1) A court session by a district judge at least once each week in each county of the district, announced in advance in the form of a written schedule, unless a different schedule is approved by the supreme court.

22.6(2) Additional sessions in each county for the trial of cases, and other judicial matters, of such duration and frequency as will best serve to expeditiously dispose of pending cases ready for trial, and other pending judicial matters.

[Report 1969; Court Order November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.7 Case assignment. The chief judge may assign and monitor cases within the district and may delegate this authority to the district court administrator by general supervisory order or on

a case-by-case basis. District judges, district associate judges, associate juvenile judges, associate probate judges, and magistrates shall attend to any matter within their statutory jurisdiction assigned to them by the chief judge.

[Court Order May 30, 1986; February 14, 1996; July 26, 1996; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.8 Judicial district scheduling.

22.8(1) The chief judge of each judicial district shall by annual written order set the times and places of holding court within the judicial district and designate the respective presiding judges. The order shall provide for a court session at least once a week in each county of the judicial district, unless otherwise approved by the supreme court. The order shall provide for a scheduled trial session in each county of the judicial district at least four times each year, to be presided over by a different judge. In determining the schedule ordered, the chief judge shall rotate trial judges without regard to judicial election district lines to facilitate the administration of justice, integrate the district bench and promote the ideal of district administration.

22.8(2) An order of the chief judge demonstrating compliance with this rule for the next calendar year shall be filed by October 15 of the preceding calendar year with the clerk of the supreme court. Following supreme court approval, the chief judge shall file a copy of the order with the clerk of the district court in each county of the respective judicial district.

[Court Order October 15, 1985; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.9 Change of venue to another judicial district.

22.9(1) Definitions. As used in this rule:

- a. “*Receiving county*” means the county to which a change of venue is ordered.
- b. “*Sending county*” means the county from which a change of venue is ordered.

22.9(2) Communication prior to ordering a change of venue. Before ordering a change of venue to another judicial district for trial, a judge shall communicate with the office of the chief judge of the judicial district in which the intended receiving county is located. The judge shall determine from inquiry of the chief judge or the chief judge’s designee the availability of a courtroom, a jury panel if required, and any necessary court personnel in the receiving county. Subject to the approval of the chief justice, the judicial district in which the sending county is located shall provide the trial judge and court reporter for the transferred proceeding.

22.9(3) Transmission of copies of order changing venue. Copies of an order changing venue shall be promptly transmitted to all of the following:

- a. The chief judge of the judicial district in which the receiving county is located.
- b. The court administrator for the judicial district in which the receiving county is located.
- c. The clerk of the district court for the receiving county.
- d. The state court administrator, Iowa Judicial Branch Building, 1111 East Court Avenue, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.
- e. Any other persons required by law to receive copies of such an order.

22.9(4) Action brought in wrong county. This rule does not apply where the action was brought in the wrong county.

[Court Order October 20, 1981; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; April 9, 2003]

See also rule 2.11 and rule 2.65.

Rule 22.10 Judges — monthly report.

22.10(1) Each senior judge, district judge, district associate judge, full-time associate juvenile judge, full-time associate probate judge, and judicial magistrate shall report monthly to the supreme court, through the office of the state court administrator, all matters taken under advisement in any case for longer than 60 days, together with an explanation of the reasons for the delay and an expected date of decision. If no matters have been taken under advisement over 60 days, the report shall state “none.” Senior judges need only file reports for those months during which they perform judicial duties or have matters under advisement.

22.10(2) Any submission shall be reported when all hearings have been completed and the matter awaits decision without further appearance of the parties or their attorney. A matter shall be deemed submitted even though briefs or transcripts have been ordered but have not yet been filed.

22.10(3) The report shall be due on the tenth day of each calendar month for the period ending with the last day of the preceding calendar month. The report shall be signed by the judge or magistrate and submitted on a form prescribed by the state court administrator.

22.10(4) A judge who is reporting a matter or matters taken under advisement for longer than 60 days shall send to the district court administrator a copy of the report forwarded to the state court administrator. The chief judge of the district shall review the copies filed in the district court administrator's office and take such action as shall be appropriate. A chief judge may elect whether to report any action taken to the supreme court. A district chief judge reporting such matters to the supreme court shall forward a copy to the liaison justice for the chief judge's judicial district.

22.10(5) The state court administrator shall promptly cause all reports received to be filed in the office of the clerk of the supreme court as records available for public inspection.

[Court Order December 15, 1977; February 20, 1981; July 16, 1984 — received for publication October 25, 1984; June 28, 1985, effective July 1, 1985; July 26, 1996; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.11 Practice of law by judges.

22.11(1) A newly appointed full-time associate juvenile judge, full-time associate probate judge, district associate judge, district judge, court of appeals judge, or supreme court justice (hereinafter, judge) may have 30 days from the date of qualifying for office pursuant to Iowa Code section 63.6, or until the vacancy in the office actually occurs, whichever is later, in which to terminate any private law practice before assuming judicial duties. No newly appointed judge shall be placed on the state payroll or assume judicial duties until such private practice is concluded.

22.11(2) In terminating a law practice, the newly appointed judge shall undertake no new matters, shall conclude those matters which can be completed within the time provided in rule 22.11(1) and shall transfer those matters which cannot be so concluded or which require trial. While in the process of terminating a private practice, the newly appointed judge shall keep court appearances to a minimum.

22.11(3) Upon good cause shown, the supreme court may extend the time in which a newly appointed judge shall comply with this rule.

22.11(4) After assuming judicial duties and being placed on the payroll, a judge shall not engage in the practice of law. The practice of law includes but is not limited to the examination of abstracts, consummation of real estate transactions, preparation of legal briefs, deeds, buy and sell agreements, contracts, wills and tax returns.

[Court Order April 29, 1980; June 28, 1985, effective July 1, 1985; July 26, 1996; December 17, 1996, effective January 2, 1997; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; April 4, 2002]

Rule 22.12 Senior judges.

22.12(1) The supreme court, in ruling on an application for senior status, including reappointment of an applicant to an additional term, may consider the following factors:

a. The applicant's demonstrated willingness and ability to undertake and complete all assigned work during the applicant's service as a judge or a senior judge.

b. The result of a confidential vote of all full-time judges of the judicial district or appellate court in which the applicant served as a full-time judge. In addition, if the applicant is requesting assignment to another district or to an appellate court in which the applicant did not serve as a full-time judge, the court shall consider the result of a confidential vote of all full-time judges of the judicial district or the appellate court to which the applicant requests assignment: i.e., (suggested) "Shall X be appointed a senior judge?"

c. The result of the most recent judicial plebiscite.

d. The applicant's monthly reports issued pursuant to rule 22.10.

e. The applicant's agreement to perform duties as scheduled and assigned by the chief judge of the district or appellate court where the senior judge is assigned.

f. The applicant's plans, if any, to regularly spend time or reside out-of-state or to become a resident of a state other than Iowa, or an applicant's residency in a state other than Iowa.

g. The applicant's work or plans to work as a mediator, arbitrator or provider of other alternative dispute resolution services.

22.12(2) A person who files an election to become a senior judge any time after the date of retirement, pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9203, shall file written evidence with the clerk of the supreme court that the person has not engaged in the practice of law between the person's date of retirement and date of senior judge election.

22.12(3) An applicant for appointment to become a senior judge or a senior judge who applies for reappointment to an additional term shall provide evidence to the satisfaction of the supreme court that the applicant or senior judge does not suffer from a physical or mental disability or an illness that would substantially interfere with the performance of duties agreed to under this rule. Evidence shall include:

a. A statement of ability to serve by the applicant and a written opinion of a doctor of medicine or doctor of osteopathic medicine and surgery.

b. Prior to or following appointment or reappointment, a judge or senior judge must provide the court with additional information about the senior judge's physical and mental health and authorization for the release of medical information upon request.

22.12(4) A senior judge shall cease holding office when the senior judge reaches seventy-eight years of age. However, the supreme court may appoint a senior judge to serve up to two additional one-year terms after reaching seventy-eight years of age. To be eligible for consideration, a senior judge must file an application for reappointment within 30 days prior to the expiration of the senior judge's term. Under no circumstances shall a senior judge serve after reaching the age of eighty.

22.12(5) At the end of each calendar quarter, a senior judge shall file a report with the clerk of the supreme court indicating the dates on which the senior judge performed judicial or other assigned duties and the nature of the duties performed or the name of the cases over which the judge presided on each date of service. A senior judge assigned to a judicial district shall provide a copy of the report to the chief judge and the district court administrator. A senior judge assigned to an appellate court shall provide a copy of the report to the chief judge of the court of appeals or the chief justice, whichever is appropriate, and to the state court administrator. For purposes of this rule, a calendar quarter is a three-month period in the one-year period that commences on the date a retired judge becomes a senior judge and continues for each successive one-year period while the judge continues to be a senior judge.

22.12(6) Senior judges and applicants for appointment and reappointment to the senior judge program must provide information and reports required by this section on forms approved by the supreme court.

22.12(7) The following rules shall apply to senior judges, retired judges assigned to temporary judicial duties pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.1612, and retired senior judges assigned to temporary judicial duties pursuant to section 602.1612 who wish to engage in mediation, arbitration, or other forms of alternate dispute resolution:

a. A judge covered by this rule shall not act as an arbitrator, mediator, or provider of other forms of alternate dispute resolution while assigned to judicial service or when such action will interfere with an assignment to judicial service. A judge covered by this rule shall not use the title "senior judge" or the title "judge" in any form while acting as an arbitrator or mediator.

b. A senior judge shall disclose to the parties if the senior judge has mediated a dispute involving any party or any party's insurer, lawyer, or law firm involved in a case before the senior judge, and any negotiations or agreements for the provision of mediation services between the senior judge and any party or any party's insurer, lawyer, or law firm to a case before the senior judge. A senior judge shall not preside over any case involving a party or a party's insurer, lawyer, or law firm that is using or negotiating to use the senior judge as a mediator, or has used or agreed to use the senior judge as a mediator in the past two years. A senior judge shall not serve as a mediator in any case in which the judge is currently presiding. A senior judge shall not mediate any dispute that is filed in or could be venued or filed in the judicial district or appellate court in which the judge serves. These restrictions cannot be waived by consent of the parties or lawyers. For purposes of this section, mediation includes arbitration and other forms of alternate dispute resolution.

c. At the end of each calendar quarter, a senior judge who has engaged in private mediation or dispute resolution activities during the quarter shall file a report with the clerk of the supreme court. The senior judge shall report the date or time period when the mediation occurred, the county where the mediation occurred, the county in which the dispute arose, the names of the parties, and the names of the lawyers and insurers, if any, involved in the mediation. A senior judge assigned to a judicial district shall provide a copy of the report to the chief judge and to the district court administrator. A senior judge assigned to an appellate court shall provide a copy of the report to the chief judge of the court of appeals or the chief justice, whichever is appropriate, and to the state court administrator. For purposes of this rule, a calendar quarter is a three-month period in the one-year period that commences

on the date a retired judge becomes a senior judge and continues for each successive one-year period while the judge continues to be a senior judge.

[Court Order December 17, 1996, effective January 2, 1997; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; February 27, 2008; October 31, 2008, effective January 1, 2009; April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 22.13 Service by retired judges. No retired judge or retired senior judge shall be eligible for temporary service under the provisions of Iowa Code section 602.1612 after reaching the age of 78. [Court Order September 30, 1987; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.14 Judicial vacation.

22.14(1) Supreme court justices, court of appeals judges, district judges, district associate judges, full-time associate juvenile judges, and full-time associate probate judges are entitled to 22 working days of vacation per calendar year. After 15 years of service with the judicial branch, supreme court justices, court of appeals judges, district judges, district associate judges, full-time associate juvenile judges, and full-time associate probate judges are entitled to 27 working days of vacation per calendar year.

Vacation schedules of district judges, district associate judges, full-time associate juvenile judges, and full-time associate probate judges shall be coordinated through the office of the chief judge of the district. The chief judge shall cause a record to be kept of the amount of vacation taken by each judicial officer in the district. The number of vacation days shall be prorated during the calendar years a judicial officer begins and separates from judicial service.

No more than 27 working days of accrued, unused vacation from a prior year may be carried into a calendar year. Separation from judicial office shall cancel all unused vacation time. No compensation shall be granted for unused vacation time remaining at the time of separation.

22.14(2) Schedules for judicial magistrates should be arranged by the chief judge of each district to accommodate a reasonable vacation period; however, a judicial magistrate shall not be entitled to any specific vacation days for which compensation may be granted, nor may compensation be granted for days not taken prior to separation from judicial service.

[Court Order May 20, 1980; May 23, 1985, effective August 1, 1985; September 18, 1992, effective January 2, 1993; July 26, 1996; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; August 29, 2002; November 22, 2004, effective January 1, 2005]

Rule 22.15 Quasi-judicial business.

22.15(1) Each supreme court justice, court of appeals judge, district judge, district associate judge, full-time associate juvenile judge, and full-time associate probate judge may take up to ten working days per calendar year for the purpose of quasi-judicial business. This right is subject to the ability of the chief judge of each district to make necessary scheduling adjustments to accommodate requests. The ten days shall be prorated during the calendar years a judicial officer begins and separates from judicial service. The chief justice of the supreme court may authorize exceptions to this rule.

22.15(2) “Quasi-judicial business” includes teaching, speaking, attending related educational programs, courses or seminars, and those duties specified in rule 22.16(5)(b)(8) and rule 22.16(5)(b)(13) but does not include time spent on other “official duties” enumerated in rule 22.16(5)(b), or teaching judicial branch educational programs when prior approval is obtained from the chief judge of the appropriate judicial district and chief justice of the supreme court.

[Court Order May 20, 1980; May 23, 1985, effective August 1, 1985; June 28, 1985, effective July 1, 1985; October 24, 1985, effective November 1, 1985; July 26, 1996; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; August 29, 2002]

Rule 22.16 Preaudit travel claims of judiciary — definitions. As used in this rule and rules 22.17 through 22.21:

22.16(1) “*Court employee*” or “*employee of the judicial branch*” means an officer or employee of the judicial branch except for a judicial officer or a court reporter.

22.16(2) “*Court reporter*” means every full-time or temporary court reporter compensated by the judicial branch pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.1502.

22.16(3) “*Judicial officer*” means every justice, judge, district associate judge, senior judge, associate juvenile judge, associate probate judge, judicial hospitalization referee, and magistrate, appointed to serve in the state of Iowa.

22.16(4) “*Official domicile*” means the following:

a. "Court employee's official domicile" means the city, town, or metropolitan area within which the office is located to which that court employee is assigned. Transportation costs between any such employee's permanent home and that person's office, and subsistence within the limits of an employee's official domicile are not reimbursable.

b. "Judicial officer and court reporter's official domicile." By December 15 of each year, the chief judge of the judicial district shall designate a courthouse as an official domicile for each judicial officer and court reporter. The official domicile of a judicial officer and a court reporter shall be the courthouse in the county in which the judge or court reporter works more than 50 percent of the time. When the judge or reporter does not work more than 50 percent of the time in the same courthouse, the judge's or reporter's official domicile shall be a courthouse designated by the chief judge. Notification of the official domicile must be filed with the state court administrator's office.

c. Reserved.

d. For purposes of this definition, the following are official domicile-defining metropolitan areas.

Metropolitan Areas	Inclusions
1. Cedar Rapids	1. Hiawatha Marion
2. Clinton	2. Camanche Elvira Low Moor
3. Council Bluffs	3. Bellevue Bennington Boys Town Carter Lake Elkhorn Irvington LaPlatte LaVista Millard Omaha Papillion Ralston Springfield
4. Davenport	4. Bettendorf East Moline Hampton Milan Moline Pleasant Valley Riverdale Rock Island Silvis
5. Des Moines	5. Polk County
6. Dubuque	6. Asbury Centralia East Dubuque Sageville
7. Iowa City	7. Coralville
8. Mason City	8. Clear Lake
9. Sioux City	9. North Sioux City Sergeant Bluff South Sioux City
10. Waterloo	10. Cedar Falls Evansdale

22.16(5) “*Official duties*” means the following:

a. “*Official duties*” of a court reporter or court employee are the responsibilities and functions contained in the judicial branch job description for the position the individual holds.

b. “*Official duties*” of a judicial officer are the responsibilities and functions customarily and usually pertaining to the office of judge or referee. Subject to Iowa Code section 602.1509, and this rule and rules 22.17 through 22.21, official duties include the following:

(1) Attendance at court sittings and performance of the other work of the court.

(2) Attendance at judicial conferences called under Iowa Code section 602.1203.

(3) Attendance by district judges, district associate judges, associate juvenile judges, associate probate judges, and judicial magistrates at district judicial conferences called by chief judges of the district court.

(4) Attendance to give testimony before committees of the general assembly, at the committees’ request.

(5) Attendance at meetings of judicial nominating commissions as the judicial member of the commission.

(6) Performance of functions as a member of committees or commissions appointed by the supreme court, the chief justice, or a chief judge of the district court on court procedure, administration, or structure.

(7) Attendance at meetings when designated by the chief justice to represent the judicial branch.

(8) If approved in advance by the chief justice: attendance to serve as judge at moot court proceedings for Iowa Law School and Drake Law School not to exceed one attendance per calendar year by any one attending judge; attendance at legal or judicial educational and training sessions and courses outside the state; and attendance at meetings of national associations of chief justices, appellate court justices and judges, trial court judges, and judicial officers of limited jurisdiction.

(9) Performance by chief judges of the district court of their administrative functions.

(10) Attendance by members of the judicial council at meetings of the council and of its committees.

(11) Performance by liaison justices of their functions as such within their assigned judicial districts.

(12) Attendance by district associate judges and judicial magistrates at the Iowa judicial magistrates schools of instruction and traffic court conferences.

(13) Performance of functions for which reimbursement of travel expense is authorized by any other Iowa statute or rule of the supreme court.

[Court Order November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; August 29, 2002; Supervisory Order August 10, 2004]

Rule 22.17 Reimbursable travel.**22.17(1)** *In-state.*

a. Expenses incurred for in-state travel outside the judicial district, except expenses incurred by juvenile court officers in the discharge of their official duties, are not reimbursable unless prior approval for the travel has been given by the chief justice or the chief justice’s designee on a prescribed form. In-state travel for juvenile court officers shall include travel within a 100-mile radius outside the borders of the state of Iowa. Expenses incurred for in-state travel outside the judicial district by juvenile court officers in the discharge of their official duties are not reimbursable unless approval for the travel has been given by the chief juvenile court officer of the judicial district.

b. Reimbursement under this chapter for in-state travel expenses incurred by juvenile court officers in the discharge of their official duties shall be provided from funds administered by the judicial branch or pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.141, as applicable.

22.17(2) *Out-of-state.*

a. Requests to attend conferences, meetings, training courses, programs, and similar gatherings which require out-of-state travel shall be submitted to the chief justice or the chief justice’s designee on a prescribed form at least two weeks prior to the proposed departure date. No reimbursement of out-of-state expenses shall be made unless the trip has received prior approval of the chief justice or the chief justice’s designee except as otherwise provided in this rule.

b. Reimbursement for expenses incurred for out-of-state travel by juvenile court officers in the discharge of their official duties relating to court-ordered transportation and placement shall be

allowed if oral or written approval is given by the chief juvenile court officer of the judicial district and the chief justice or the chief justice's designee at any time prior to the proposed departure.

c. Reimbursement under this chapter for out-of-state travel expenses incurred by juvenile court officers in the discharge of their official duties shall be provided from funds administered by the judicial branch or pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.141, as applicable.

[Court Order November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; August 29, 2002]

Rule 22.18 Transportation.

22.18(1) *Route and conveyance.* Transportation shall be by the usually traveled route. Mileage shall be based on mileage published by the department of transportation. Reimbursement shall be limited to the most economical means of conveyance available.

22.18(2) *Mileage — personal car.* Judicial officers, court reporters, and court employees shall be reimbursed their mileage expense when required in the discharge of official duties to travel outside their official domicile. Reimbursement shall be for the miles driven from the official domicile or employee's residence, whichever is less, to the assigned work location. In no instance shall employees and judicial officers be reimbursed for more than actual miles driven, or for commuting to and from their residence and their official domicile or a courthouse within their county of residence. Carpooling is required whenever possible. A judge and the judge's court reporter shall not be separately reimbursed for duplicate mileage expense in traveling to court assignments. The allowance for use of a private automobile on official judicial branch business shall be established by order¹ of the supreme court and shall be presumed to include all automobile expenses. Additionally, judicial officers, juvenile court officers, court reporters, and court employees shall be reimbursed their mileage expense for travel required in the discharge of official duties within the continuous metropolitan area of their official domicile, but not for commuting.

22.18(3) *Transportation other than private automobile.* Expenses for transportation other than private automobile are reimbursed on an actual incurred cost basis and must be claimed accompanied by an original receipt.

22.18(4) *Reimbursement of parking.* Reimbursement for parking expense is allowable when mileage is claimed. Receipts for parking, taxi and/or other transportation expenses, are not required when the total amount, per day, does not exceed \$15. Receipts must be attached to the travel voucher for employees to receive reimbursement for the above expenses in excess of \$15 per day.

[Court Order November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; August 29, 2002; Supervisory Order August 10, 2004]

Rule 22.19 Lodging.

22.19(1) *In-state.* Lodging expense is reimbursed as incurred when a judicial officer, court reporter, or court employee is required, in the discharge of official duties, to leave the county of that person's official domicile. The name of the establishment where the expense is incurred shall be indicated on the claim form and the original receipt shall be attached. The single room rate is to be noted on the receipt when other than a single room was charged. Special rates for judicial officers, court reporters, and court employees are available at many motels and hotels in the state. An identification card identifying the holder as a judicial officer, court reporter, or court employee is usually necessary. Identification cards are available upon request from the office of the state court administrator. The allowance for lodging shall be the actual cost, but not exceeding \$50 (plus applicable taxes) per day.

Judicial officers and court employees are to seek lodging facilities whose rates are within those prescribed in this rule or a reasonable explanation must be noted in the expense claim in order to be considered for reimbursement over the defined maximum rates. (*See rule 22.21(6)*). When seeking overnight lodging judicial officers and court employees should request the lowest of "state," "government," or "commercial" rates, as many facilities offer these "special" rates which a state employee can and should obtain.

22.19(2) *Out-of-state.* Lodging expense is not limited outside the state, but the incurred expenditures are to be reasonable. Lodging for approved out-of-state travel shall be reimbursed for the night preceding and the night of the ending date of the authorized meeting.

[Court Order November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; June 16, 2006, effective July 1, 2006]

1. 40 cents per mile, Supervisory Order 7/18/07, effective 8/1/07.

Rule 22.20 Meals.

22.20(1) *In-state.* Incurred meal expense shall be reimbursed at “reasonable and necessary” cost when a judicial officer, court reporter, or court employee is required, in the discharge of official duties, to leave the county of that person’s official domicile. A maximum of \$28 per day may be reimbursed for meals, as outlined below; however, if departure from the official domicile is before 6 a.m., a notation must be included on the Travel Voucher. At the return of the trip, if arrival back at the official domicile is after 7 p.m., a notation to this effect must be included on the Travel Voucher. Meal allowance for travel will be as follows:

a. Departure before 6 a.m. and return to official domicile after 7 p.m. may be reimbursed the actual cost for breakfast, lunch, and dinner up to a maximum of \$28.

b. Departure before 6 a.m. and return to official domicile before 7 p.m. may be reimbursed the actual cost for breakfast and lunch up to a maximum of \$13.

c. Departure after 6 a.m. and return to official domicile after 7 p.m. may be reimbursed the actual cost for lunch and dinner up to a maximum of \$23.

d. Departure after 6 a.m. and return to official domicile before 7 p.m. may be reimbursed the actual cost for lunch up to a maximum of \$8.

22.20(2) *Out-of-state.* Meal expenses are not limited out-of-state, but the incurred expenses are to be reasonable. When in travel status, lunch and dinner the day preceding the meeting, and breakfast and lunch the day after a meeting, are reimbursable expenditures.

22.20(3) *Overnight lodging required.* The provisions for meal reimbursement in rules 22.20(1) and 22.20(2) apply only when the travel includes overnight lodging.

[Court Order November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002, May 8, 2006; July 18, 2007, effective August 1, 2007]

Rule 22.21 Miscellaneous travel provisions.

22.21(1) *Continuing education expenses.* Provisions relating to “Official duties,” “Travel,” “Transportation,” “Lodging” and “Meals” as used in rules 22.16 through 22.21 shall not be applicable to expenses for continuing education requirements for court reporters or court employees, unless otherwise ordered by the chief justice or the chief justice’s designee.

22.21(2) *Examining Board expenses.* Board of Law Examiners and Shorthand Reporters Examiners will be reimbursed actual and necessary expenses not to exceed one and one-half times the reimbursement allowances provided in rules 22.19 and 22.20.

22.21(3) *Living outside official domicile.* When additional expense is incurred by reason of a court employee maintaining a permanent home in a city, town, or metropolitan area other than that person’s official domicile, unless otherwise determined by the state court administrator, the additional expense is not reimbursable.

22.21(4) *Registration fees.* Registration fees for authorized meetings and conferences are an allowable expense when accompanied by receipt.

22.21(5) *Claim preparation.* All claims shall be typewritten, or printed in ink, and signed by the claimant. Receipts for lodging, public transportation, and any authorized miscellaneous expenses shall be attached to the upper left-hand corner of the form. Claim for reimbursement for out-of-state travel shall be submitted for payment upon completion of the trip.

If reimbursement is sought pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.141, the district court administrator shall process the claim per rules and procedures of the applicable county and the department of human services.

22.21(6) *Exceptions.* The chief justice or the chief justice’s designee may grant exceptions to rules 22.16 through 22.21 as necessitated by unusual circumstances.

22.21(7) *Refreshments.* The cost of refreshments served at meetings will not be reimbursed, except for educational programs sponsored and authorized by the chief justice or the chief justice’s designee.

22.21(8) Form. A written request for travel authority from the chief justice or the chief justice's designee pursuant to rules 22.16 through 22.21 shall be in substantially the following form:

JUDICIAL BRANCH
REQUEST FOR TRAVEL AUTHORITY

<p>_____ Outside of Iowa _____ In-state, out of Judicial District</p> <p>Name _____ Title _____ Judicial District _____</p> <p>DEPARTURE FROM:</p> <p>TRAVEL DATES (ROUND TRIP):</p> <p>MODE OF TRAVEL:</p> <p>PURPOSE OF TRAVEL: (INCLUDE NATURE AND DATES OF MEETING OR OTHER PURPOSE OF TRAVEL AND JUSTIFICATION FOR PROFESSIONAL PURPOSES)</p> <p>ESTIMATED COST:</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Transportation: Lodging: Meals: Other (Please Specify): Total:</p> <p>Anticipated Funding Source(s):</p> <p>Approved as to form:</p> <p>_____ District Court Administrator (initials) Request Approved/Denied: Request Approved/Denied:</p>	<p>Date _____</p> <p>Form to be submitted to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice's designee prior to proposed departure date. See rules 22.16 to 22.21 for applicable travel and time for submission.</p> <p>DESTINATION:</p> <p>_____ Person requesting approval _____ Supervising authority (when applicable)</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">_____ Chief Judge</td> <td style="width: 50%;">_____ Date</td> </tr> <tr> <td>_____ Chief Justice</td> <td>_____ Date</td> </tr> </table> <p>Supreme Court of Iowa (or Chief Justice's designee)</p>	_____ Chief Judge	_____ Date	_____ Chief Justice	_____ Date
_____ Chief Judge	_____ Date				
_____ Chief Justice	_____ Date				

[Court Order June 11, 1981; November 30, 1981 (Received for publication January 5, 1983); June 28, 1984; June 28, 1985, effective July 1, 1985; October 3, 1985, effective October 15, 1985; May 15, 1986, effective July 1, 1986; November 20, 1986, effective December 1, 1986; July 21, 1988, effective August 1, 1988; October 12, 1989, effective November 1, 1989; November 13, 1990, effective January 2, 1991; January 17, 1991; July 12, 1991, effective July 12, 1991, for expenses on or after January 2, 1991; December 16, 1994, effective December 16, 1994; December 16, 1994, effective January 2, 1995; January 3, 1996; March 21, 1996; July 26, 1996; November 5, 1996; December 21, 1999, effective January 1, 2000; May 26, 2000, effective July 1, 2000; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.22 Gifts.

22.22(1) Judicial officers are not subject to the provisions of this rule, but shall be subject to the gift provisions of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.

22.22(2) Except as otherwise provided in this rule, an employee of the judicial branch or a member of that person's immediate family shall not, directly or indirectly, accept, receive or solicit any gift or series of gifts.

22.22(3) As used in this rule:

a. "Employee" means any employee of the judicial branch other than a judicial officer subject to the gift provisions of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.

b. "Gift" means a rendering of anything of value in return for which legal consideration of equal or greater value is not given or received, if the donor is:

(1) A party or other person involved in a case pending before the donee.

(2) A party or a person seeking to be a party to any sale, purchase, lease or contract involving the judicial branch or any of its offices, if the donee has authority to approve the sale, purchase, lease or contract, or if the donee assists or advises the person with authority to approve the sale, purchase, lease or contract.

(3) A person who will be directly or substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the donee's official duties in a way that is greater than the effect on the public generally or on a substantial class of persons to which the donor belongs as a member of a profession, occupation, industry or region.

c. "Gift" does not include:

(1) Informational material relevant to the employee's duties, such as books, pamphlets, reports, documents or periodicals, or the cost of registration for an education conference or seminar which is relevant to the employee's duties.

(2) Anything received from a person related within the fourth degree of kinship or marriage, unless the donor is acting as an agent or intermediary for another person not so related.

(3) An inheritance or bequest.

(4) Anything available or distributed to the public generally without regard to the official status of the recipient.

(5) Actual expenses of a donee for food, beverages, travel, and lodging, which is given in return for participation at a meeting as a speaker, panel member or facilitator, when the expenses relate directly to the day or days on which the donee participates at the meeting, including necessary travel time.

(6) Plaques or items of negligible resale value given as recognition for public service.

(7) Nonmonetary items with a value of \$3 or less that are received from any one donor during one calendar day.

(8) Items or services solicited by or given to a state, national or regional organization in which the state of Iowa or a political subdivision of the state is a member.

(9) Items or services received as part of a regularly scheduled event that is part of a conference, seminar or other meeting that is sponsored and directed by any state, national or regional organization in which the judicial branch is a member.

(10) Funeral flowers or memorials to a church or nonprofit organization.

(11) Gifts which are given to an employee for the employee's wedding or twenty-fifth or fiftieth wedding anniversary.

d. "Immediate family" means the spouse and minor children of an employee of the judicial branch.

22.22(4) For purposes of determining the value of an item, an individual who gives an item on behalf of more than one person shall not divide the value of the item by the number of persons on whose behalf the item is given and the value shall be the value actually received by the donee.

22.22(5) An employee of the judicial branch or the person's immediate family member, may accept a nonmonetary gift or a series of nonmonetary gifts and not be in violation of this rule if the nonmonetary gift or series of nonmonetary gifts is donated within 30 days to a public body, the state court administrator, the department of general services, or a bona fide educational or charitable organization, if no part of the net earnings of the educational or charitable organization inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or other individual.

[Court Order June 30, 1980; July 31, 1987, effective August 3, 1987; December 29, 1992, effective January 1, 1993; August 19, 1993; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 22.23 Honoraria.

22.23(1) An official or employee of the judicial branch shall not seek or accept an honorarium.

22.23(2) As used in this rule:

a. "Honorarium" means anything of value that is accepted by, or on behalf of, an official or employee of the judicial branch as consideration for an appearance, speech or article if the donor is:

- (1) A party or other person involved in a case pending before the donee.
- (2) A party or person seeking to be a party to any sale, lease, or contract involving the judicial branch or any of its offices, if the donee has authority to approve the sale, lease, or contract or if the donee assists or advises the person with authority to approve the sale, lease, or contract.
- (3) A person who will be directly and substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the donee's official duties in a way that is greater than the effect on the public generally or on a substantial class of persons to which the donor belongs as a member of a profession, occupation, industry or region.

b. "Honorarium" does not include:

- (1) Actual expenses of a donee for food, beverages, travel, lodging and registration which is given in return for participation at a meeting as a speaker, panel member or facilitator when the expenses relate directly to the day or days on which the donee participates at the meeting, including necessary travel time.
- (2) Payment to an employee for services rendered as part of outside employment which has been approved pursuant to the department's personnel policies, if the payment is commensurate with the actual activity or services rendered and not based upon the employee's position within the department, but, rather, because of some special expertise or other qualification.
- (3) Payment to a judge or magistrate for officiating and making return for a marriage pursuant to rule 22.29.
- (4) Payment to a judge or senior judge for instruction at an accredited education institution, if the payment is commensurate with the actual activity or services rendered and not based upon the judge's official position.
- (5) Payment to a part-time judge for services rendered as part of a bona fide business or profession in which the judge is engaged, if the payment is commensurate with the actual activity or services rendered and not based upon the judge's official position.
- (6) Payment to a senior judge for services rendered as an arbitrator or mediator, if the payment is commensurate with the actual activity or services rendered and not based upon the senior judge's official position. [Court Order December 29, 1992, effective January 1, 1993; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.24 Interests in public contracts.

22.24(1) A full-time official or employee of the judicial branch shall not sell any goods or services to any state agency.

22.24(2) As used in this rule, "services" does not include any of the following:

a. Instruction at an accredited education institution by a judge, senior judge or magistrate if permitted as a quasi-judicial or extrajudicial activity pursuant to the Code of Judicial Conduct or by an employee as part of outside employment which has been approved pursuant to the judicial branch's personnel policies.

b. The preparation of a transcript by an official court reporter.

[Court Order December 29, 1992, effective January 1, 1993; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; August 29, 2002]

Rule 22.25 Services against the state.

22.25(1) No official or employee of the judicial branch shall receive, directly or indirectly, or enter into an agreement, express or implied, for any compensation, in whatever form, for the appearance or rendition of services against the interest of the state in relation to any case, proceeding, application, or other matter before any state agency, any court of the state of Iowa, any federal court, or any federal bureau, agency, commission or department.

22.25(2) As used in this rule, "appearance or service against the interest of the state" means an appearance or service which conflicts with a person's duties or employment obligations owed to the state.

[Court Order December 29, 1992, effective January 1, 1993; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.26 Personal disclosure.

22.26(1) Each official shall file a statement of personal financial disclosure in the manner provided in this rule. The disclosure must be filed even if there is no financial information to report. The disclosure must contain:

a. A list of each business, occupation, or profession (other than employment by the judicial branch) in which the person is engaged and the nature of that business, occupation, or profession, unless already apparent.

b. A list of any sources of income (other than income from employment by the judicial branch) if the source produces more than one thousand dollars annually in gross income. "Sources of income" includes those sources which are held jointly with one or more persons and which in total generate more than \$1000 of income. "Jointly" means the ownership of the income source is undivided among the owners and all owners have one and the same interest in an undivided possession, each with full rights of use and enjoyment of the total income. Sources of income that are co-owned but with ownership interests that are legally divisible, without full rights of use or enjoyment of the total income, need not be reported unless the person's portion of the income from that source exceeds \$1000. For purposes of this rule, income earned solely by the spouse of a person subject to reporting is not income to that person and need not be reported as a source of income.

Sources of income listed pursuant to this rule may be listed under any of the following categories:

- (1) Securities.
- (2) Instruments of financial institutions.
- (3) Trusts.
- (4) Real estate.
- (5) Retirement systems.
- (6) Other income categories specified in state and federal income tax regulations.

22.26(2) The statement of personal financial disclosure shall be reported on forms adopted by the supreme court and shall be filed with the clerk of the supreme court on or by the first day of April each year or no later than 30 days after assuming office. The statement of personal financial disclosure forms shall be retained for a period of two years.

[Court Order December 29, 1992, effective January 1, 1993; Statement required April 1, 1994; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; November 22, 2004]

Rule 22.27 Definitions. As used in rules 22.22 to 22.26:

22.27(1) "*Employee*" means a paid employee of the state of Iowa, including independent contractors, and does not include a member of a board, commission, or committee.

22.27(2) "*Official*" means an officer of the judicial branch performing judicial functions, including an associate juvenile judge, a magistrate or referee, an associate probate judge, and the state court administrator, and does not include a member of a board, commission, or committee.

[Court Order December 29, 1992, effective January 1, 1993; July 26, 1996; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.28 Transcripts — rates for transcribing a court reporter's official notes.

22.28(1) Pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.3202, the maximum compensation of shorthand reporters for transcribing their official notes shall be as follows:

a. Ordinary transcript (a transcript of all or part of the proceedings) - \$3.50 per page for the original and one copy to the party ordering the original and 50 cents per page for each additional copy.

b. Expedited transcript (a transcript of all or part of the proceedings to be delivered within seven calendar days after receipt of an order) - \$4.50 per page for the original and one copy to the party ordering the original and 75 cents per page for each additional copy.

c. Daily transcript (a transcript of all or part of the proceedings to be delivered following adjournment for the day and prior to the normal opening hour of the court on the following morning whether or not it actually is a court day) - \$5.50 per page for the original and one copy to the party ordering the original and \$1.00 per page for each additional copy.

d. Unedited transcript (an unedited draft transcript produced as a byproduct of realtime or computer aided transcription software to be delivered on electronic media or paper) - \$2.25 per page for the original and 25 cents per page for each copy. The unedited disk or printed draft transcript shall not be certified and may not be used to contradict the official district court transcript.

e. Realtime transcript (an unedited draft transcript produced by a certified realtime reporter as a byproduct of realtime to be delivered electronically during proceedings for viewing and retention) -

\$2.75 per page for the original and \$1.00 per page for each copy. The unedited text of the proceedings shall not be certified and may not be used to contradict the official district court transcript. Litigants who order realtime services, and subsequently order an original certified transcript of the same proceeding, will not receive credit toward the purchase cost of the certified transcript. Only certified realtime reporters may be compensated for such transcripts.

22.28(2) These rates of compensation shall apply to each separate page of transcript even if they are produced in a condensed transcript format.

22.28(3) These rates of compensation shall be the same whether the transcript is produced in an electronic or paper format. A certified transcript may be sold in an electronic format only if a paper transcript is produced, certified, and filed with the clerk of court for the records of the court or delivered to the custodial attorney. No additional charge is permitted for an ASCII disk or other form of electronic media when it accompanies a paper transcript.

22.28(4) Court reporters are only required to prepare ordinary transcripts. They may, but are not required to, produce the types of transcripts described in rule 22.28(1)(b-e).

22.28(5) An official court reporter shall file with the state court administrator a report that discloses the compensation received and the expenses paid by the reporter for the production of transcripts and copies of transcripts of court proceedings during the reporting period. This report shall include the following information for each transcript or copy of a transcript:

a. The caption, county, and number of the case in which the court reporter produced the transcript or copy.

b. The person, government body, or entity that paid for the transcript or copy.

c. The amount received for the transcript or copy.

d. The number of pages of the transcript or copy.

e. Whether the transcript was requested pursuant to rule 6.803.

f. The expenses paid by the court reporter directly related to the cost of preparing the original or copies of the transcript, including paper, copying services, transcription services, audio tapes, binding services, and materials and shipping and postage.

22.28(6) In addition to the information required by rule 22.28(5), the report shall disclose the expenses paid by the court reporter for equipment and software, including computers, laptop computers, audio recorders, stands, printers, and related accessories used to produce transcripts and copies of transcripts. Software includes application software necessary for the operation of court reporting equipment and the production of notes and a transcript of official court proceedings, annual updates to court reporting application software, and the support and maintenance of court reporting application software.

22.28(7) The reporter shall electronically file the report required by this rule every six months on forms approved by the supreme court. The report for the months of January through June shall be filed by the first day of August of that year and for the months of July through December by the first day of February of the following year. The information required by rule 22.28(6) shall be reported annually in the February report and shall include expenses incurred in the preceding calendar year. A reporter's first report should disclose expenses for equipment and software purchased prior to, but used during, the reporting period. If a reporter ceases employment, the report required by this rule shall be filed within 30 days of cessation of employment.

22.28(8) These reporting requirements apply to all types of transcripts described in rule 22.28(1)(a) to (e). The state court administrator shall retain the reports required by this rule for a minimum of two years. These reports shall be public information.

[Court Order March 15, 2007; November 9, 2009]

Rule 22.29 Marriage fees received by a judicial officer.

22.29(1) A judge or magistrate may charge a fee for officiating and making return for each marriage solemnized at a time other than regular judicial working hours and at a place other than a court facility. This fee shall not exceed the sum of \$200.

22.29(2) A judge or magistrate may charge the parties to the marriage for expenses incurred in solemnizing the marriage. In no event shall the expenses charged exceed the maximum amounts set by rules 22.16 through 22.21.

22.29(3) The phrase “regular judicial working hours,” for purposes of this rule, shall mean 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday through Friday (except for legal holidays) for all judicial officers except magistrates, and for them the schedule fixed by the chief judge of the judicial district.
[Court Order July 1, 1983; received for publication April 2, 1984; September 17, 1984; Court Order July 7, 1994, effective January 3, 1995; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; March 16, 2006]

Rule 22.30 Use of signature facsimile.

22.30(1) In all instances where a law of this state requires a written signature by a justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of appeals, district judge, district associate judge, judicial magistrate, clerk of the district court, county attorney, court reporter, associate juvenile judge, associate probate judge, judicial hospitalization referee, probate referee, or law enforcement officer, any such officer may use, or direct and authorize a designee to possess and use, a facsimile signature stamp bearing that officer’s signature or an electronically scanned signature of the officer pursuant to the provisions of this rule.

22.30(2) Whether used personally by the officer whose signature it bears or by a designee of that officer, a facsimile signature stamp or electronically scanned signature must contain a true facsimile of the actual signature of that officer. The stamp or electronically scanned signature shall be kept in the secure possession of the officer or that officer’s designee at all times, accessible only to the officer or the officer’s designee.

22.30(3) An officer directing and authorizing a designee to possess and use a facsimile signature stamp or electronically scanned signature bearing that officer’s signature shall execute a written designation of the authorization. The designation shall be addressed to the designee, by name or title, and shall specifically identify each category of documents to which the designee is authorized to affix the stamp or electronically scanned signature. The original of the written designation shall be filed with the district court administrator in the judicial district within which the officer is located; appellate judges and justices shall file their original designations with the clerk of the supreme court. A copy of the written designation shall be retained by the officer and by the designee.

22.30(4) A written designation made by an officer pursuant to rule 22.30(3) may be revoked, in writing, at any time by the officer who executed it, and shall stand automatically revoked upon that officer’s ceasing to hold the office for any reason. A written revocation of designation shall be addressed to the former designee, in the same manner as the original designation. A copy of the written revocation shall be retained by the officer and by the former designee. A facsimile signature stamp in the possession of a former designee shall be forthwith returned to the officer who issued it, if available, or shall be destroyed by the former designee. A revoked electronically scanned signature shall be deleted.

22.30(5) Nothing contained in this rule shall abrogate any provision of Iowa Code section 4.1(39).
[Court Order May 17, 1984; July 25, 1986, effective September 2, 1986; June 22, 1987, effective August 3, 1987; July 26, 1996; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; June 3, 2009; March 9, 2010]

Rule 22.31 Juror compensation.

22.31(1) Compensation for a juror’s first seven days of attendance and service on a case shall be \$30 per day, including attendance required for the purpose of being considered for service.

22.31(2) When a juror’s attendance and service on a case exceed seven days, the rate of compensation shall be \$50 for each day after the seventh day.

22.31(3) For purposes of juror compensation, the days of attendance and service do not have to be consecutive.

[Court Order September 25, 2006; October 22, 2007]

Rule 22.32 Magistrates — annual school of instruction. Each magistrate shall be required to attend a judicial branch school of instruction prior to taking office and annually thereafter unless excused by the chief justice for good cause. A magistrate appointed to fill a vacancy shall attend the first school of instruction that is held following the appointment, unless excused by the chief justice for good cause.

[Court Order September 23, 1985, effective October 15, 1985; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; August 29, 2002]

Rule 22.33 Nepotism. No judicial officer or employee of the judicial branch shall appoint, or continue to employ any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree. This

prohibition shall apply to any employment where a direct supervisory relationship exists between the judicial officer or employee and the person supervised.

In the event an employment situation exists within the judicial branch which is consistent with Iowa Code chapter 71 but inconsistent with this rule, the supervisor shall terminate the employment relationship prior to March 15, 1986. Every effort shall be made by the judicial branch to relocate within the branch any individual who is dismissed as a result of this rule.

[Court Order January 22, 1986, effective February 3, 1986; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002; August 29, 2002]

Rule 22.34 Judicial branch appointments. It is a policy of the judicial branch that all boards, commissions, and committees to which appointments are made or confirmed by any part of the judicial branch shall reflect, as much as possible, a gender balance. If there are multiple appointing authorities for a board, commission, or committee, they shall consult with each other to avoid contravention of this policy.

[Court Order June 30, 1986, effective July 1, 1986; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.35 Service copies.

22.35(1) After April 1, 1988, the clerk of court shall not make a part of the court file, or otherwise retain in the clerk's office, service copies of pleadings, orders, or writs.

22.35(2) "Service copy" means the copy of the pleading, order, or writ attached to either the return of service or the document proving service.

22.35(3) All returns of service shall specify what pleading, order, or writ was served. Returns of service of an original notice shall certify that a copy of the petition was served with the notice pursuant to Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.302.

[Court Order January 29, 1988, effective March 1, 1988; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.36 Paper size and requested copies.

22.36(1) Paper size. All pleadings and other papers filed in the Iowa district courts and their small claims divisions shall be on 8½ inch by 11 inch size white paper of standard weight, with a margin of at least one inch at the top of each page. Exhibits attached to pleadings shall be of the same size as pleadings, reduced from their original size if necessary. Original documents, including wills, bonds, notes, foreclosed mortgages, and real estate contracts, may be filed on longer paper. Uniform Citation forms and other court forms smaller than 8½ by 11 inches shall be accepted for filing. The clerks of court shall not accept filings which do not substantially comply with this rule.

22.36(2) Requested copies. If counsel or any party requests file-stamped copies of pleadings or other papers to be returned by mail, an extra copy and a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope, large enough to accommodate the copy being returned, must be included with the filing. No copy shall be returned by mail unless this rule is followed.

[Court Order May 12, 1989, effective July 3, 1989; March 20, 1991, effective July 1, 1991; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.37 Purging of case files.

22.37(1) Each clerk of the district court may purge civil case files ten years after final disposition. For purposes of this rule and rule 22.38, civil case files do not include juvenile, mental health, probate, or adoption proceedings. Each district court clerk may purge criminal case files ten years after dismissal of all charges, or ten years after the expiration of all sentences imposed or the date probation is granted, whichever later occurs. For purposes of this rule and rule 22.38, "purging" means the removal and destruction of documents in the case file which have no legal, administrative or historical value. The documents are to be retained or discarded in accordance with the purging lists in rule 22.38.

22.37(2) Purging shall be done prior to reproduction of an entire court file in preparation for destruction under Iowa Code section 602.8103. A file shall be purged only once, pursuant to the provisions of this rule in effect at the time of purging.

22.37(3) Each clerk of the district court shall designate either the clerk or a deputy as the "Records Management Specialist." The records management specialist shall be responsible for implementing office procedures for records management and retention, including the implementation of this rule. The records management specialist shall be the local supervisor who will answer questions about purging any documents not on the lists provided in rule 22.38. Any question not answerable by the

records management specialist shall be referred to the district court administrator, who may refer questions to the state court administrator.

22.37(4) The district court clerk need not give notice to any agency, attorney, party, or other group before purging any files under this rule and rule 22.38. Any government agency, historical society, group, or person may request and obtain any or all purged documents upon making written request to the local district court clerk, and tendering payment therefor. District court clerks shall cooperate with reasonable requests of local and state historical societies when implementing purging operations.

22.37(5) Case files will be excepted from this rule only upon court order signed by a majority of the district judges of that district. The order may prohibit purging specific court files in whole or part, and must state the reason for the prohibition.

22.37(6) Purging of case files in proceedings involving parental notification of a minor's abortion under Iowa Code chapter 135L shall be in accordance with Iowa Ct. R. 8.32(3).

22.37(7) Orders appointing condemnation commissioners shall be retained for five years and then destroyed without reproduction.

22.37(8) One year after filing, district court clerks may destroy, without reproduction, "Confidential Information Forms" filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.6111.

[Court Order November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.38 Purging of case files — lists.

22.38(1) Civil case files.

(A) Retain in files:

- (1) Original notice.
- (2) Petition.
- (3) Return of service—affidavit of publication, certificate of state official (long arm/nonresident motorist, foreign corporations).
- (4) Answer.
- (5) Cross-petition.
- (6) Answer to cross-petition.
- (7) Counterclaim.
- (8) Signed orders (original signed by judge).
- (9) Decisions or decrees of court opinions.
- (10) Amended pleadings (see nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, or 7).
- (11) Writs issued (return of service).
- (12) Entry of judgment.
- (13) Dismissal.
- (14) Jury verdict form (signed).
- (15) Notice of appeal.
- (16) Procedendo from clerk of supreme court.
- (17) Agreement for judgment.
- (18) Offer to confess judgment.
- (19) Acceptance of offer to confess judgment.
- (20) Execution/special execution.
- (21) Return on execution/sheriff's sale.
- (22) Stipulations.
- (23) Partial satisfactions.
- (24) Special appearance.
- (25) Claim for return of seized property.
- (26) Application for forfeiture of seized property.
- (27) Release and/or satisfaction.

(B) Discard from files (EXCEPT in those cases excluded in rule 22.37(1)):

- (1) All duplicates of original documents.
- (2) Bonds.

- (3) Motions/Applications:
 - (a) Amend
 - (b) Change venue
 - (c) Dismiss/demurrer
 - (d) Strike
 - (e) Quash
 - (f) More specific statement
 - (g) Summary judgment
 - (h) Consolidation
 - (i) Stay
 - (j) Compel
 - (k) Sanctions
 - (l) New trial
 - (m) Reconsideration
 - (n) Enlarge and amend
 - (o) Continuance
 - (p) Consolidate or sever
 - (q) Judgment notwithstanding verdict
 - (r) Examinations of judgment debtor
 - (s) Substitute party
 - (t) Withdrawal of attorney
 - (u) Condemn funds
 - (v) Citation for contempt
- (4) Response to any motion.
- (5) Briefs.
- (6) Notice of deposition.
- (7) Deposition transcripts.
- (8) Interrogatories and answers.
- (9) Notice of interrogatories.
- (10) Request for production.
- (11) Response to request for production.
- (12) Request for admissions and responses.
- (13) Pretrial compliance reports.
- (14) Trial certificates.
- (15) Objections to trial certificate.
- (16) Subpoenas.
- (17) Proposed jury instructions.
- (18) Witness lists; exhibits lists.
- (19) Correspondence.
- (20) Directions to sheriff for service.
- (21) Demand for jury trial.
- (22) Certificate of reporters re: costs of or taking deposition.
- (23) Order condemning funds.
- (24) Scheduling order or notices.
- (25) Orders that only set hearings.
- (26) Strike list notices.
- (27) Warrant for arrest of contemnor.
- (28) Entry of default.
- (29) Jury instructions.
- (30) Receipts for exhibits.
- (31) Praecipe.

- (32) Affidavit of amount due.
- (33) Affidavit of payments made.

22.38(2) Criminal case files.

(A) Retain in files:

- (1) Trial information and minutes of testimony.
- (2) Indictment.
- (3) Amended trial information.
- (4) Written plea of guilty.
- (5) Opinion or decision of court.
- (6) All orders of court, except those only setting a hearing.
- (7) Jury instructions.
- (8) Jury verdict (signed).
- (9) Notice of appeal.
- (10) Procedendo from clerk of supreme court.
- (11) Notice of dismissal of appeal.
- (12) Judgment entry.
- (13) Sentencing entry.
- (14) Presentence investigation report and associated reports.

(B) Discard from files (EXCEPT in those cases excluded in rule 22.37(1)):

- (1) All duplicates of original documents.
- (2) All copies and originals of jail booking forms and receipts.
- (3) All subpoenas issued and returned.
- (4) Written stipulations.
- (5) Warrant for arrest.
- (6) Return on warrant.
- (7) Bail bonds.
- (8) Recognizance agreements to appear.
- (9) Written arraignment.
- (10) Motions:
 - (a) To suppress and response
 - (b) Change of venue and response
 - (c) Limine and response
 - (d) To dismiss and response
 - (e) To sever trial and response
 - (f) Bill of particulars and response
 - (g) To amend trial information
 - (h) For appointment of counsel
 - (i) For withdrawal of counsel
 - (j) To determine competency
 - (k) To consolidate trial
 - (l) For continuance
 - (m) To correct sentence
 - (n) Reduction of bail or review conditions of release
 - (o) To revoke bail or pretrial release
 - (p) To forfeit bail
 - (q) To compel
- (11) Orders that only set hearings.
- (12) Briefs.
- (13) Proposed or requested jury instructions.
- (14) Pretrial conference reports, minutes, or orders.

- (15) Notices of depositions.
- (16) Scheduling notices.
- (17) Requests for transcripts.
- (18) Registered mail receipt cards or letters returned.
- (19) Receipts for evidence.
- (20) Correspondence from attorneys.
- (21) Nonsubstantive correspondence from defendants.
- (22) Application to revoke probation, or to adjudicate guilt, or to revoke deferred judgment.
- (23) Magistrate's transcript.
- (24) Complaint forms.
- (25) Media coordinator requests.
- (26) Appearance of attorney.
- (27) Witness lists.
- (28) Notice of special defense, (i.e., insanity, intoxication, alibi, duress, etc.)
- (29) Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.14(2)(a), disclosure required upon receipt (Notice).
- (30) Application for search warrant.
- (31) Return on search warrant.

22.38(3) Divorce/Dissolution of Marriage/Separate Maintenance/Child Support and Paternity case files.

(A) Retain in files:

- (1) Original notice.
- (2) Petition for divorce, separate maintenance, dissolution of marriage, child support, or to determine paternity.
- (3) Return of service—affidavit of publication.
- (4) Acceptance of service.
- (5) Answer.
- (6) Cross-petition.
- (7) Answer to cross-petition.
- (8) Signed orders (original signed by judge).
- (9) Decrees or decisions of court.
- (10) Amended pleadings (see nos. 2, 5, 6, or 7).
- (11) Writs issued (return of service).
- (12) Entry of default.
- (13) Dismissal.
- (14) Notice of appeal.
- (15) Procedendo from clerk of supreme court.
- (16) Paternity test results.
- (17) Petition or application for modification.
- (18) Answer to petition or application for modification.
- (19) Order for temporary support or temporary custody.
- (20) Stipulations.
- (21) Execution/special execution.
- (22) Satisfaction/partial satisfaction.
- (23) Appearance by attorney or party.
- (24) Assignments of judgments and terminations of assignments.
- (25) Financial affidavits.
- (26) Child support worksheets.
- (27) Confidential information required under Iowa Code section 598.22B.

(B) Discard from files:

- (1) All duplicates of original documents.
- (2) Bonds.
- (3) Motions/applications:
 - (a) Amend
 - (b) Change venue
 - (c) Dismiss/demurrer
 - (d) Strike
 - (e) Quash
 - (f) More specific statement
 - (g) Stay
 - (h) Compel
 - (i) Sanctions
 - (j) New trial
 - (k) Reconsideration
 - (l) Enlarge and amend (Iowa R. Civ.P. 1.904(2))
 - (m) Continuance
 - (n) Examinations of judgment debtor
 - (o) Withdrawal of attorney
 - (p) Condemn funds
 - (q) Citation for contempt
- (4) Response to any motion.
- (5) Briefs.
- (6) Notice of deposition.
- (7) Depositions transcripts.
- (8) Interrogatories and answers to interrogatories.
- (9) Notice of interrogatories.
- (10) Requests for production.
- (11) Response to requests for production.
- (12) Requests for admissions and responses.
- (13) Trial certificates.
- (14) Objections to trial certificates.
- (15) Subpoenas.
- (16) Correspondence.
- (17) Directions to sheriff for service.
- (18) Certificate of reporters re: costs of or taking depositions.
- (19) Order condemning funds.
- (20) Scheduling order or notices.
- (21) Orders that only set hearings.
- (22) Warrant for arrest of contemnor.
- (23) Strike list notices.
- (24) Receipts for exhibits.
- (25) Proof of service by Child Support Recovery Unit.
- (26) Certificate of completion of parent education program.

[Court Order February 17, 1989, effective April 15, 1989; July 26, 1996; October 3, 1997; November 25, 1998; October 27, 1999; November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002]

Rule 22.39 Staffing offices of clerks of court. The supreme court shall allocate staff to the clerk of court office in each county. The court shall take into account workload and availability of funds for state court operations. The court shall set the business hours of each office. To facilitate case processing, the court may allow each office of the clerk of court to operate without being open to the

public for a portion of each day the office is open for business to enable an office to process its work without interruption.

[Court Order November 12, 2009]

Rule 22.40 Public business hours of offices of clerks of court. For purposes of Iowa Code section 4.1(34), the word “day” means the period of time defined by the public business hours of an office of the clerk of court as established by order of the supreme court. If the supreme court has by order closed an office of the clerk of court for an entire day, that day shall be treated as a holiday or a weekend. Nothing in this rule shall prevent a party from filing with the court pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(5).

[Court Order November 12, 2009]

CHAPTER 32

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CHAPTER 32

IOWA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

PREAMBLE AND SCOPE

PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.

[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.

[3] In addition to these representational functions, a lawyer may serve as a third-party neutral, a nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other matter. Some of these rules apply directly to lawyers who are or have served as third-party neutrals. *See, e.g.*, rules 32:1.12 and 32:2.4. In addition, there are rules that apply to lawyers who are not active in the practice of law or to practicing lawyers even when they are acting in a nonprofessional capacity. For example, a lawyer who commits fraud in the conduct of a business is subject to discipline for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. *See* rule 32:8.4.

[4] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt, and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

[5] A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers, and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.

[6] As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice, and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law, and work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer should further the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.

[7] Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession, and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service.

[8] A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done. So also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest

because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their communications will be private.

[9] In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system, and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the rules. These principles include the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous, and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.

[10] The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.

[11] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice.

[12] The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to ensure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.

[13] Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.

SCOPE

[14] The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not." These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas under the rules in which the lawyer has discretion to exercise professional judgment. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion. Other rules define the nature of relationships between the lawyer and others. The rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's professional role. Many of the comments use the term "should." Comments do not add obligations to the rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the rules.

[15] The rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers, and substantive and procedural law in general. The comments are sometimes used to alert lawyers to their responsibilities under such other law.

[16] Compliance with the rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion, and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.

[17] Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under rule 32:1.6, that attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established. *See* rule 32:1.18. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact.

[18] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory, and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. These rules do not abrogate any such authority.

[19] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors, and whether there have been previous violations.

[20] Violation of a rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. In addition, violation of a rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the rule. Nevertheless, since the rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.

[21] The comment accompanying each rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative.

Rule 32:1.0: TERMINOLOGY

(a) "*Belief*" or "*believes*" denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances.

(b) "*Confirmed in writing*," when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. *See* paragraph (e) for the definition of "informed consent." If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.

(c) "*Firm*" or "*law firm*" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship, or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.

(d) "*Fraud*" or "*fraudulent*" denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.

(e) "*Informed consent*" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and

reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.

(f) “*Knowingly*,” “*known*,” or “*knows*” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.

(g) “*Partner*” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, or a member of an association authorized to practice law.

(h) “*Reasonable*” or “*reasonably*” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.

(i) “*Reasonable belief*” or “*reasonably believes*” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.

(j) “*Reasonably should know*” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.

(k) “*Screened*” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.

(l) “*Substantial*” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.

(m) “*Tribunal*” denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding, or a legislative body, administrative agency, or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency, or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular matter.

(n) “*Writing*” or “*written*” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or videorecording, and e-mail. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.

Comment

Confirmed in Writing

[1] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client’s informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter.

Firm

[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (c) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another.

[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates.

[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules.

Fraud

[5] When used in these rules, the terms “fraud” or “fraudulent” refer to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform.

Informed Consent

[6] Many of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. *See, e.g.,* rules 32:1.2(c), 32:1.6(a), 32:1.7(b), 32:1.9(a), 32:1.11(a), 32:1.12(a), and 32:1.18(d). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct, and a discussion of the client’s or other person’s options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent.

[7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client’s or other person’s silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of rules require that a person’s consent be confirmed in writing. *See* rules 32:1.7(b), 32:1.9(a), 32:1.11(a), 32:1.12(a), and 32:1.18(d). For a definition of “writing” and “confirmed in writing,” see paragraphs (n) and (b). Other rules require that a client’s consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. *See, e.g.,* rules 32:1.8(a) and (g). For a definition of “signed,” see paragraph (n).

Screened

[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under rule 32:1.11, 32:1.12, or 32:1.18.

[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce, and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with

other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter, and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel.

[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

Rule 32:1.1: COMPETENCE

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

Comment

Legal Knowledge and Skill

[1] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter, and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances.

[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence, and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.

[3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest.

[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. *See also* rule 32:6.2.

Thoroughness and Preparation

[5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer and the client regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible. *See* rule 32:1.2(c).

Maintaining Competence

[6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, engage in continuing study and education, and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.2: SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION AND ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER

(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by rule 32:1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify.

(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social, or moral views or activities.

(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.

(1) The client's informed consent must be confirmed in writing unless:

(i) the representation of the client consists solely of telephone consultation;

(ii) the representation is provided by a lawyer employed by a nonprofit legal services program or participating in a nonprofit or court-annexed legal services program and the lawyer's representation consists solely of providing information and advice or the preparation of court-approved legal forms; or

(iii) the court appoints the attorney for a limited purpose that is set forth in the appointment order.

(2) If the client gives informed consent in a writing signed by the client, there shall be a presumption that:

(i) the representation is limited to the attorney and the services described in the writing; and

(ii) the attorney does not represent the client generally or in any matters other than those identified in the writing.

(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.

Comment*Allocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer*

[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See rule 32:1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by rule 32:1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.

[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal, and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be

applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. *See* rule 32:1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. *See* rule 32:1.16(a)(3).

[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to rule 32:1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time.

[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to rule 32:1.14.

Independence from Client's Views or Activities

[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities.

Agreements Limiting Scope of Representation

[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent.

[7] Although this rule affords the lawyer and client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. *See* rule 32:1.1.

[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. *See, e.g.,* rules 32:1.1, 32:1.8, and 32:5.6.

Criminal, Fraudulent, and Prohibited Transactions

[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.

[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. *See* rule 32:1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the

lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. *See* rule 32:4.1.

[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary.

[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent avoidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities.

[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. *See* rule 32:1.4(a)(5).

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005; March 12, 2007]

Rule 32:1.3: DILIGENCE

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

Comment

[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction, or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. *See* rule 32:1.2. The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect. *See* Iowa Ct. R. ch. 33.

[2] A lawyer's work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.

[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client.

[4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in rule 32:1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and the lawyer and the client have not agreed that the lawyer will handle the matter on appeal, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter. *See* rule 32:1.4(a)(2). Whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client or other applicable law. *See* rule 32:1.2. *See, e.g.,* Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.29(6); Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.102(1)(b) and 6.201, 6.109(4) and 6.109(5).

[5] To prevent neglect of client matters in the event of a sole practitioner's death or disability, the duty of diligence may require that each sole practitioner prepare a plan, in conformity with applicable rules, that designates another competent lawyer to review client files, notify each client of the lawyer's death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protective action. *See* Iowa

Ct. Rs. 35.16(6), 35.17 (where reasonable necessity exists, the local chief judge shall appoint a lawyer to serve as trustee to inventory files, sequester client funds, and take any other appropriate action to protect the interests of the clients and other affected persons of a deceased, suspended, or disabled lawyer).

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.4: COMMUNICATION

(a) A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in rule 32:1.0(e), is required by these rules;

(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;

(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;

(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and

(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Comment

[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.

Communicating with Client

[2] If these rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a)(1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. *See* rule 32:1.2(a).

[3] Paragraph (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. The lawyer should also discuss relevant provisions of the Standards for Professional Conduct and indicate the lawyer's intent to follow those Standards whenever possible. *See* Iowa Ct. R. ch. 33. In some situations—depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client—this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation.

[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a)(4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. Client telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged.

Explaining Matters

[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part

on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, when there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in rule 32:1.0(e).

[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. *See* rule 32:1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. *See* rule 32:1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client.

Withholding Information

[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 32:3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.5: FEES

(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses, or violate any restrictions imposed by law. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial, or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for

which the client will be liable whether or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:

(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or

(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:

(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;

(2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and

(3) the total fee is reasonable.

Comment

Reasonableness and Legality of Fee and Expenses

[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer. A fee that is otherwise reasonable may be subject to legal limitations, of which the lawyer should be aware. For example, a lawyer must comply with restrictions imposed by statute or court rule on the timing and amount of fees in probate.

Basis or Rate of Fee

[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to fees and expenses must be promptly established. Generally, it is desirable to furnish the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements that states the general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate, or total amount of the fee, and whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any costs, expenses, or disbursements in the course of the representation. A written statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding.

[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable, or may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis for the fee. Applicable law also may apply to situations other than a contingent fee, for example, government regulations regarding fees in certain tax matters.

Terms of Payment

[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. *See rule 32:1.16(d).* A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to rule 32:1.8(i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of rule 32:1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client.

[5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.

Prohibited Contingent Fees

[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony, or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns.

Division of Fee

[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a fee either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes responsibility for the representation as a whole. In addition, the client must agree to the arrangement, including the share that each lawyer is to receive, and the agreement must be confirmed in writing. Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and must otherwise comply with paragraph (c) of this rule. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership. A lawyer should only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter. *See* rule 32:1.1.

[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm.

Disputes over Fees

[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b) or required by paragraph (c).

(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

- (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;**
- (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services;**
- (3) to prevent, mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of**

another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;

(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these rules;

(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or

(6) to comply with other law or a court order.

(c) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent imminent death or substantial bodily harm.

Comment

[1] This rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representation of a client during the lawyer's representation of the client. See rule 32:1.18 for the lawyer's duties with respect to information provided to the lawyer by a prospective client, rule 32:1.9(c)(2) for the lawyer's duty not to reveal information relating to the lawyer's prior representation of a former client, and rules 32:1.8(b) and 32:1.9(c)(1) for the lawyer's duties with respect to the use of such information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients.

[2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation. See rule 32:1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.

[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. *See also* Scope.

[4] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer's use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved.

Authorized Disclosure

[5] Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation. In some situations, for example, a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers.

Permissive Disclosure Adverse to Client

[6] Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered in the near future or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat. Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town's water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims.

[7] Paragraph (b)(2) is a limited exception to the rule of confidentiality that permits the lawyer to reveal information to the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud, as defined in rule 32:1.0(d), that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services. Such a serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits the protection of this rule. The client can, of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct. Although paragraph (b)(2) does not require the lawyer to reveal the client's misconduct, the lawyer may not counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See rule 32:1.2(d). See also rule 32:1.16 with respect to the lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw from the representation of the client in such circumstances, and rule 32:1.13(c), which permits the lawyer, where the client is an organization, to reveal information relating to the representation in limited circumstances.

[8] Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the situation in which the lawyer does not learn of the client's crime or fraud until after it has been consummated. Although the client no longer has the option of preventing disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct, there will be situations in which the loss suffered by the affected person can be prevented, rectified, or mitigated. In such situations, the lawyer may disclose information relating to the representation to the extent necessary to enable the affected persons to prevent or mitigate reasonably certain losses or to attempt to recoup their losses. Paragraph (b)(3) does not apply when a person who has committed a crime or fraud thereafter employs a lawyer for representation concerning that offense.

[9] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct.

[10] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal, disciplinary, or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(5) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend also applies, of course, where a proceeding has been commenced.

[11] A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(5) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary.

[12] Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information about a client. Whether such a law supersedes rule 32:1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of these rules. When disclosure of information relating to the representation appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must

discuss the matter with the client to the extent required by rule 32:1.4. If, however, the other law supersedes this rule and requires disclosure, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to make such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.

[13] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the representation of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel the disclosure. Absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by rule 32:1.4. Unless review is sought, however, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's order.

[14] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.

[15] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client's representation to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6). In exercising the discretion conferred by this rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction, and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer's decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other rules. Some rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). *See* rules 32:1.2(d), 32:4.1(b), 32:8.1, and 32:8.3. Rule 32:3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this rule. *See* rule 32:3.3(c).

Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality

[16] A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. *See* rules 32:1.1, 32:5.1, and 32:5.3.

[17] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this rule.

Former Client

[18] The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. *See* rule 32:1.9(c)(2). *See* rule 32:1.9(c)(1) for the prohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the former client.

Required Disclosure Adverse to Client

[19] Rule 32:1.6(c) requires a lawyer to reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent imminent death or substantial

bodily harm. Rule 32:1.6(c) differs from rule 32:1.6(b)(1) in that rule 32:1.6(b)(1) permits, but does not require, disclosure in situations where death or substantial bodily harm is deemed to be reasonably certain rather than imminent. For purposes of rule 32:1.6, “reasonably certain” includes situations where the lawyer knows or reasonably believes the harm will occur, but there is still time for independent discovery and prevention of the harm without the lawyer’s disclosure. For purposes of this rule, death or substantial bodily harm is “imminent” if the lawyer knows or reasonably believes it is unlikely that the death or harm can be prevented unless the lawyer immediately discloses the information.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.7: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;

(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and

(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

(c) In no event shall a lawyer represent both parties in dissolution of marriage proceedings.

Comment

General Principles

[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person, or from the lawyer’s own interests. For specific rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see rule 32:1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see rule 32:1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see rule 32:1.18. For definitions of “informed consent” and “confirmed in writing,” see rule 32:1.0(e) and (b).

[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).

[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. *See also* comment to rule 32:5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer’s violation of this rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see comment to rule 32:1.3 and Scope.

[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). *See* rule 32:1.16. Where more than one client is involved,

whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. *See* rule 32:1.9. *See also* comments [5] and [29].

[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. *See* rule 32:1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. *See* rule 32:1.9(c).

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse

[6] Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.

[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation

[8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.

Lawyer's Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons

[9] In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under rule 32:1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor, or corporate director.

Personal Interest Conflicts

[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See rule 32:1.8 for specific rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. *See also* rule 32:1.10 (personal interest conflicts under rule 32:1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).

[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., a parent, child, sibling, spouse, cohabiting partner, or lawyer related in any other familial or romantic capacity, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family relationship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. *See* rule 32:1.10.

[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. *See* rule 32:1.8(j).

Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service

[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. *See* rule 32:1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.

[13a] Where a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent the insured pursuant to the insurer's obligations under a liability insurance policy, the lawyer may comply with reasonable cost-containment litigation guidelines proposed by the insurer if such guidelines do not materially interfere with the lawyer's duty to exercise independent professional judgment to protect the reasonable interests of the insured, do not regulate the details of the lawyer's performance, and do not materially limit the professional discretion and control of the lawyer. The lawyer may provide the insurer with a description of the services rendered and time spent, but the lawyer may not agree to provide detailed information that would undermine the protection of confidential client-lawyer information, if the insurer will share such information with a third party. If the lawyer believes that guidelines proposed by the insurer prevent the lawyer from exercising independent professional judgment or from protecting confidential client information, the lawyer shall identify and explain the conflict of interest to the insurer and insured and also advise the insured of the right to seek independent legal counsel. If the conflict is not eliminated but the insured wants the lawyer to continue the representation, the lawyer may proceed if the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation and the insured's informed consent is obtained pursuant to paragraph (b)(4).

Prohibited Representations

[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as

indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.

[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. *See* rule 32:1.1 (competence) and rule 32:1.3 (diligence).

[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable law.

[17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Paragraph (c) provides a specific example of such a nonconsentable conflict, that is, where a lawyer is asked to represent both parties in a marriage dissolution proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under rule 32:1.0(m)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).

Informed Consent

[18] Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. *See* rule 32:1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality, and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. *See* comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).

[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining whether common representation is in the client's interests.

Consent Confirmed in Writing

[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. *See* rule 32:1.0(b). *See also* rule 32:1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. *See* rule 32:1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.

Revoking Consent

[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other clients, and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

Consent to Future Conflict

[22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b).

Conflicts in Litigation

[23] Paragraphs (b)(3) and (c) prohibit representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.

[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved, and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.

[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need

the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.

Nonlitigation Conflicts

[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise, and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. *See* comment [8].

[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.

[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest, or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication, or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.

Special Considerations in Common Representation

[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment, and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.

[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.

[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. *See* rule 32:1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate

for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.

[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. *See* rule 32:1.2(c).

[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and the protection of rule 32:1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in rule 32:1.16.

Organizational Clients

[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. *See* rule 32:1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.

[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board, and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.8: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS: SPECIFIC RULES

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:

(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;

(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and

(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.

(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these rules.

(c) A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to

the client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include a spouse, child, sibling, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.

(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.

(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:

(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and

(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.

(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:

(1) the client gives informed consent;

(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and

(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by rule 32:1.6.

(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.

(h) A lawyer shall not:

(1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice; or

(2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in connection therewith.

(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:

(1) acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and

(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

(j) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client, or a representative of a client, unless the person is the spouse of the lawyer or the sexual relationship predates the initiation of the client-lawyer relationship. Even in these provisionally exempt relationships, the lawyer should strictly scrutinize the lawyer's behavior for any conflicts of interest to determine if any harm may result to the client or to the representation. If there is any reasonable possibility that the legal representation of the client may be impaired, or the client harmed by the continuation of the sexual relationship, the lawyer should immediately withdraw from the legal representation.

(k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoing paragraphs (a) through (i) that applies to any one of them shall apply to all of them.

(l) A lawyer related to another lawyer shall not represent a client whose interests are directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer knows is represented by the related lawyer except upon the client's informed consent, confirmed in a writing signed by the client. Even if the client's interests do not appear to be directly adverse, the lawyer should not undertake the representation of a client if there is a significant risk that the related lawyer's involvement will interfere with the lawyer's loyalty and exercise of independent judgment, or will create a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed. For purposes of this paragraph, "related lawyer" includes a parent, child, sibling, spouse, cohabiting partner, or lawyer related in any other familial or romantic capacity.

Comment

Business Transactions Between Client and Lawyer

[1] A lawyer's legal skill and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence

between lawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property, or financial transaction with a client, for example, a loan or sales transaction or a lawyer investment on behalf of a client. The requirements of paragraph (a) must be met even when the transaction is not closely related to the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will for a client learns that the client needs money for unrelated expenses and offers to make a loan to the client. The rule applies to lawyers engaged in the sale of goods or services related to the practice of law, for example, the sale of investment services to existing clients of the lawyer's legal practice. *See* rule 32:5.7. It also applies to lawyers purchasing property from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by rule 32:1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee. In addition, the rule does not apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.

[2] Paragraph (a)(1) requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its essential terms be communicated to the client, in writing, in a manner that can be reasonably understood. Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the client also be advised, in writing, of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel. It also requires that the client be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer obtain the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the transaction and to the lawyer's role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss both the material risks of the proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the lawyer's involvement, and the existence of reasonably available alternatives and should explain why the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable. *See* rule 32:1.0(e) (definition of informed consent).

[3] The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer's financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's financial interest in the transaction. Here the lawyer's role requires that the lawyer must comply, not only with the requirements of paragraph (a), but also with the requirements of rule 32:1.7. Under that rule, the lawyer must disclose the risks associated with the lawyer's dual role as both legal adviser and participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the lawyer will structure the transaction or give legal advice in a way that favors the lawyer's interests at the expense of the client. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest may be such that rule 32:1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking the client's consent to the transaction.

[4] If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of this rule is inapplicable, and the paragraph (a)(1) requirement for full disclosure is satisfied either by a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction or by the client's independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently represented in the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement was fair and reasonable to the client as paragraph (a)(1) further requires.

Use of Information Related to Representation

[5] Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates the lawyer's duty of loyalty. Paragraph (b) applies when the information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or business associate of the lawyer. For example, if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a purchase. The rule does not prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who learns a government agency's interpretation of trade legislation during the representation of one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients. Paragraph (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these rules. *See* rules 32:1.2(d), 32:1.6, 32:1.9(c), 32:3.3, 32:4.1(b), 32:8.1, and 32:8.3.

Gifts to Lawyers

[6] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If a client offers the lawyer a more substantial gift, paragraph (c) does not prohibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift may be voidable by the client under the doctrine of undue influence, which treats client gifts as presumptively fraudulent. In any event, due to concerns about overreaching and imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a substantial gift be made to the lawyer or for the lawyer's benefit, except where the lawyer is related to the client as set forth in paragraph (c).

[7] If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. The sole exception to this rule is where the client is a relative of the donee.

[8] This rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision in rule 32:1.7 when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the position.

Literary Rights

[9] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to rule 32:1.5 and paragraphs (a) and (i).

Financial Assistance

[10] Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court costs and litigation expenses, including the expenses of medical examination and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, because these advances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts. Similarly, an exception allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs and litigation expenses regardless of whether these funds will be repaid is warranted.

Person Paying for a Lawyer's Services

[11] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company), or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. *See also* rule 32:5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another).

[12] Sometimes, it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client's informed consent regarding the fact of the payment and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the fee arrangement creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply with rule 32:1.7. The lawyer must also conform to the requirements of rule 32:1.6 concerning confidentiality. Under rule 32:1.7(a), a conflict of interest exists if there is significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in the fee arrangement or by the lawyer's responsibilities to the third-party payer (for example, when the third-party payer is a co-client). Under rule 32:1.7(b), the lawyer may accept or continue the representation with the informed consent of each affected client, unless the conflict is nonconsentable under that paragraph. Under rule 32:1.7(b), the informed consent must be confirmed in writing.

[12a] When the lawyer is publicly-compensated, such as in the case of a public defender in a criminal case or a guardian appointed in a civil case or when civil legal services are provided by a legal aid organization, the fee arrangement ordinarily does not pose the same risk of interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment that exists in other contexts. Under paragraph (f), such a lawyer must disclose the fact that the lawyer is being compensated through public funding or that legal services are being provided as part of a legal aid organization; however, formal consent by the client to the fee arrangement is not required under such circumstances given the limited ability of an indigent client as a practical matter to refuse the services of the lawyer being compensated through public funding or through legal aid.

Aggregate Settlements

[13] Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under rule 32:1.7, this is one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of the process of obtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, rule 32:1.2(a) protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a criminal case. The rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these rules and provides that, before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms of the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is accepted. *See also* rule 32:1.0(e) (definition of informed consent). Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class members and other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate protection of the entire class.

Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims

[14] Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for malpractice are prohibited because they are likely to undermine competent and diligent representation. Also, many clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before a dispute has arisen, particularly if they are then represented by the lawyer seeking the agreement. This paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of the agreement. Nor does this paragraph limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity, where permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally liable to the client for his or her own conduct and the firm complies with any conditions required by law, such as provisions requiring client notification or maintenance of adequate liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordance with rule 32:1.2 that defines the scope of the representation, although a definition of scope that makes the obligations of representation illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.

[15] Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not prohibited by this rule. Nevertheless, in view of the danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage of an unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer must first advise such a person in writing of the appropriateness of independent representation in connection with such a settlement. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former client a reasonable opportunity to find and consult independent counsel.

Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Litigation

[16] Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The rule is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these rules. The exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation is set forth in paragraph (e). In addition, paragraph (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. Iowa law determines which liens are authorized. These may include liens granted by statute and liens acquired by contract with the client. When a lawyer acquires by contract a security interest in property other than that recovered through the lawyer's efforts in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with a client and is governed by the requirements of paragraph (a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases are governed by rule 32:1.5.

Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships

[17] The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without impairment of the exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what extent client confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant danger of harm to client interests and because the client's own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could give adequate informed consent, this rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.

[18] Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are diminished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, before proceeding with the representation in these circumstances, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability to represent the client will be materially limited by the relationship. *See* rule 32:1.7(a)(2).

[19] When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this rule prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs, or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters.

Imputation of Prohibitions

[20] Under paragraph (k), a prohibition on conduct by an individual lawyer in paragraphs (a) through (i) also applies to all lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. For example, one lawyer in a firm may not enter into a business transaction with a client of another member of the firm without complying with paragraph (a), even if the first lawyer is not personally involved in the representation of the client. The prohibitions set forth in paragraphs (j) and (l) are personal and are not applied to associated lawyers.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.9: DUTIES TO FORMER CLIENTS

(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent

another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client

(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person, and

(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by rules 32:1.6 and 32:1.9(c) that is material to the matter, unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:

(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or

(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client.

Comment

[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this rule. Under this rule, for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction. Nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. *See* comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this rule to the extent required by rule 32:1.11.

[2] The scope of a "matter" for purposes of this rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question.

[3] Matters are "substantially related" for purposes of this rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required

to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services.

Lawyers Moving Between Firms

[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.

[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by rules 32:1.6 and 32:1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See rule 32:1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm.

[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions, or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought.

[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See rules 32:1.6 and 32:1.9(c).

[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client.

[9] The provisions of this rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See rule 32:1.0(e). With regard to the effectiveness of an advance waiver, see comment [22] to rule 32:1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see rule 32:1.10.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.10: IMPUTATION OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE

(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by rule 32:1.7 or 32:1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.

(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited

from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, unless:

(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and

(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by rules 32:1.6 and 32:1.9(c) that is material to the matter.

(c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in rule 32:1.7.

(d) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers is governed by rule 32:1.11.

Comment

Definition of “Firm”

[1] For purposes of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, the term “firm” denotes lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship, or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization. *See* rule 32:1.0(c). Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. *See* rule 32:1.0, comments [2] - [4].

Principles of Imputed Disqualification

[2] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by rules 32:1.9(b) and 32:1.10(b).

[3] The rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented. Where one lawyer in a firm could not effectively represent a given client because of strong political beliefs, for example, but that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the lawyer will not materially limit the representation by others in the firm, the firm should not be disqualified. On the other hand, if an opposing party in a case were owned by a lawyer in the law firm, and others in the firm would be materially limited in pursuing the matter because of loyalty to that lawyer, the personal disqualification of the lawyer would be imputed to all others in the firm.

[4] The rule in paragraph (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does paragraph (a) prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person did while a law student. Such persons, however, ordinarily must be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. In addition, written notice must be promptly given to any affected former client to enable the former client to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule. *See* rules 32:1.0(k) and 32:5.3.

[5] Rule 32:1.10(b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate rule 32:1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by rules 32:1.6 and 32:1.9(c).

[6] Rule 32:1.10(c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or former

client under the conditions stated in rule 32:1.7. The conditions stated in rule 32:1.7 require the lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by rule 32:1.7(b) and that each affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may not be cured by client consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the future, see rule 32:1.7, comment [22]. For a definition of informed consent, see rule 32:1.0(e).

[7] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, imputation is governed by rule 32:1.11(b) and (c), not this rule. Under rule 32:1.11(d), where a lawyer represents the government after having served clients in private practice, nongovernmental employment, or in another government agency, former-client conflicts are not imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually disqualified lawyer.

[8] Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under rule 32:1.8, paragraph (k) of that rule, and not this rule, determines whether that prohibition also applies to other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.11: SPECIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR FORMER AND CURRENT GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the government:

(1) is subject to rule 32:1.9(c); and

(2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation.

(b) When a lawyer is disqualified from representation under paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:

(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.

(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person, acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. As used in this rule, the term “confidential government information” means information that has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to the public. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.

(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee:

(1) is subject to rules 32:1.7 and 32:1.9; and

(2) shall not:

(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing; or

(ii) negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer, or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by rule 32:1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in rule 32:1.12(b).

(e) As used in this rule, the term “matter” includes:

(1) any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular

matter involving a specific party or parties, and

(2) any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government agency.

(f) Prosecutors for the state or county shall not engage in the defense of an accused in any criminal matter during the time they are engaged in such public responsibilities. However, this paragraph does not apply to a lawyer not regularly employed as a prosecutor for the state or county who serves as a special prosecutor for a specific criminal case, provided that the employment does not create a conflict of interest or the lawyer complies with the requirements of rule 32:1.7(b).

Comment

[1] A lawyer who has served or is currently serving as a public officer or employee is personally subject to the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against concurrent conflicts of interest stated in rule 32:1.7. In addition, such a lawyer may be subject to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency may give consent under this rule. See rule 32:1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent.

[2] Paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), and (d)(1) restate the obligations of an individual lawyer who has served or is currently serving as an officer or employee of the government toward a former government or private client. Rule 32:1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by this rule. Rather, paragraph (b) sets forth a special imputation rule for former government lawyers that provides for screening and notice. Because of the special problems raised by imputation within a government agency, paragraph (d) does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.

[3] Paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) apply regardless of whether a lawyer is adverse to a former client and are thus designed not only to protect the former client, but also to prevent a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of another client. For example, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of the government may not pursue the same claim on behalf of a later private client after the lawyer has left government service, except when authorized to do so by the government agency under paragraph (a). Similarly, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of a private client may not pursue the claim on behalf of the government, except when authorized to do so by paragraph (d). As with paragraphs (a)(1) and (d)(1), rule 32:1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by these paragraphs.

[4] This rule represents a balancing of interests. On the one hand, where the successive clients are a government agency and another client, public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to the other client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of the government. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the other client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. On the other hand, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. Thus a former government lawyer is disqualified only from particular matters in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. The provisions for screening and waiver in paragraph (b) are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. The limitation of disqualification in paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) to matters involving a specific party or parties, rather than extending disqualification to all substantive issues on which the lawyer worked, serves a similar function.

[5] When a lawyer has been employed by one government agency and then moves to a second government agency, it may be appropriate to treat that second agency as another client for purposes of this rule, as when a lawyer is employed by a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. However, because the conflict of interest is governed by paragraph (d), the latter agency is not required to screen the lawyer as paragraph (b) requires a law firm to do. The question of whether two government agencies should be regarded as the same or different clients for conflict of interest

purposes is beyond the scope of these rules. *See* rule 32:1.13 comment [9].

[6] Paragraphs (b) and (c) contemplate a screening arrangement. *See* rule 32:1.0(k) (requirements for screening procedures). These paragraphs do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

[7] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

[8] Paragraph (c) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer.

[9] Paragraphs (a) and (d) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government agency when doing so is permitted by rule 32:1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law.

[10] For purposes of paragraph (e) of this rule, a "matter" may continue in another form. In determining whether two particular matters are the same, the lawyer should consider the extent to which the matters involve the same basic facts, the same or related parties, and the time elapsed.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.12: FORMER JUDGE, ARBITRATOR, MEDIATOR, OR OTHER THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL

(a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or law clerk to such a person or as an arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party neutral, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing.

(b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or as an arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party neutral. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge or other adjudicative officer may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the law clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the law clerk has notified the judge or other adjudicative officer.

(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:

(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(2) written notice is promptly given to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.

(d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.

Comment

[1] This rule generally parallels rule 32:1.11. The term "personally and substantially" signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. Compare the comment to rule 32:1.11. The term "adjudicative officer" includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers, and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Application section III(B) of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a magistrate or other continuing part-time judge "shall not act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which the judge has served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto." Although phrased differently from this rule, that rule corresponds in meaning.

[2] Like former judges, lawyers who have served as arbitrators, mediators, or other third-party

neutrals may be asked to represent a client in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. This rule forbids such representation unless all of the parties to the proceedings give their informed consent, confirmed in writing. *See* rule 32:1.0(e) and (b). Other law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals may impose more stringent standards of personal or imputed disqualification. *See* rule 32:2.4.

[3] Although lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals do not have information concerning the parties that is protected under rule 32:1.6, they typically owe the parties an obligation of confidentiality under law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals. Thus, paragraph (c) provides that conflicts of the personally disqualified lawyer will be imputed to other lawyers in a law firm unless the conditions of this paragraph are met.

[4] Requirements for screening procedures are stated in rule 32:1.0(k). Paragraph (c)(1) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

[5] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005; April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 32:1.13: ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT

(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.

(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee, or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act, or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.

(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if

(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization,

then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not rule 32:1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.

(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee, or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.

(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that the lawyer has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to ensure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.

(f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.

(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, subject to the provisions of rule 32:1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by rule 32:1.7, the

consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.

Comment

The Entity as the Client

[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders, and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees, and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. “Other constituents” as used in this comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees, and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.

[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization’s lawyer in that person’s organizational capacity, the communication is protected by rule 32:1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client’s employees or other constituents are covered by rule 32:1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by rule 32:1.6.

[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer’s province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in rule 32:1.0(f), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious.

[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant considerations. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent’s innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer’s advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer’s advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by rule 32:1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization.

[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization’s highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation.

Relation to Other Rules

[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other rules. In particular, this rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under rule 32:1.8, 32:1.16, 32:3.3, or 32:4.1. Paragraph (c) of this rule supplements rule 32:1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of rule 32:1.6(b)(1) - (6). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyer's representation of the organization. If the lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a crime or fraud by the organization, rules 32:1.6(b)(2) and 32:1.6(b)(3) may permit the lawyer to disclose confidential information. In such circumstances rule 32:1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under rule 32:1.16(a)(1) may be required.

[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee, or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim.

[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that the lawyer has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.

Government Agency

[9] The duty defined in this rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these rules. *See Scope* [18]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is a governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and ensuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This rule does not limit that authority. *See Scope*.

Clarifying the Lawyer's Role

[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization, of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to ensure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged.

[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case.

Dual Representation

[12] Paragraph (g) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder.

Derivative Actions

[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization.

[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, rule 32:1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.14: CLIENT WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY

(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment, or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.

(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial, or other harm unless action is taken, and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian.

(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by rule 32:1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under rule 32:1.6 to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.

Comment

[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions.

[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person has a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication.

[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the presence of such persons generally does not affect the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf.

[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. *See* rule 32:1.2(d).

Taking Protective Action

[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial, or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decisionmaking tools such as durable powers of attorney, or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies, or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests, and the goals of intruding into the client's decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities, and respecting the client's family and social connections.

[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind, and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.

[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client.

Disclosure of the Client's Condition

[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by rule 32:1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one.

Emergency Legal Assistance

[9] In an emergency where the health, safety, or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent, or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client.

[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.15: SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.

(b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but only in an amount necessary for that purpose.

(c) A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.

(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.

(e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are not in dispute.

(f) All client trust accounts shall be governed by chapter 45 of the Iowa Court Rules.

Comment

[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property that is the property of clients or third persons, including prospective clients, must be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. A lawyer should maintain on a current basis books and records in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice and comply with any recordkeeping rules established by law or court order. *See*, Iowa Ct. R. ch 45.

[2] While normally it is impermissible to commingle the lawyer's own funds with client funds, paragraph (b) provides that it is permissible when necessary to pay bank service charges on that

account. Accurate records must be kept regarding which part of the funds are the lawyer's.

[3] Lawyers often receive funds from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. The lawyer is not required to remit to the client funds that the lawyer reasonably believes represent fees owed. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds must be kept in a trust account and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed.

[4] Paragraph (e) also recognizes that third parties may have lawful claims against specific funds or other property in a lawyer's custody, such as a client's creditor who has a lien on funds recovered in a personal injury action. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client. In such cases, when the third-party claim is not frivolous under applicable law, the lawyer must refuse to surrender the property to the client until the claims are resolved. A lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party; but when there are substantial grounds for dispute as to the person entitled to the funds, the lawyer may file an action to have a court resolve the dispute.

[5] The obligations of a lawyer under this rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves only as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction and is not governed by this rule.

[6] A lawyers' fund for client protection provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Such a fund has been established in Iowa, and lawyer participation is mandatory to the extent required by chapter 39 of the Iowa Court Rules.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.16: DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION

(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:

(1) the representation will result in violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or

(3) the lawyer is discharged.

(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if:

(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client;

(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;

(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;

(4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;

(5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;

(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or

(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.

(c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.

(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by law.

Comment

[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest, and to completion. Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed when the agreed-upon assistance has been concluded. *See* rules 32:1.2(c) and 32:6.5. *See also* rule 32:1.3, comment [4].

Mandatory Withdrawal

[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.

[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. *See also* rule 32:6.2. Similarly, court approval or notice to the court is often required by applicable law before a lawyer withdraws from pending litigation. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations to both clients and the court under rules 32:1.6 and 32:3.3.

Discharge

[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances.

[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. A client seeking to do so should be given a full explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring self-representation by the client.

[6] If the client has severely diminished capacity, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and may take reasonably necessary protective action as provided in rule 32:1.14.

Optional Withdrawal

[7] A lawyer may withdraw from representation in some circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if the withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer may also withdraw where the client insists on taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.

[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation.

Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal

[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. The lawyer may retain papers as security for a fee to the extent permitted by Iowa Code section 602.10116 or other law. *See* rule 32:1.15.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.17: SALE OF LAW PRACTICE

A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, or an area of law practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) The seller ceases to engage in the private practice of law, or in the area of practice that has been sold, in the geographic area in which the practice has been conducted;

(b) The entire practice, or the entire area of practice, is sold to one or more lawyers or law firms;

(c) The seller gives written notice to each of the seller's clients regarding:

(1) the proposed sale;

(2) the client's right to retain other counsel or to take possession of the file; and

(3) the fact that the client's consent to the transfer of the client's files will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within 90 days of receipt of the notice.

If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file.

(d) The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale.

Comment

[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this rule, when a lawyer or an entire firm ceases to practice, or ceases to practice in an area of law, and other lawyers or firms take over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. *See* rules 32:5.4 and 32:5.6.

Termination of Practice by the Seller

[2] The requirement that all of the private practice, or all of an area of practice, be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice, or the area of practice, available for sale to the purchasers. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchasers but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances does not necessarily result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a retention election for the office or resigns from a judiciary position.

[3] The requirement that the seller cease to engage in the private practice of law does not prohibit employment as a lawyer on the staff of a public agency or a legal services entity that provides legal services to the poor, or as in-house counsel to a business.

[4] This rule contemplates that a lawyer who sells an entire practice may continue in the practice of law in Iowa provided that the lawyer practices in another geographic area of the state.

[5] This rule also permits a lawyer or law firm to sell an area of practice. If an area of practice is sold and the lawyer remains in the active practice of law, the lawyer must cease accepting any matters in the area of practice that has been sold, either as counsel or co-counsel or by assuming joint responsibility for a matter in connection with the division of a fee with another lawyer as would otherwise be permitted by rule 32:1.5(e). For example, a lawyer with a substantial number of estate planning matters and a substantial number of probate administration cases may sell the estate planning portion of the practice but remain in the practice of law by concentrating on probate administration; however, that practitioner may not thereafter accept any estate planning matters. Although a lawyer who leaves a geographical area typically would sell the entire practice, this rule permits the lawyer to limit the sale to one or more areas of the practice, thereby preserving the lawyer's right to continue practice in the areas of the practice that were not sold.

Sale of Entire Practice or Entire Area of Practice

[6] The rule requires that the seller's entire practice, or an entire area of practice, be sold. The prohibition against sale of less than an entire practice area protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchasers are required to undertake all client matters in the practice or practice area, subject to client consent. This requirement is satisfied, however, even if a purchaser is unable to undertake a particular client matter because of a conflict of interest.

Client Confidences, Consent, and Notice

[7] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of rule 32:1.6 than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to client-specific information relating to the representation and to the file, however, requires client consent. The rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed.

[8] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera.

[9] All elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice or area of practice.

Fee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser

[10] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing arrangements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser.

Other Applicable Ethical Standards

[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice or a practice area are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see rule 32:1.1); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure the client's informed consent for those conflicts that can be agreed to (see rule 32:1.7 regarding conflicts and rule 32:1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see rules 32:1.6 and 32:1.9).

[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see rule 32:1.16).

Applicability of the Rule

[13] This rule applies to the sale of a law practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a nonlawyer representative not subject to these rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the

requirements of this rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met.

[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this rule.

[15] This rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice or an area of practice.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:1.18: DUTIES TO A PROSPECTIVE CLIENT

(a) A person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client.

(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the consultation, except as rule 32:1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.

(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d).

(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if:

(1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing, or:

(2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client; and

(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(ii) written notice is promptly given to the prospective client.

Comment

[1] Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer's custody, or rely on the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's discussions with a prospective client usually are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients.

[2] Not all persons who communicate information to a lawyer are entitled to protection under this rule. A person who communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, is not a "prospective client" within the meaning of paragraph (a).

[3] It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the decision about formation of a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except as permitted by rule 32:1.9, even if the client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be.

[4] In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter should limit the initial interview to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for nonrepresentation exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer, and if consent is possible under rule 32:1.7, then consent from all affected present or former clients

must be obtained before accepting the representation.

[5] A lawyer may condition conversations with a prospective client on the person's informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See rule 32:1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. If the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer's subsequent use of information received from the prospective client.

[6] Even in the absence of an agreement, under paragraph (c), the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter.

[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in rule 32:1.10, but, under paragraph (d)(1), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. In the alternative, imputation may be avoided if the conditions of paragraph (d)(2) are met and all disqualified lawyers are timely screened and written notice is promptly given to the prospective client. See rule 32:1.0(k) (requirements for screening procedures). Paragraph (d)(2)(i) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

[8] Notice, including a general description of the subject matter about which the lawyer was consulted and of the screening procedures employed, should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

[9] For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a prospective client, see rule 32:1.1. For a lawyer's duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer's care, see rule 32:1.15.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

COUNSELOR

Rule 32:2.1: ADVISOR

In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.

Comment

Scope of Advice

[1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.

[2] Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied. In the final analysis, the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to pursue or forgo legally available objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client and not for the lawyer.

[3] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations.

[4] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession.

Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology, or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts.

Offering Advice

[5] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer's duty to the client under rule 32:1.4 may require that the lawyer offer advice if the client's course of action is related to the representation. Similarly, when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary under rule 32:1.4 to inform the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:2.2 (RESERVED)

Rule 32:2.3: EVALUATION FOR USE BY THIRD PERSONS

(a) A lawyer may provide an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client.

(b) When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer shall not provide the evaluation unless the client gives informed consent.

(c) Except as disclosure is authorized in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by rule 32:1.6.

Comment

Definition

[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction or when impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation. *See* rule 32:1.2. Such an evaluation may be for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government agency; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business.

[2] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available.

Duties Owed to Third Person and Client

[3] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings.

Access to and Disclosure of Information

[4] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations that are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. In no circumstances is the lawyer permitted to knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law in providing an evaluation under this rule. *See* rule 32:4.1.

Obtaining Client's Informed Consent

[5] Information relating to an evaluation is protected by rule 32:1.6. In many situations, providing an evaluation to a third party poses no significant risk to the client; thus, the lawyer may be impliedly authorized to disclose information to carry out the representation. *See* rule 32:1.6(a). Where, however, it is reasonably likely that providing the evaluation will affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer must first obtain the client's consent after the client has been adequately informed concerning the important possible effects on the client's interests. *See* rules 32:1.6(a) and 32:1.0(e).

Financial Auditor's Requests for Information

[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:2.4: LAWYER SERVING AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL

(a) A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator, or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.

(b) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.

Comment

[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator, or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator, or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court.

[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other laws that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. In 1987, the supreme court adopted the Rules Governing Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes, chapter 11 of the Iowa Court Rules. Lawyers engaged in family law mediation should carefully review these rules because they address matters of special concern and state different and more restrictive rules on conflicts of interest.

[3] Unlike nonlawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected.

[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in rule 32:1.12.

[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (*See* rule 32:1.0(m)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by rule 32:3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by rule 32:4.1.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

ADVOCATE

Rule 32:3.1: MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.

Comment

[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the

limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.

[2] The filing of an action, defense, or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. What is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients' positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

[3] The lawyer's obligations under this rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this rule.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:3.2: EXPEDITING LITIGATION

A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.

Comment

[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule 32:1.6.

(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

Comment

[1] This rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See rule 32:1.0(m) for the definition of “tribunal.” It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal’s adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false.

[2] This rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

Representations by a Lawyer

[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client’s behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. *Compare* rule 32:3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer’s own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in rule 32:1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with rule 32:1.2(d), see the comment to that rule. See also the comment to rule 32:8.4(b).

Legal Argument

[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(2), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.

Offering Evidence

[5] Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client’s wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer’s obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity.

[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness’s testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit or otherwise permit the witness to present the testimony that the lawyer knows is false.

[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. An advocate’s obligation under the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to a court’s directive requiring counsel to present the accused as a witness or to allow the accused to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires. *See also* comment [9].

[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation

to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. *See* rule 32:1.0(f). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.

[9] Although paragraph (a)(3) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. *See also* comment [7].

Remedial Measures

[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal, and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by rule 32:1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done—making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or perhaps nothing.

[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal, but also loss of the case, and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. *See* rule 32:1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.

Preserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process

[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official, or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence, or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person, including the lawyer's client, intends to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding.

Duration of Obligation

[13] A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this rule when it is beyond the power of a tribunal to correct, modify, reverse, or vacate a final judgment, or to grant a new trial.

Ex Parte Proceedings

[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be

presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision.

Withdrawal

[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by rule 32:1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see rule 32:1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this rule or as otherwise permitted by rule 32:1.6.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:3.4: FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL

A lawyer shall not:

(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;

(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;

(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;

(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;

(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused; or

(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:

(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.

Comment

[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.

[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed, or destroyed. The law may make it an offense to destroy material for the purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. The law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the

purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence. In such a case, the law may require the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances.

[3] With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper to pay a witness's expenses, including loss of time in attending or testifying, or to compensate an expert witness on terms permitted by law. It is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee other than as authorized by law for testifying and it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.

[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. *See also* rule 32:4.2.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:3.5: IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL

A lawyer shall not:

(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror, or other official by means prohibited by law;

(b) communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order;

(c) communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:

(1) the communication is prohibited by law or court order;

(2) the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or

(3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress, or harassment; or

(d) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.

Comment

[1] Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. Others are specified in the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, with which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is required to avoid contributing to a violation of such provisions.

[2] During a proceeding a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with persons serving in an official capacity in the proceeding, such as judges, masters, or jurors, unless authorized to do so by law or court order.

[3] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror or prospective juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication.

[4] The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge's default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review, and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics.

[5] The duty to refrain from disruptive conduct applies to any proceeding of a tribunal, including a deposition. *See* rule 32:1.0(m).

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:3.6: TRIAL PUBLICITY

(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.

(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:

(1) the claim, offense, or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;

(2) information contained in a public record;

(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;

- (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;**
- (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;**
- (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and**
- (7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):**
 - (i) the identity, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused;**
 - (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;**
 - (iii) the fact, time, and place of arrest; and**
 - (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.**
- (c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.**
- (d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).**
- (e) Any communication made under paragraph (b) that includes information that a defendant will be or has been charged with a crime must also include a statement explaining that a criminal charge is merely an accusation and the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.**

Comment

[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at ensuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.

[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations, and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. Rule 32:3.4(c) requires compliance with such rules.

[3] The rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates.

[4] Paragraph (b) identifies specific matters about which a lawyer's statements would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial likelihood of material prejudice, and should not in any event be considered prohibited by the general prohibition of paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the subjects upon which a lawyer may make a statement, but statements on other matters may be subject to paragraph (a).

[5] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to:

- (1) the character, credibility, reputation, or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
- (2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of

guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;

(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;

(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;

(5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or

(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

[6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding.

[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others.

[8] See rule 32:3.8(f) for additional duties of prosecutors in connection with extrajudicial statements about criminal proceedings.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:3.7: LAWYER AS WITNESS

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or

(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.

(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by rule 32:1.7 or rule 32:1.9.

Comment

[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party and can also involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.

Advocate-Witness Rule

[2] The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.

[3] To protect the tribunal, paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously serving as advocate and necessary witness except in those circumstances specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3). Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting

the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony.

[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the tribunal and the opposing party. Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The conflict of interest principles stated in rules 32:1.7, 32:1.9, and 32:1.10 have no application to this aspect of the problem.

[5] Because the tribunal is not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm will testify as a necessary witness, paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to do so except in situations involving a conflict of interest.

Conflict of Interest

[6] In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in which the lawyer will be a necessary witness, the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give rise to a conflict of interest that will require compliance with rule 32:1.7 or 32:1.9. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer, the representation involves a conflict of interest that requires compliance with rule 32:1.7. This would be true even though the lawyer might not be prohibited by paragraph (a) from simultaneously serving as advocate and witness because the lawyer's disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client. Similarly, a lawyer who might be permitted to simultaneously serve as an advocate and a witness by paragraph (a)(3) might be precluded from doing so by rule 32:1.9. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. If there is a conflict of interest, the lawyer must secure the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the lawyer will be precluded from seeking the client's consent. See rule 32:1.7. See rule 32:1.0(b) for the definition of "confirmed in writing" and rule 32:1.0(e) for the definition of "informed consent."

[7] Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is not disqualified from serving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated in a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a). If, however, the testifying lawyer would also be disqualified by rule 32:1.7 or rule 32:1.9 from representing the client in the matter, other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from representing the client by rule 32:1.10 unless the client gives informed consent under the conditions stated in rule 32:1.7 or 32:1.9.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:3.8: SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know is not supported by probable cause;

(b) make reasonable efforts to ensure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;

(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;

(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;

(e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:

- (1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;
- (2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and
- (3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; and
- (f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees, or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under rule 32:3.6 or this rule.

Comment

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. *See generally* ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor, and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of rule 32:8.4.

[2] A defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause. Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary hearings or other important pretrial rights from unrepresented accused persons. Paragraph (c) does not apply, however, to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence. In addition, paragraph (c) does not apply to a defendant charged with a simple misdemeanor for which the prosecutor reasonably believes the defendant will not be incarcerated.

[3] The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest. For purposes of paragraph (d), evidence tending to negate the guilt of the accused includes evidence that tends to impeach a witness for the State.

[4] Paragraph (e) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship.

[5] Paragraph (f) supplements rule 32:3.6, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with rule 32:3.6(b) or 32:3.6(c) and with rule 32:3.6(e).

[6] Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to rules 32:5.1 and 32:5.3, which relate to responsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work for or are associated with the lawyer's office. Paragraph (f) reminds the prosecutor of the importance of these obligations in connection with the unique dangers of improper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. In addition, paragraph (f) requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to prevent persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making improper extrajudicial statements, even when such persons are not under the direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law-enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:3.9: ADVOCATE IN NONADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS

A lawyer representing a client before a legislative body or administrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity

and shall conform to the provisions of rules 32:3.3(a) through (c), 32:3.4(a) through (c), and 32:3.5.

Comment

[1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues, and advance argument in the matters under consideration. The decision-making body, like a court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before such a body must deal with it honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedure. In all such appearances the lawyer shall identify the client if identification of the client is not prohibited by law. It is not improper, however, for a lawyer to seek from an agency information available to the public without identifying a client. *See* rules 32:3.3(a)-(c), 32:3.4(a)-(c), and 32:3.5.

[2] Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court. The requirements of this rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However, legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal with courts.

[3] This rule only applies when a lawyer represents a client in connection with an official hearing or meeting of a governmental agency or a legislative body to which the lawyer or the lawyer's client is presenting evidence or argument. It does not apply to representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental agency or in connection with an application for a license or other privilege or the client's compliance with generally applicable reporting requirements, such as the filing of income tax returns. Nor does it apply to the representation of a client in connection with an investigation or examination of the client's affairs conducted by government investigators or examiners. Representation in such matters is governed by rules 32:4.1 through 32:4.4.

[4] A lawyer representing a client before a governmental body in a nonadjudicative proceeding is engaged in the practice of law, even if such undertakings could also be engaged in by nonlawyers. Accordingly, a client who employs a lawyer to represent that client in lobbying or other advocacy before governmental bodies is entitled to assume that the lawyer will do so pursuant to the lawyer's professional obligations under these rules, specifically including those provisions concerning confidentiality, competence, and conflicts of interest.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS

Rule 32:4.1: TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS

In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly:

- (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or**
- (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by rule 32:1.6.**

Comment

Misrepresentation

[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements. For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of representing a client, see rule 32:8.4.

Statements of Fact

[2] This rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as

one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.

Crime or Fraud by Client

[3] Under rule 32:1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Paragraph (b) states a specific application of the principle set forth in rule 32:1.2(d) and addresses the situation where a client's crime or fraud takes the form of a lie or misrepresentation. Ordinarily, a lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. If the lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is prohibited by rule 32:1.6.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:4.2: COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.

(b) An otherwise unrepresented person to whom limited representation is being provided or has been provided in accordance with rule 32:1.2(c) is considered to be unrepresented for purposes of this rule unless the opposing lawyer knows of, or has been provided with, a written notice of appearance under which, or a written notice of time period during which, the opposing lawyer is to communicate with the limited-representation lawyer as to the subject matter within the limited scope of representation.

Comment

[1] This rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship, and the uncounseled disclosure of information relating to the representation.

[2] This rule applies to communications with any person who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates.

[3] The rule applies even though the represented person initiates or consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not permitted by this rule.

[4] This rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this rule through the acts of another. *See* rule 32:8.4(a). Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising a client concerning a communication that the client is legally entitled to make. Also, a lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so.

[5] Communications authorized by law may include communications by a lawyer on behalf of a

client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the government. Communications authorized by law may also include investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings. When communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, a government lawyer must comply with this rule in addition to honoring the constitutional rights of the accused. The fact that a communication does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient to establish that the communication is permissible under this rule.

[6] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury.

[7] In the case of a represented organization, this rule prohibits communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs, or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. Consent of the organization's lawyer is not required for communication with a former constituent. If a constituent of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this rule. *Compare* rule 32:3.4(f). In communicating with a current or former constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the organization. *See* rule 32:4.4.

[8] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. *See* rule 32:1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious.

[9] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to rule 32:4.3.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005; March 12, 2007]

Rule 32:4.3: DEALING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSON

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.

Comment

[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see rule 32:1.13(f).

[2] The rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented person's interests is so great that the rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents

that require the person's signature, and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations.
[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:4.4: RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.

(b) A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.

Comment

[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer relationship. For example, present or former organizational employees or agents may have information protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege or the work product doctrine of the organization itself. If the person contacted by the lawyer has no authority to waive the privilege, the lawyer may not deliberately seek to obtain the information in this manner.

[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive documents that were mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document was sent inadvertently, then this rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document has been waived. Similarly, this rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been wrongfully obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this rule, "document" includes e-mail or other electronic modes of transmission subject to being read or put into readable form.

[3] Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. *See* rules 32:1.2 and 32:1.4.
[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Rule 32:5.1: RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTNERS, MANAGERS, AND SUPERVISORY LAWYERS

(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct.

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

Comment

[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. *See* rule 32:1.0(c). This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm.

[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property, and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.

[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. *See* rule 32:5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members, and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the rules.

[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. *See also* rule 32:8.4(a).

[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.

[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification, or knowledge of the violation.

[7] Apart from this rule and rule 32:8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate, or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these rules.

[8] The duties imposed by this rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. *See* rule 32:5.2(a). [Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:5.2: RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUBORDINATE LAWYER

(a) A lawyer is bound by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.

(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

Comment

[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character.

[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under rule 32:1.7, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:5.3: RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING NONLAWYER ASSISTANTS

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

Comment

[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer must give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline.

[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. See comment [1] to rule 32:5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:5.4: PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:

(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;

(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of rule 32:1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and

(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.

(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.

(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.

(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:

(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;

(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position of similar responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation; or

(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.

Comment

[1] The provisions of this rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment.

[2] This rule also expresses traditional limitations on permitting a third party to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering legal services to another. *See also* rule 32:1.8(f) (lawyer may accept compensation from a third party as long as there is no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and the client gives informed consent).

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:5.5: UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW

(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.

(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:

(1) except as authorized by these rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or

(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.

(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:

(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;

(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;

(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise

out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or

(4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.

(d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:

(1) are provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or

(2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction.

Comment

[1] A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis. Paragraph (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action or by the lawyer assisting another person.

[2] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. This rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. *See* rule 32:5.3.

[3] A lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants, and persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers also may assist independent nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se.

[4] Other than as authorized by law or this rule, a lawyer who is not admitted to practice generally in this jurisdiction violates paragraph (b) if the lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law. Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not physically present here. Such a lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. *See also* rules 32:7.1(a) and 32:7.5(b).

[5] There are occasions in which a lawyer admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction under circumstances that do not create an unreasonable risk to the interests of the lawyer's clients, the public, or the courts. Paragraph (c) identifies four such circumstances. The fact that conduct is not so identified does not imply that the conduct is or is not authorized. With the exception of paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), this rule does not authorize a lawyer to establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice generally here.

[6] There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer's services are provided on a "temporary basis" in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under paragraph (c). Services may be "temporary" even though the lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation.

[7] Paragraphs (c) and (d) apply to lawyers who are admitted to practice law in any United States jurisdiction, which includes the District of Columbia and any state, territory, or commonwealth of the United States. The word "admitted" in paragraph (c) contemplates that the lawyer is authorized to practice in the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted and excludes a lawyer who, while technically admitted, is not authorized to practice because, for example, the lawyer is on inactive status.

[8] Paragraph (c)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction.

For this paragraph to apply, however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must actively participate in and share responsibility for the representation of the client.

[9] Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under paragraph (c)(2), a lawyer does not violate this rule when the lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this rule requires the lawyer to obtain that authority.

[10] Paragraph (c)(2) also provides that a lawyer rendering services in this jurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate this rule when the lawyer engages in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice law or in which the lawyer reasonably expects to be admitted pro hac vice. Examples of such conduct include meetings with the client, interviews of potential witnesses, and the review of documents. Similarly, a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction may engage in conduct temporarily in this jurisdiction in connection with pending litigation in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is or reasonably expects to be authorized to appear, including taking depositions in this jurisdiction.

[11] When a lawyer has been or reasonably expects to be admitted to appear before a court or administrative agency, paragraph (c)(2) also permits conduct by lawyers who are associated with that lawyer in the matter, but who do not expect to appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, subordinate lawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses in support of the lawyer responsible for the litigation.

[12] Paragraph (c)(3) permits a lawyer admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction to perform services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if those services are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. The lawyer, however, must obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or otherwise if court rules or law so require.

[13] Paragraph (c)(4) permits a lawyer admitted in another jurisdiction to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted but are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3). These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers.

[14] Paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. A variety of factors evidence such a relationship. The lawyer's client may have been previously represented by the lawyer, or may be resident in or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a significant connection with that jurisdiction. In other cases, significant aspects of the lawyer's work might be conducted in that jurisdiction or a significant aspect of the matter may involve the law of that jurisdiction. The necessary relationship might arise when the client's activities or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions, such as when the officers of a multinational corporation survey potential business sites and seek the services of their lawyer in assessing the relative merits of each. In addition, the services may draw on the lawyer's recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, nationally uniform, foreign, or international law.

[14a] Lawyers should consult Iowa Ct. R. 31.17 when they are not admitted to practice law in Iowa but desire to temporarily provide pro bono legal services or to practice law temporarily in Iowa following a determination that there has been a major disaster in Iowa or another jurisdiction.

[15] Paragraph (d) identifies two circumstances in which a lawyer who is admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law as well as provide legal services on a temporary basis. Except as provided in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), a lawyer who is admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction and who establishes an office or other systematic or continuous presence in this jurisdiction must become

admitted to practice law generally in this jurisdiction.

[16] Paragraph (d)(1) applies to a lawyer who is employed by a client to provide legal services to the client or its organizational affiliates, i.e., entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common control with the employer. This paragraph does not authorize the provision of personal legal services to the employer's officers or employees. The paragraph applies to in-house corporate lawyers, government lawyers, and others who are employed to render legal services to the employer. The lawyer's ability to represent the employer outside the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed generally serves the interests of the employer and does not create an unreasonable risk to the client and others because the employer is well situated to assess the lawyer's qualifications and the quality of the lawyer's work.

[17] If an employed lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering legal services to the employer, the lawyer must register and follow the requirements of Iowa Court Rule 31.16.

[18] Paragraph (d)(2) recognizes that a lawyer may provide legal services in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so by federal or other law, which includes statute, court rule, executive regulation, or judicial precedent.

[19] A lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph (c) or (d) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. *See* rule 32:8.5(a).

[20] In some circumstances, a lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph (c) or (d) may have to inform the client that the lawyer is not licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction. For example, that may be required when the representation occurs primarily in this jurisdiction and requires knowledge of the law of this jurisdiction. *See* rule 32:1.4(b).

[21] Paragraphs (c) and (d) do not authorize communications advertising legal services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction by lawyers who are admitted to practice in other jurisdictions. Whether and how lawyers may communicate the availability of their services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction is governed by rules 32:7.1 to 32:7.5, 32:7.7, and 32:7.8.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005; May 14, 2007]

Rule 32:5.6: RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE

A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:

(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or

(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.

Comment

[1] An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm.

[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client.

[3] This rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to rule 32:1.17.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:5.7: RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING LAW-RELATED SERVICES

(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:

(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or

(2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to ensure that a person obtaining the

law-related services knows that the services are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.

(b) The term “law-related services” denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.

Comment

[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case.

[2] Rule 32:5.7 applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed and whether the law-related services are performed through a law firm or a separate entity. The rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. *See, e.g.,* rule 32:8.4.

[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services must adhere to the requirements of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in paragraph (a)(1). Even when the law-related and legal services are provided in circumstances that are distinct from each other, for example through separate entities or different support staff within the law firm, the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the lawyer as provided in paragraph (a)(2) unless the lawyer takes reasonable measures to ensure that the recipient of the law-related services knows that the services are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not apply.

[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such an entity’s operations, the rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to ensure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer’s control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.

[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with rule 32:1.8(a).

[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to ensure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to ensure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing.

[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-related services.

[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with

respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for ensuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by rule 32:5.3, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity that the lawyer controls comply in all respects with the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct.

[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing financial planning, accounting, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, and non-legal consulting such as engineering, medical, or environmental consulting.

[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the rules addressing conflict of interest (rules 32:1.7 through 32:1.11, especially rules 32:1.7(a)(2) and 32:1.8(a), (b), and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of rule 32:1.6 relating to disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with rules 32:7.1 through 32:7.5, 32:7.7, and 32:7.8, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of this state's decisional law.

[11] When the full protections of all of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest, and permissible business relationships with clients. *See also* rule 32:8.4 (Misconduct).

[12] Certain services that may be performed by nonlawyers nonetheless are treated as the practice of law in Iowa when performed by lawyers, including consummation of real estate transactions, preparation of tax returns, legislative lobbying, and estate planning. *See* rule 32:3.9, cmt. [4]; Iowa Ct. R. 37.5. Accordingly, the lawyer providing such services must at all times and under all circumstances comply fully with the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

PUBLIC SERVICE

Rule 32:6.1: VOLUNTARY PRO BONO PUBLICO SERVICE

Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should:

(a) provide a substantial majority of the 50 hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:

(1) persons of limited means or

(2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental, and educational organizations in matters that are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and

(b) provide any additional services through:

(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups, or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties, or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental, and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;

(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or

(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system, or the legal profession.

In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.

Comment

[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a

responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation.

[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making, and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law.

[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation or by the Iowa Lawyer Trust Account Commission, or other comparable non-profit programs offering legal services to the economically disadvantaged, and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but, nevertheless, cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers, and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term "governmental organizations" includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies.

[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory attorneys' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means.

[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service remained unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory, or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) and paragraphs (b)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b)(3), to the extent permitted by such restrictions.

[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims, and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural, and religious groups.

[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this paragraph.

[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator, and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system, or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph.

[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono

responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities.

[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible.

[11] Law firms should act reasonably to enable and encourage all lawyers in the firm to provide the pro bono legal services called for by this rule.

[12] The responsibility set forth in this rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:6.2: ACCEPTING APPOINTMENTS

A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause, such as:

(a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

(b) representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or

(c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.

Comment

[1] A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro bono publico service. *See* rule 32:6.1. An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services.

Appointed Counsel

[2] For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, *see* rule 32:1.1, or if undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust.

[3] An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the rules.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:6.3: MEMBERSHIP IN LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer, or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization:

(a) if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under rule 32:1.7; or

(b) where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation

of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.

Comment

[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal services organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed.

[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:6.4: LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES AFFECTING CLIENT INTERESTS

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer, or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefitted by a decision in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need not identify the client.

Comment

[1] Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. Otherwise, it might follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. *See also* rule 32:1.2(b). For example, a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other rules, particularly rule 32:1.7. A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect the integrity of the program by making an appropriate disclosure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client might be materially benefitted.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:6.5: NONPROFIT AND COURT-ANNEXED LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS

(a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter:

(1) is subject to rules 32:1.7 and 32:1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and

(2) is subject to rule 32:1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by rule 32:1.7 or 32:1.9(a) with respect to the matter.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2), rule 32:1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this rule.

Comment

[1] Legal services organizations, courts, and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as advice or the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics, or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer

to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. *See, e.g.,* rules 32:1.7, 32:1.9, and 32:1.10.

[2] A lawyer who provides short-term limited legal services pursuant to this rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. *See* rule 32:1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this rule, the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, including rules 32:1.6 and 32:1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation.

[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with rule 32:1.7 or 32:1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with rule 32:1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by rule 32:1.7 or 32:1.9(a) in the matter.

[4] Because the limited nature of the services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that rule 32:1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with rule 32:1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by rule 32:1.7 or 32:1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program.

[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, rules 32:1.7, 32:1.9(a), and 32:1.10 become applicable.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES

Rule 32:7.1: COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING A LAWYER'S SERVICES

(a) A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.

(b) A lawyer shall not communicate with the public using statements that are unverifiable. In addition, advertising permitted under these rules shall not rely on emotional appeal or contain any statement or claim relating to the quality of the lawyer's legal services.

Comment

[1] This rule governs all communications about a lawyer's services, including advertising permitted by rule 32:7.2. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them must be truthful and verifiable.

[2] Truthful statements that are misleading are also prohibited by this rule. A truthful statement is misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the lawyer's communication considered as a whole not materially misleading. A truthful statement is also misleading if there is a substantial likelihood that it will lead a reasonable person to formulate a specific conclusion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services for which there is no reasonable factual foundation.

[3] A lawyer should ensure that information contained in any advertising which the lawyer publishes, or causes to be published, is relevant, is dignified, is disseminated in an objective and understandable fashion, and would facilitate the prospective client's ability to make an informed choice about legal representation. A lawyer should strive to communicate such information without undue emphasis upon style and advertising stratagems that hinder rather than facilitate intelligent selection of counsel. Appeal should not be made to the prospective client's emotions, prejudices, or personal likes or dislikes. Care should be exercised to ensure that false hopes of success or undue expectations are not communicated. Only unambiguous information relevant to a layperson's decision regarding legal rights or the selection of counsel, provided in ways that comport with the

dignity of the profession and do not demean the administration of justice, is appropriate in public communications.

[4] See also rule 32:8.4(e) for the prohibition against stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:7.2: ADVERTISING

(a) The following communications shall not be considered advertising and accordingly are not subject to rules 32:7.2, 32:7.3, and 32:7.4: (1) communications or solicitations for business between lawyers; (2) communications between a lawyer and an existing or former client, provided the lawyer does not know or have reason to know the attorney-client relationship has been terminated; or (3) communications by a lawyer that are in reply to a request for information by a member of the public that was not prompted by unauthorized advertising by the lawyer; information available through a hyperlink on a lawyer's Web site shall constitute this type of communication. Nonetheless, any brochures or pamphlets containing biographical and informational data disseminated to existing clients, former clients, lawyers, or in response to a request for information by a member of the public shall include the disclosures required by paragraph (h) when applicable.

(b) Subject to the limitations contained in these rules, a lawyer may advertise services through written, recorded, or electronic communication, including public media. Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the name and office of at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for the content.

(c) Subject to the limitations contained in these rules, a lawyer licensed to practice law in Iowa may permit the inclusion of the lawyer's name, address, telephone number, and designation as a lawyer, in a telephone or city directory, subject to the following requirements:

(1) Only a lawyer's name, address, telephone number, and designation as a lawyer may be alphabetically listed in the residential, business, and classified sections of the telephone or city directory.

(2) Listings in the classified section shall be under the general heading "Lawyers" or "Attorneys," except that a lawyer who has complied with rule 32:7.4(e) may be listed in classifications or headings identifying those fields or areas of practice as listed in rule 32:7.4(a). By further exception, a lawyer qualified under rule 32:7.4 to practice in the field of taxation law also may be listed under the general heading "Tax Preparation" or "Tax Return Preparation" either in lieu of or in addition to the general heading "Lawyers" or "Attorneys."

(3) All other telephone or city directory advertising permitted by these rules, including display or box advertisements, shall include the disclosures required by paragraph (h) when applicable.

(d) Subject to the limitations contained in these rules, a law firm may permit the inclusion of the firm name, address, and telephone number in a telephone or city directory, subject to the following requirements:

(1) The firm name, a list of its members, address, and telephone number may be listed alphabetically in the residential, business, and classified sections of the telephone or city directory.

(2) Listings in the classified section shall be under the general heading "Lawyers" or "Attorneys," except that a law firm may be listed in each of the classifications or headings identifying those fields or areas of practice as listed in rule 32:7.4(a) in which one or more members of the firm are qualified by virtue of compliance with rule 32:7.4(e).

(3) All other telephone or city directory advertising permitted by these rules, including display or box advertising, may contain the firm name, address, and telephone number, and the names of the individual lawyer members of the firm. All display or box advertisements shall include within the advertisement the disclosures required by paragraph (h) when applicable.

(e) Information permitted by these rules, articulated only by a single nondramatic voice, not that of the lawyer, and with no other background sound, may be communicated by radio or television, or other electronic or telephonic media. In the case of television, no visual display shall be allowed except that allowed in print as articulated by the announcer. All such communications shall contain the disclosures required by paragraph (h) when applicable.

(f) Whether or not the advertisement contains fee information, a lawyer shall preserve for at least three years a copy of each advertisement placed in a newspaper, in the classified section of the telephone or city directory, or in a periodical, a tape of any radio, television, or other electronic or telephonic media commercial, or recording, and a copy of all information placed on the World Wide Web, and a record of the date or dates and name of the publication in which the advertisement appeared or the name of the medium through which it was aired.

(g) The following information may be communicated to the public in the manner permitted by this rule, provided it is presented in a dignified style:

(1) name, including name of law firm, names of professional associates, addresses, telephone numbers, Internet addresses and URLs, and the designation “lawyer,” “attorney,” “J.D.,” “law firm,” or the like;

(2) the following descriptions of practice:

(i) “general practice”;

(ii) “general practice including but not limited to” followed by one or more fields of practice descriptions set forth in rule 32:7.4(a)-(c);

(iii) fields of practice, limitation of practice, or specialization, but only to the extent permitted by rule 32:7.4; and

(iv) limited representation as authorized by rule 32:1.2(c);

(3) date and place of birth;

(4) date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts;

(5) schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees, and other scholastic distinctions;

(6) public or quasi-public offices;

(7) military service;

(8) legal authorships;

(9) legal teaching positions;

(10) memberships, offices, and committee and section assignments in bar associations;

(11) memberships and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;

(12) technical and professional licenses;

(13) memberships in scientific, technical, and professional associations and societies; and

(14) foreign language ability.

(h) Fee information may be communicated to the public in the manner permitted by this rule, provided it is presented in a dignified style.

(1) The following information may be communicated:

(i) the fee for an initial consultation;

(ii) the availability upon request of either a written schedule of fees, or an estimate of the fee to be charged for specific services, or both;

(iii) contingent fee rates, subject to rule 32:1.5(c) and (d), provided that the statement discloses whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs and advises the public that, in the event of an adverse verdict or decision, the contingent fee litigant could be liable for court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examinations, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence;

(iv) fixed fees or range of fees for specific legal services;

(v) hourly fee rates; and

(vi) whether credit cards are accepted.

(2) If fixed fees or a range of fees for specific legal services are communicated, the lawyer must disclose, in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information, the following information:

(i) that the stated fixed fees or range of fees will be available only to clients whose matters are encompassed within the described services; and

(ii) if the client’s matters are not encompassed within the described services, or if an hourly fee rate is stated, the client is entitled, without obligation, to a specific written estimate of the fees likely to be charged.

(3) For purposes of these rules, the term “specific legal services” shall be limited to the following services:

(i) abstract examinations and title opinions not including services in clearing title;

(ii) uncontested dissolutions of marriage involving no disagreement concerning custody of children, alimony, child support, or property settlement. *See* rule 32:1.7(c);

- (iii) wills leaving all property outright to one beneficiary and contingently to one beneficiary or one class of beneficiaries;
- (iv) income tax returns for wage earners;
- (v) uncontested personal bankruptcies;
- (vi) changes of name;
- (vii) simple residential deeds;
- (viii) residential purchase and sale agreements;
- (ix) residential leases;
- (x) residential mortgages and notes;
- (xi) powers of attorney;
- (xii) bills of sale; and
- (xiii) limited representation as authorized by rule 32:1.2(c).

(4) Unless otherwise specified in the public communication concerning fees, the lawyer shall be bound, in the case of fee advertising in the classified section of the telephone or city directory, for a period of at least the time between printings of the directory in which the fee advertisement appears and in the case of all other fee advertising for a period of at least ninety days thereafter, to render the stated legal service for the fee stated in the communication unless the client's matters do not fall within the described services. In that event or if a range of fees is stated, the lawyer shall render the service for the estimated fee given the client in advance of rendering the service.

(i) In the event a lawyer's communication seeks to advise the institution of litigation, the communication must also disclose that the filing of a claim or suit solely to coerce a settlement or to harass another could be illegal and could render the person so filing liable for malicious prosecution or abuse of process.

(j) A lawyer recommended by, paid by, or whose legal services are furnished by an organization listed in rule 32:7.7(d) may authorize, permit, or assist such organization to use means of dignified commercial publicity that does not identify any lawyer by name to describe the availability or nature of its legal services or legal service benefits.

(k) This rule does not prohibit limited and dignified identification of a lawyer as a lawyer as well as by name:

(1) in political advertisements when the professional status is germane to the political campaign or to a political issue;

(2) in public notices when the name and profession of a lawyer are required or authorized by law or are reasonably pertinent for a purpose other than the attraction of potential clients;

(3) in routine reports and announcements of a bona fide business, civic, professional, or political organization in which the lawyer serves as a director or officer;

(4) in and on legal documents prepared by the lawyer;

(5) in and on legal textbooks, treatises, and other legal publications, and in dignified advertisements thereof; and

(6) in communications by a qualified legal assistance organization, along with the biographical information permitted under paragraph (g), directed to a member or beneficiary of such organization.

(l) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to representatives of the press, radio, television, or other communication medium in anticipation of or in return for professional publicity in a news item or voluntarily give any information to such representatives which, if published in a news item, would be in violation of rule 32:7.1.

Comment

[1] Advertisements and public communications, whether in reputable legal directories, telephone directories, or newspapers, should be formulated to convey only information that is necessary for the client to make an appropriate selection. Competency may be a factor in the selection of a lawyer. However, competency cannot be determined from an advertisement. The cost of legal services may also be a factor in the selection of a lawyer. A layperson may be aided in the selection of a lawyer if the costs of legal services were available for comparison or could be considered in an atmosphere conducive to logic, reason, and reflection. This factual information can be made available through advertising. Care must be exercised to ensure that there is a proper basis for the comparison of costs

communicated in a manner that will truthfully inform, and not mislead, a prospective client as to the total costs. For example, to state an hourly charge and to characterize it as a “reasonable fee” is misleading because the total cost or fee can vary greatly depending upon the number of hours spent.

[2] The lack of sophistication on the part of many members of the public concerning legal services and the importance of the interests affected by the choice of a lawyer require that special care be taken by lawyers to avoid misleading the public and to ensure that the information set forth in any advertising is relevant to the selection of a lawyer. The lawyer must be mindful that the benefits to the public of a lawyer’s advertising depend upon its reliability and accuracy. Advertising marked by excesses of content, volume, scope or frequency, or which unduly emphasizes unrepresentative biographical information, does not provide that public benefit. Fee advertising involves special concerns. With rare exception, lawyers render unique and varied services for each client, even as to so-called “routine” matters. When consulted about any matter, whether or not “routine,” a lawyer should make relevant inquiries, which may uncover the need for different services than those that the client originally sought. These factors make it difficult to set a fixed fee or a range of fees for a specific legal service in advance of rendering the service and provide temptation to depart from an advertised fee or to fail to render a needed service. Thus, a lawyer who advertises a fee for a service should exercise particular caution to avoid misleading prospective clients and should include appropriate disclaimers. A lawyer should also scrupulously avoid the use of fee advertising as an indirect means of attracting clients in the hope of performing other, more lucrative, legal services. In communications concerning a lawyer’s fees, the lawyer may use restrained subjective characterizations of rates or fees such as “reasonable,” “moderate,” and “very reasonable,” but shall avoid all unrestrained subjective characterizations of rates or fees, such as, but not limited to, “cut rate,” “lowest,” “giveaway,” “below cost,” “discount,” and “special.”

[3] All disclosures required to be published by these rules shall be in 9-point type or larger. Whenever a disclosure or notice is required by these rules, a lawyer or law firm hosting a site on the World Wide Web shall display the required disclosure or notice on the site’s home page.

[4] Nothing contained in these rules shall prohibit a lawyer from permitting the inclusion in reputable law lists and law directories intended primarily for the use of the legal profession of such information as traditionally has been included in these publications whether published in print or on the Internet or other electronic system.

[5] Any member of the bar desiring to expand the information authorized for disclosure pursuant to this rule or to provide for its dissemination through forums other than as authorized herein, may file an application with the supreme court specifying the requested change. Court approval of the application is required before an attorney may engage in advertising that includes the expanded information or is disseminated through the new forum.

[6] When the court receives a request to expand or constrict the list of “specific legal services” in rule 32:7.2(h)(3), it will consider the following criteria in determining which services should be included in the list:

(1) the description of the service would not be misunderstood by the average layperson or be misleading or deceptive;

(2) substantially all of the service normally can be performed in the lawyer’s office with the aid of standardized forms and office procedures;

(3) the service does not normally involve a substantial amount of legal research, drafting of unique documents, investigation, court appearances, or negotiation with other parties or their attorneys; and

(4) competent performance of the service normally does not depend upon ascertainment and consideration of more than a few varying factual circumstances.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005; November 19, 2007]

Rule 32:7.3: DIRECT CONTACT WITH PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS

(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client.

(b) A lawyer may engage in written solicitation by direct mail or e-mail to persons or groups who may need specific legal services because of a condition or occurrence known to the soliciting lawyer. A lawyer must retain a copy of the written solicitation for at least three years. Simultaneously with the mailing of the solicitation, the lawyer must file a copy of it with the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board along with a signed affidavit in which the lawyer attests to:

(1) the truthfulness of all facts contained in the communication;
(2) how the identity and specific legal need of the intended recipients were discovered; and
(3) how the identity and specific need of the intended recipients were verified by the soliciting lawyer.

(c) Information permitted by these rules may be communicated by direct mail or e-mail to the general public other than persons or groups of persons who may be in need of specific or particular legal services because of a condition or occurrence which is known or could with reasonable inquiry be known to the advertising lawyer. A lawyer must simultaneously file a copy of the communication with the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board and must retain a copy of the communication for at least three years.

(d) All communications authorized by paragraphs (b) and (c) shall contain the disclosures required by rule 32:7.2(h) when applicable. These communications shall, in addition to other required disclosures, carry the following disclosure in 9-point or larger type: “ADVERTISEMENT ONLY.”

Comment

[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in direct in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic contact by a lawyer with a prospective client known to need legal services. These forms of contact between a lawyer and a prospective client subject the layperson to the private importuning of the trained advocate in a direct interpersonal encounter. The prospective client, who may already feel overwhelmed by the circumstances giving rise to the need for legal services, may find it difficult fully to evaluate all available alternatives with reasoned judgment and appropriate self-interest in the face of the lawyer’s presence and insistence upon being retained immediately. The situation is fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and overreaching.

[2] This potential for abuse inherent in direct in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic solicitation of prospective clients justifies its prohibition, particularly since lawyer advertising and written communications permitted under rule 32:7.2 offer alternative means of conveying necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Advertising and written communications which may be mailed make it possible for a prospective client to be informed about the need for legal services and about the qualifications of available lawyers and law firms, without subjecting the prospective client to direct in-person, telephone, or real-time electronic persuasion that may overwhelm the client’s judgment.

[3] The use of general advertising and written, recorded or electronic communications to transmit information from lawyer to prospective client, rather than direct in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic contact, will help to ensure that the information flows cleanly as well as freely. Because rule 32:7.2(f) requires that the contents of advertisements and communications permitted under rule 32:7.2 be preserved, the contents cannot be disputed and may be shared with others who know the lawyer. This potential for informal review is itself likely to help guard against statements and claims that might constitute false and misleading communications in violation of rule 32:7.1. The contents of direct in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic conversations between a lawyer and a prospective client can be disputed and may not be subject to third-party scrutiny. Consequently, such conversations are much more likely to approach (and occasionally cross) the dividing line between accurate representations and those that are false and misleading.

[4] There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices against an individual who is a current or former client or with whom the lawyer has a close personal or family relationship. Nor is there a serious potential for abuse when the person contacted is a lawyer. Consequently, a lawyer may suggest the need for legal services to such individuals as authorized in rule 32:7.8. Also, paragraph (a) is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from participating in constitutionally protected activities of public or charitable legal-service organizations or bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee, or trade organizations whose purposes include providing or recommending legal services to its members or beneficiaries.

[5] But even permitted forms of solicitation can be abused. Thus, any solicitation which contains information which is false or misleading within the meaning of rule 32:7.1 is prohibited.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:7.4: COMMUNICATION OF FIELDS OF PRACTICE AND SPECIALIZATION

(a) A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer practices in or limits the lawyer's practice to certain fields of law as authorized by this rule. Subject to the exceptions and requirements of this rule, a lawyer may identify or describe the lawyer's practice by reference to the following fields of practice:

- Administrative Law
- Adoption Law
- Agricultural Law
- Alternate Dispute Resolution
- Antitrust & Trade Regulation
- Appellate Practice
- Aviation & Aerospace
- Banking Law
- Bankruptcy
- Business Law
- Civil Rights & Discrimination
- Collections Law
- Commercial Law
- Communications Law
- Constitutional Law
- Construction Law
- Contracts
- Corporate Law
- Criminal Law
- Debtor and Creditor
- Education Law
- Elder Law
- Election, Campaign & Political
- Eminent Domain
- Employee Benefits
- Employment Law
- Energy
- Entertainment & Sports
- Environmental Law
- Family Law
- Finance
- Franchise Law
- Government
- Government Contracts
- Health Care
- Immigration
- Indians & Native Populations
- Information Technology Law
- Insurance
- Intellectual Property
- International Law
- International Trade
- Investments
- Juvenile Law
- Labor Law
- Legal Malpractice
- Litigation
- Media Law
- Medical Malpractice
- Mergers & Acquisitions
- Military Law

Municipal Law
Natural Resources
Nonprofit Law
Occupational Safety & Health
Pension & Profit Sharing Law
Personal Injury
Product Liability
Professional Liability
Public Utility Law
Real Estate
Securities
Social Security Law
Taxation
Tax Returns
Technology and Science
Toxic Torts
Trademarks & Copyright Law
Transportation
Trial Law
Wills, Trusts, Estate Planning & Probate Law
Workers' Compensation
Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Any member of the bar desiring to expand this list may file an application with the supreme court specifying the requested change.

In describing the field of practice the lawyer may use the suffix “law,” “lawyer,” “matters,” “cases,” or “litigation.”

(b) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation “Patents,” “Patent Attorney,” “Patent Lawyer,” or “Registered Patent Attorney.”

(c) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice may use the designation “Admiralty,” “Proctor in Admiralty,” or a substantially similar designation.

(d) A lawyer shall not state or imply that a lawyer is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law, unless:

(1) the lawyer has been certified as a specialist by an organization that has been approved by the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board; and

(2) the name of the certifying organization is clearly identified in the communication.

(e) Prior to publicly describing one’s practice as permitted in paragraph (a) and (c), a lawyer shall comply with the following prerequisites:

(1) For all fields of practice designated, a lawyer must have devoted the greater of 100 hours or 10 percent of the lawyer’s time spent in the actual practice of law to each indicated field of practice for the preceding calendar year. In addition, the lawyer must have completed at least ten hours of accredited continuing legal education courses of study in each indicated field of practice during the preceding calendar year.

(2) A lawyer who wishes to use the terms “practice limited to . . .” or “practicing primarily in . . .” must have devoted the greater of 400 hours or 40 percent of the lawyer’s time spent in the actual practice of law to each separate indicated field of practice for the preceding calendar year. In addition, the lawyer must have completed at least fifteen hours of accredited continuing legal education courses of study in each separate indicated field of practice during the preceding calendar year.

Prior to communication of a description or indication of limitation of practice, a lawyer shall report the lawyer’s compliance with the eligibility requirements of this paragraph each year to the Commission on Continuing Legal Education. *See* Iowa Ct. R. 41.9.

(f) A lawyer describing the lawyer’s practice as “General practice including but not limited to” followed by one or more fields of practice descriptions set forth in this rule need not comply with the eligibility requirements of paragraph (e).

Comment

[1] In some instances lawyers limit their practice to, or practice primarily in, certain fields of law. In the absence of controls to ensure the existence of special competence, lawyers should not be permitted to hold themselves out as specialists or as having special training or ability other than in the field of patent or admiralty law where a holding out as a specialist historically has been permitted. However, lawyers who comply with this rule may hold themselves out publicly as practicing in, or limiting their practice to, certain fields of law, but such communications are subject to the false and misleading standard applied in rule 32:7.1 to communications concerning a lawyer's services.

[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes the long-established policy of the Patent and Trademark Office for the designation of lawyers practicing before the Office. Paragraph (c) recognizes that designation of Admiralty practice has a long historical tradition associated with maritime commerce and the federal courts.

[3] Paragraph (d) permits a lawyer to state that the lawyer is certified as a specialist in a field of law if such certification is granted by an organization approved by the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board. Certification signifies that an objective entity has recognized an advanced degree of knowledge and experience in the specialty area greater than is suggested by general licensure to practice law. Certifying organizations may be expected to apply standards of experience, knowledge, and proficiency to ensure that a lawyer's recognition as a specialist is meaningful and reliable. In order to ensure that consumers can obtain access to useful information about an organization granting certification, the name of the certifying organization must be included in any communication regarding the certification.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005; March 12, 2007; November 19, 2007]

Rule 32:7.5: PROFESSIONAL NOTICES, LETTERHEADS, OFFICES, AND SIGNS

(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead, or other professional designation that violates rule 32:7.1. A lawyer or law firm may use the following professional cards, signs, letterheads, or similar professional notices or devices if they are in dignified form:

(1) A professional card of a lawyer identifying the lawyer by name and as a lawyer, and giving addresses, telephone numbers, the name of the lawyer's law firm, and any information permitted under rule 32:7.4. A professional card of a law firm may also give the names of members and associates. Such cards may be used for identification.

(2) A brief professional announcement card stating new or changed associations or addresses, change of firm name, or similar matters pertaining to the professional office of a lawyer or law firm, which may be mailed to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives. It shall not state biographical data except to the extent reasonably necessary to identify the lawyer or to explain the change in the lawyer's association, but it may state the immediate past position of the lawyer. It may give the names and dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line of succession. It shall not state the nature of the practice except as permitted under rule 32:7.4. A dignified announcement of a change in location of office, the addition of a new partner, equity holder or associate, or a change in the name of a law firm may be published in one or more newspapers of general circulation over a period of no more than four weeks.

(3) A sign on or near the door of the office and in the building directory identifying the law office. The sign shall not state the nature of the practice, except as permitted under rule 32:7.4.

(4) A letterhead of a lawyer identifying the lawyer by name and as a lawyer and giving the lawyer's addresses, telephone numbers, the name of the lawyer's law firm, associates, and any information permitted under rule 32:7.4. A letterhead of a law firm may also give the names of members and associates, and names and dates related to deceased and retired members. A lawyer may be designated "Of Counsel" on a letterhead if the lawyer has a continuing relationship with a lawyer or law firm, other than as a partner or associate. A lawyer or law firm may be designated as "General Counsel" or by similar professional reference on stationery of a client if the lawyer or the firm devotes a substantial amount of professional time in the representation of that client. The letterhead of a law firm may give the names and dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line of succession.

(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name or other professional designation in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the

jurisdiction where the office is located.

(c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.

(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.

(e) A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a name that is misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name, or a firm name containing names other than those of one or more of the lawyers in the firm. However, the name of a professional corporation, professional association, professional limited liability company, or registered limited liability partnership may contain "P.C.", "P.A.", "P.L.C.", "L.L.P." or similar symbols indicating the nature of the organization and, if otherwise lawful, a firm may use as, or continue to include in, its name, the name or names of one or more deceased or retired members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession.

(f) A lawyer who is engaged both in the practice of law and another profession or business shall not so indicate on the lawyer's letterhead, office sign, or professional card, and shall not be identified as a lawyer in any publication in connection with the lawyer's other profession or business.

Comment

[1] A firm may be designated by the names of all or some of its members or by the names of deceased members when there has been a continuing succession in the firm's identity. The use of a trade name or an assumed name could mislead laypersons concerning the identity, responsibility, and status of those practicing under a trade name or an assumed name; therefore, such a practice is not permitted by this rule.

[2] In order to avoid the possibility of misleading persons with whom they deal, lawyers should be scrupulous in the representation of their professional status. With regard to paragraph (d), lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact associated with each other in a law firm, may not denominate themselves as, for example, "Smith and Jones," for that title suggests that they are practicing law together in a firm.

[3] A lawyer who occupies a judicial, legislative, or public executive or administrative position and who has the right to practice law concurrently may allow the lawyer's name to remain in the name of the firm if actively continuing to practice law as a member of the firm. Otherwise, the lawyer's name should be removed from the firm name, the lawyer should not be identified as a past or present member of the firm, and the lawyer should not be held out as being a practicing lawyer. The name of a partner who withdraws from a firm but continues to practice law should be omitted from the firm name in order to avoid misleading the public.

[4] The term "clinic," "center," or any other similar term shall not be used in any communication to the public unless the practice of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm is limited to specific legal services as described in rule 32:7.2(h)(3) for which costs of rendering the service can be substantially reduced because of the repetitive nature of the services performed and the use of standardized forms and office procedures.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:7.6: POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO OBTAIN LEGAL ENGAGEMENTS OR APPOINTMENTS BY JUDGES

A lawyer or law firm shall not accept a government legal engagement or an appointment by a judge if the lawyer or law firm makes a political contribution or solicits political contributions for the purpose of obtaining or being considered for that type of legal engagement or appointment.

Comment

[1] Lawyers have a right to participate fully in the political process, which includes making and soliciting political contributions to judges on the ballot for judicial retention and to candidates for other public offices. Nevertheless, when lawyers make or solicit political contributions in order to

obtain an engagement for legal work awarded by a government agency or to obtain appointment by a judge, the public may legitimately question whether the lawyers engaged to perform the work are selected on the basis of competence and merit. In such a circumstance, the integrity of the profession is undermined.

[2] The term “political contribution” denotes any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of anything of value made directly or indirectly to a candidate, incumbent, political party, or campaign committee to influence or provide financial support for retention of a judge or election of a person to government office. Political contributions in initiative and referendum elections are not included. For purposes of this rule, the term “political contribution” does not include uncompensated services.

[3] Subject to the exceptions below, (i) the term “government legal engagement” denotes any engagement to provide legal services that a public official has the direct or indirect power to award; and (ii) the term “appointment by a judge” denotes an appointment to a position such as referee, commissioner, special master, receiver, guardian, or other similar position that is made by a judge. Those terms do not, however, include (a) substantially uncompensated services; (b) engagements or appointments made on the basis of experience, expertise, professional qualifications, and cost following a request for proposal or other process that is free from influence based upon political contributions; and (c) engagements or appointments made on a rotational basis from a list compiled without regard to political contributions.

[4] The term “lawyer or law firm” includes a political action committee or other entity owned or controlled by a lawyer or law firm.

[5] Political contributions are for the purpose of obtaining or being considered for a government legal engagement or appointment by a judge if, but for the desire to be considered for the legal engagement or appointment, the lawyer or law firm would not have made or solicited the contributions. The purpose may be determined by an examination of the circumstances in which the contributions occur. For example, one or more contributions that in the aggregate are substantial in relation to other contributions by lawyers or law firms, made for the benefit of an official in a position to influence award of a government legal engagement, and followed by an award of the legal engagement to the contributing or soliciting lawyer or the lawyer’s firm would support an inference that the purpose of the contributions was to obtain the engagement, absent other factors that weigh against existence of the proscribed purpose. Those factors may include among others that the contribution or solicitation was made to further a political, social, or economic interest or because of an existing personal, family, or professional relationship with a candidate.

[6] If a lawyer makes or solicits a political contribution under circumstances that constitute bribery or another crime, rule 32:8.4(b) is implicated.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:7.7: RECOMMENDATION OF PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT

(a) A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in rules 32:7.2 and 32:7.3, recommend employment of the lawyer, the lawyer’s partner, or an associate of the lawyer, as a private practitioner, to a nonlawyer who has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer.

(b) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may:

(1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by rule 32:7.2;

(2) pay the usual charges of a lawyer referral service operated or sponsored by the bar association; and

(3) pay for a law practice in accordance with rule 32:1.17.

(c) A lawyer shall not request that a person or organization recommend or promote the use of the lawyer’s services or those of a partner, associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer’s firm, as a private practitioner, except as authorized in rules 32:7.2 and 32:7.3, and except that:

(1) A lawyer may request referrals from a lawyer referral service operated or sponsored by the bar association.

(2) A lawyer may participate in a directory listing by Iowa lawyers in an organization or association of lawyers engaged in a particular area of practice upon authorization by the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board. *See* Iowa Ct. R. 34.14(1).

(3) A lawyer may cooperate with the legal service activities of any of the offices or organizations enumerated in paragraphs (d)(1) through (4) and may perform legal services for

those to whom the lawyer was recommended by the office or organization to do such work if both of the following requirements are met:

(i) The person to whom the recommendation is made is a member or beneficiary of such office or organization.

(ii) The lawyer remains free to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client.

(d) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that furnishes or pays for legal services to others to promote the use of the lawyer's services or those of the lawyer's partners or associates or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer's firm, except as permitted by this rule. However, this rule does not prohibit a lawyer, a partner, an associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or firm, from being recommended, employed or paid by, or cooperating with, one of the following offices or organizations that promote the use of the lawyer's services or those of a partner, associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the firm:

(1) A legal aid office or public defender office operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school, a bona fide nonprofit community organization, or a governmental agency, or operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association.

(2) A military legal assistance office.

(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association.

(4) A legal services plan. A legal services plan is any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to its members or its beneficiaries provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(i) Such organization, including any affiliate, is organized and operated so that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of legal services by lawyers, and that, if the organization is organized for profit, the legal services are not rendered by lawyers employed, directed, supervised, or selected by it except in connection with matters where such organization bears ultimate liability of its member or beneficiary.

(ii) Neither the lawyer, nor any partner, associate, or other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer's firm, nor any nonlawyer, shall have initiated or promoted such organization for the primary purpose of providing financial or other benefit to such lawyer, partner, associate, or affiliated lawyer.

(iii) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private practitioner outside of the legal services program of the organization.

(iv) The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are furnished, and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in the matter.

(v) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal services furnished or paid for by the organization may, independent of the arrangement, if such member or beneficiary so desires, and at the person's own expense, select counsel other than that furnished, selected, or approved by the organization for the particular matter involved.

(vi) The legal service plan of such organization provides appropriate relief for any member or beneficiary who asserts a claim that the representation by counsel furnished, selected, or approved would be unethical, improper, or inadequate under the circumstances of the matter involved and the plan provides an appropriate procedure for seeking such relief.

(vii) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such organization is in violation of applicable laws, rules of court, and other legal requirements that govern its legal service operations.

(viii) The legal services plan is developed, administered, and operated so as to prevent a third party from interfering with or controlling a lawyer's performance of his or her duties or a third party's receipt of any part of the consideration paid to a lawyer for furnishing legal services.

(ix) There is no publicity and solicitation concerning the arrangement except by means of simple, dignified announcements. Such announcements may only set forth the purpose and activities of the organization and the nature and extent of the benefits provided under the arrangement. The announcements shall not identify the lawyers who render the legal services, and such announcement must be solely for the good faith purpose of developing, administering, or operating the arrangement, and not for the purpose of soliciting business for

any specific lawyer. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a statement in response to individual inquiries regarding the identities of the lawyers rendering services for the organization. Such responses may provide the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of such lawyers.

(x) Such organization has filed with the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board on or before July 1 of each year the report required by Iowa Ct. R. 34.14(2). A lawyer will not be deemed in violation of this provision if such organization has failed to file the required report so long as the lawyer does not know or have cause to know of such failure.

(e) A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person seeking legal services does so as a result of conduct prohibited under this rule.

Comment

[1] Selection of a lawyer by a layperson should be made on an informed basis. Advice and recommendation of third parties—relatives, friends, acquaintances, business associates, or other lawyers—and disclosure of relevant information about the lawyer and the lawyer's practice may be helpful. A layperson is best served if the recommendation is disinterested and informed. In order that the recommendation be disinterested, a lawyer should not seek to influence another to recommend employment. A lawyer should not compensate another person for a recommendation of employment, for influencing a prospective client to employ the lawyer, or to encourage future recommendations.

[2] Lawyers are not permitted to pay others for channeling professional work. Paragraph (b)(1), however, allows a lawyer to pay for advertising and communications permitted by rule 32:7.2, including the costs of print directory listings, on-line directory listings, newspaper advertisements, and television and radio airtime. A lawyer may compensate employees, agents, and vendors who are engaged to provide marketing or client-development services, such as publicists, public-relations personnel, business-development staff, and Web site designers. See rule 32:5.3 for the duties of lawyers and law firms with respect to the conduct of nonlawyers who prepare marketing materials for them.

[3] The legal profession has developed lawyer referral systems designed to aid individuals who are able to pay fees but need assistance in locating lawyers competent to handle their particular problems. Use of a lawyer referral system enables a layperson to avoid an uninformed selection of a lawyer because such a system makes possible the employment of competent lawyers who have indicated an interest in the subject matter involved. Lawyers should support the principle of lawyer referral systems and should encourage the evolution of other ethical plans which aid in the selection of qualified counsel.

[4] A lawyer who accepts assignments or referrals from a legal service plan or referrals from a lawyer referral service must act reasonably to ensure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible with the lawyer's professional obligations. See rule 32:5.3. Legal service plans and lawyer referral services may communicate with prospective clients, but such communication must be in conformity with these rules. Thus, advertising must not be false or misleading, as would be the case if the communications of a group legal services plan would mislead prospective clients to think that it was a lawyer referral service sponsored by a state agency or bar association. Nor could the lawyer allow in-person, telephonic, or real-time contacts that would violate rule 32:7.3.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:7.8: SUGGESTION OF NEED OF LEGAL SERVICES

(a) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice in-person or by telephone to a layperson to obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice, except that:

(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, existing client, or former client, provided the lawyer does not know or have reason to know the attorney-client relationship has been terminated.

(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from personal participation in activities designed to educate laypersons to recognize legal problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize available legal services if such activities are conducted or sponsored by

any of the offices or organizations enumerated in rule 32:7.7(d)(1) through (4), to the extent and under the conditions prescribed therein.

(3) A lawyer who is recommended, furnished, or paid by a qualified legal assistance organization enumerated in rule 32:7.7(d)(1) through (4) may represent a member or beneficiary thereof, to the extent and under the conditions prescribed therein.

(b) Without affecting the right to accept employment, a lawyer may speak publicly or write for publication on legal topics so long as such activities do not emphasize the lawyer's own professional experience or reputation and the lawyer does not undertake to give individual advice.

(c) If success in asserting rights or defenses of a client in litigation in the nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder.

Comment

[1] Whether a lawyer acts properly in volunteering in-person advice to a layperson to seek legal services depends upon the circumstances. The giving of advice that one should take legal action could well be in fulfillment of the duty of the legal profession to assist laypersons in recognizing legal problems. The advice is proper only if the lawyer is motivated by a desire to protect one who does not recognize that one may have legal problems or who is ignorant of one's legal rights or obligations. The advice is improper if the lawyer is motivated by a desire to obtain personal benefit, secure personal publicity, or cause legal action to be taken merely to harass or injure another. Since motivation is subjective and often difficult to judge, the motives of a lawyer who volunteers in-person advice likely to produce legal controversy may well be suspect if the lawyer receives professional employment or other benefits as a result. A lawyer who volunteers in-person advice that one should obtain the services of a lawyer generally should not accept employment, compensation, or other benefit in connection with that matter except as permitted by this rule.

[2] The public's need for legal services is met only if laypersons recognize their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and are able to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel. Hence, important functions of the legal profession are to educate laypersons to recognize their problems, to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available.

[3] The legal profession should assist laypersons to recognize legal problems because such problems may not be self-revealing and often are not timely noticed. Therefore, lawyers should encourage and participate in educational and public relations programs concerning our legal system with particular reference to legal problems that frequently arise. Preparation of advertisements and professional articles for lay publications and participation in seminars, lectures, and civic programs should be motivated by a desire to educate the public to an awareness of legal needs and to provide information relevant to the selection of the most appropriate counsel rather than to obtain publicity for particular lawyers.

[4] A lawyer who writes or speaks for the purpose of educating members of the public to recognize legal problems should carefully refrain from giving or appearing to give a general solution applicable to all apparently similar individual problems, since slight changes in fact situations may require a material variance in the applicable advice; otherwise, the public may be misled and misadvised. Talks and writings by lawyers for laypersons should caution laypersons not to attempt to solve individual problems upon the basis of the information contained therein.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION

Rule 32:8.1: BAR ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY MATTERS

An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or

(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure

of information otherwise protected by rule 32:1.6 or Iowa Code section 622.10.

Comment

[1] The duty imposed by this rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or disciplinary matter as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. Paragraph (b) of this rule also requires correction of any prior misstatement in the matter that the applicant or lawyer may have made and affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware.

[2] This rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this rule.

[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship, including rule 32:1.6, Iowa Code section 622.10, and, in some cases, rule 32:3.3.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:8.2: JUDICIAL AND LEGAL OFFICIALS

(a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer, or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.

(b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Comment

[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney, and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity.

[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:8.3: REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct shall inform the appropriate professional authority.

(b) A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct shall inform the appropriate authority.

(c) This rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule 32:1.6 or Iowa Code section 622.10 or information gained by a lawyer or judge while participating in an approved lawyers assistance program.

Comment

[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.

[2] A report about misconduct is not required where it would involve violation of rule 32:1.6 or Iowa Code section 622.10. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where prosecution of the professional misconduct would not substantially prejudice the client's interests.

[3] (Reserved)

[4] The duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyer retained to represent a lawyer whose professional conduct is in question. Such a situation is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship and Iowa Code section 622.10.

[5] Information about a lawyer's or judge's misconduct or fitness may be received by a lawyer in the course of that lawyer's participation in an approved lawyers or judges assistance program. In that circumstance, providing for an exception to the reporting requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule encourages lawyers and judges to seek treatment through such a program. Conversely, without such an exception, lawyers and judges may hesitate to seek assistance from these programs, which may then result in additional harm to their professional careers and additional injury to the welfare of clients and the public. These rules do not otherwise address the confidentiality of information received by a lawyer or judge participating in an approved lawyers assistance program; such an obligation, however, may be imposed by the rules of the program or other law.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:8.4: MISCONDUCT

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or

(g) engage in sexual harassment or other unlawful discrimination in the practice of law or knowingly permit staff or agents subject to the lawyer's direction and control to do so.

Comment

[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.

[2] Illegal conduct can reflect adversely on fitness to practice law. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.

[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule. For another reference to discrimination as

professional misconduct, see paragraph (g).

[4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of rule 32:1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.

[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of a lawyer. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent, and officer, director, or manager of a corporation or other organization.

[6] It is not professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others about or to supervise or participate in lawful covert activity in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights or in lawful intelligence-gathering activity, provided the lawyer's conduct is otherwise in compliance with these rules. "Covert activity" means an effort to obtain information on unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentations or other subterfuge. Covert activity may be commenced by a lawyer or involve a lawyer as an advisor or supervisor only when the lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken place, is taking place, or will take place in the foreseeable future. Likewise, a government lawyer who supervises or participates in a lawful covert operation which involves misrepresentation or deceit for the purpose of gathering relevant information, such as law enforcement investigation of suspected illegal activity or an intelligence-gathering activity, does not, without more, violate this rule.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

Rule 32:8.5: DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY; CHOICE OF LAW

(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in Iowa is subject to the disciplinary authority of Iowa, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted in Iowa is also subject to the disciplinary authority of Iowa if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in Iowa. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both Iowa and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.

(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of Iowa, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:

(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and

(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur.

Comment

Disciplinary Authority

[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in Iowa is subject to the disciplinary authority of Iowa. Extension of the disciplinary authority of Iowa to other lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in Iowa is for the protection of the citizens of Iowa. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this rule. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.18. A lawyer who is subject to Iowa's disciplinary authority under rule 32:8.5(a) appoints the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Iowa to receive service of process with respect to Iowa disciplinary matters. The fact that the lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of Iowa may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters.

Choice of law

[2] A lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules

that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.

[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.

[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer's conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits, or in another jurisdiction.

[5] When a lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this rule.

[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer for the same conduct, they should, in applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules.

[7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties, or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise.

[Court Order April 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005]

CHAPTER 51

IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

PREAMBLE

SCOPE

TERMINOLOGY

APPLICATION

CANON 1

A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD AND PROMOTE THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY AND SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

- Rule 51:1.1 COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
- Rule 51:1.2 PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
- Rule 51:1.3 AVOIDING ABUSE OF THE PRESTIGE OF JUDICIAL OFFICE

CANON 2

A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY

- Rule 51:2.1 GIVING PRECEDENCE TO THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE
- Rule 51:2.2 IMPARTIALITY AND FAIRNESS
- Rule 51:2.3 BIAS, PREJUDICE, AND HARASSMENT
- Rule 51:2.4 EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT
- Rule 51:2.5 COMPETENCE, DILIGENCE, AND COOPERATION
- Rule 51:2.6 ENSURING THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD
- Rule 51:2.7 RESPONSIBILITY TO DECIDE
- Rule 51:2.8 DECORUM, Demeanor, AND COMMUNICATION WITH JURORS
- Rule 51:2.9 EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
- Rule 51:2.10 JUDICIAL STATEMENTS ON PENDING AND IMPENDING CASES
- Rule 51:2.11 DISQUALIFICATION
- Rule 51:2.12 SUPERVISORY DUTIES
- Rule 51:2.13 ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS
- Rule 51:2.14 DISABILITY AND IMPAIRMENT
- Rule 51:2.15 RESPONDING TO JUDICIAL AND LAWYER MISCONDUCT
- Rule 51:2.16 COOPERATION WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES

CANON 3

A JUDGE SHALL CONDUCT THE JUDGE'S PERSONAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF CONFLICT WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF JUDICIAL OFFICE

- Rule 51:3.1 EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL
- Rule 51:3.2 APPEARANCES BEFORE GOVERNMENTAL BODIES AND CONSULTATION WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
- Rule 51:3.3 TESTIFYING AS A CHARACTER WITNESS
- Rule 51:3.4 APPOINTMENTS TO GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS
- Rule 51:3.5 USE OF NONPUBLIC INFORMATION
- Rule 51:3.6 AFFILIATION WITH DISCRIMINATORY ORGANIZATIONS
- Rule 51:3.7 PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATIONAL, RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, FRATERNAL, OR CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
- Rule 51:3.8 APPOINTMENTS TO FIDUCIARY POSITIONS
- Rule 51:3.9 SERVICE AS ARBITRATOR OR MEDIATOR
- Rule 51:3.10 PRACTICE OF LAW
- Rule 51:3.11 FINANCIAL, BUSINESS, OR REMUNERATIVE ACTIVITIES
- Rule 51:3.12 COMPENSATION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES
- Rule 51:3.13 ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS, LOANS, BEQUESTS, BENEFITS, OR OTHER THINGS OF VALUE
- Rule 51:3.14 REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES AND WAIVERS OF FEES OR CHARGES

CANON 4***A JUDGE OR CANDIDATE FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN
POLITICAL OR CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, OR IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY***

- Rule 51:4.1 POLITICAL AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF JUDGES AND JUDICIAL CANDIDATES IN GENERAL
- Rule 51:4.2 POLITICAL AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF JUDICIAL CANDIDATES IN RETENTION ELECTIONS
- Rule 51:4.3 ACTIVITIES OF CANDIDATES FOR APPOINTIVE JUDICIAL OFFICE
- Rule 51:4.4 CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES
- Rule 51:4.5 ACTIVITIES OF JUDGES WHO BECOME CANDIDATES FOR NONJUDICIAL OFFICE

CHAPTER 51

IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

PREAMBLE

[1] An independent, fair, and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all the rules contained in the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.

[2] Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times and avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives. They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.

[3] The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct establishes standards for the ethical conduct of judges and judicial candidates. It is not intended as an exhaustive guide for the conduct of judges and judicial candidates, who are governed in their judicial and personal conduct by general ethical standards as well as by the Code. The Code is intended, however, to provide guidance and assist judges in maintaining the highest standards of judicial and personal conduct, and to provide a basis for regulating their conduct through disciplinary agencies.

SCOPE

[1] The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct consists of four Canons, numbered rules under each Canon, and comments that generally follow and explain each rule. Scope and terminology sections provide additional guidance in interpreting and applying the Code. An application section establishes when the various rules apply to a judge or judicial candidate.

[2] The Canons state overarching principles of judicial ethics that all judges must observe. Although a judge may be disciplined only for violating a rule, the Canons provide important guidance in interpreting the rules. Where a rule contains a permissive term, such as “may” or “should,” the conduct being addressed is committed to the personal and professional discretion of the judge or candidate in question, and no disciplinary action should be taken for action or inaction within the bounds of such discretion.

[3] The comments that accompany the rules serve two functions. First, they provide guidance regarding the purpose, meaning, and proper application of the rules. They contain explanatory material and, in some instances, provide examples of permitted or prohibited conduct. Comments neither add to nor subtract from the binding obligations set forth in the rules. Therefore, when a comment contains the term “must,” it does not mean that the comment itself is binding or enforceable; it signifies that the rule in question, properly understood, is obligatory as to the conduct at issue.

[4] Second, the comments identify aspirational goals for judges. To implement fully the principles of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct as articulated in the Canons, judges should strive to exceed the standards of conduct established by the rules, holding themselves to the highest ethical standards and seeking to achieve those aspirational goals, thereby enhancing the dignity of the judicial office.

[5] The rules of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct are rules of reason that should be applied consistent with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules, and decisional law, and with due regard for all relevant circumstances. The rules should not be interpreted to impinge upon the essential independence of judges in making judicial decisions.

[6] Although the black letter of the rules is binding and enforceable, it is not contemplated that every transgression will result in the imposition of discipline. Whether discipline should be imposed should be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application of the rules, and should depend upon factors such as the seriousness of the transgression, the facts and circumstances that existed at the time

of the transgression, the extent of any pattern of improper activity, whether there have been previous violations, and the effect of the improper activity upon the judicial system or others.

[7] The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct is not designed or intended as a basis for civil or criminal liability. Neither is it intended to be the basis for litigants to seek collateral remedies against each other or to obtain tactical advantages in proceedings before a court.

TERMINOLOGY

The first time any term listed below is used in a rule in its defined sense, it is followed by an asterisk (*).

“Affiliate” and **“affiliated”** mean any person, domestic or foreign, that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with any other person. *See* rule 51:2.11.

“Appropriate authority” means the authority having responsibility for the initiation of disciplinary process in connection with the violation to be reported. *See* rules 51:2.14 and 51:2.15.

“Associate” and **“associated”** means any person who employs, is employed by, or is under common employment with another person; any person who acts in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request of, another person; and any spouse, domestic partner, or person within the third degree of relationship of any of the foregoing. *See* rule 51:2.11.

“Contribution” means both financial and in-kind contributions, such as goods, professional or volunteer services, advertising, and other types of assistance which, if obtained by the recipient otherwise, would require a financial expenditure. *See* rules 51:3.7, 51:4.1, and 51:4.4.

“Control” and **“controlled”** each refers to the power of one person to exercise, directly or indirectly or through one or more persons, a dominating, governing, or controlling influence over another person, whether by contractual relationship (including without limitation a debtor-creditor relationship), by family relationship, by ownership, dominion over, or power to vote any category or voting interest (including without limitation shares of common stock, shares of voting preferred stock, and partnership interests), or by exercising (or wielding the power to exercise) in any manner dominion over a majority of directors, partners, trustees, or other persons performing similar functions. *See* definition of “affiliate” and “affiliated.”

“De minimis,” in the context of interests pertaining to disqualification of a judge, means an insignificant interest that could not raise a reasonable question regarding the judge’s impartiality. *See* rule 51:2.11.

“Domestic partner” means a person with whom another person maintains a household and an intimate relationship, other than a person to whom he or she is legally married. *See* rules 51:2.11, 51:2.13, 51:3.13, and 51:3.14.

“Economic interest” means ownership of more than a de minimis legal or equitable interest. Except for situations in which the judge participates in the management of such a legal or equitable interest, or the interest could be substantially affected by the outcome of a proceeding before a judge, it does not include:

- (1) an interest in the individual holdings within a mutual or common investment fund;
- (2) an interest in securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization in which the judge or the judge’s spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a director, an officer, an advisor, or other participant;
- (3) a deposit in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge may maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or similar proprietary interests; or
- (4) an interest in the issuer of government securities held by the judge.

See rules 51:1.3 and 51:2.11.

“Fiduciary” includes relationships such as executor, administrator, trustee, or guardian. *See* rules 51:2.11, 51:3.2, and 51:3.8.

“Impartial,” “impartiality,” and “impartially” mean absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge. *See* Canons 1, 2, and 4, and rules 51:1.2, 51:2.2, 51:2.10, 51:2.11, 51:2.13, 51:3.1, 51:3.12, 51:3.13, 51:4.1, and 51:4.2.

“Impending matter” is a matter that is imminent or expected to occur in the near future. *See* rules 51:2.9, 51:2.10, 51:3.13, and 51:4.1.

“Impropriety” includes conduct that violates the law, court rules, or provisions of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, and conduct that undermines a judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality. *See* Canon 1 and rule 51:1.2.

“Independence” means a judge’s freedom from influence or controls other than those established by law. *See* Canons 1 and 4, and rules 51:1.2, 51:3.1, 51:3.12, 51:3.13, and 51:4.2.

“Integrity” means probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character. *See* Canon 1 and rule 51:1.2.

“Judicial candidate” means any person, including a sitting judge, who is seeking selection for or retention in judicial office by election or appointment. A person becomes a candidate for judicial office as soon as he or she declares or files as a candidate with the election or appointment authority, authorizes, where permitted, solicitation or acceptance of contributions or support, or is seeking appointment to office. *See* rules 51:2.11, 51:4.1, 51:4.2, and 51:4.4.

“Knowingly,” “knowledge,” “known,” and “knows” mean actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. *See* rules 51:2.11, 51:2.15, 51:2.16, 51:3.6, and 51:4.1.

“Law” encompasses court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions, and decisional law. *See* rules 51:1.1, 51:2.1, 51:2.2, 51:2.6, 51:2.7, 51:2.9, 51:3.1, 51:3.4, 51:3.9, 51:3.12, 51:3.13, 51:3.14, 51:3.15, 51:4.1, 51:4.2, 51:4.4, and 51:4.5.

“Member of the candidate’s family” means a spouse, domestic partner, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the candidate maintains a close familial relationship.

“Member of the judge’s family” means a spouse, domestic partner, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship. *See* rules 51:3.7, 51:3.8, 51:3.10, and 51:3.11.

“Member of a judge’s family residing in the judge’s household” means any relative of a judge by blood or marriage, or a person treated by a judge as a member of the judge’s family, who resides in the judge’s household. *See* rules 51:2.11 and 51:3.13.

“Nonpublic information” means information that is not available to the public. Nonpublic information may include, but is not limited to, information that is sealed by statute or court order or impounded or communicated in camera, and information offered in grand jury proceedings, presentencing reports, dependency cases, or psychiatric reports. *See* rule 51:3.5.

“Pending matter” is a matter that has commenced. A matter continues to be pending through any appellate process until final disposition. *See* rules 51:2.9, 51:2.10, 51:3.13, and 51:4.1.

“Person” means any natural or juridical person, including without limitation any corporation, limited liability company, partnership, trust, union, or other labor organization; any branch, division, department, or local unit of any of the foregoing; any political committee, party, or organization; or any other organization or group of persons. *See* rule 51:2.11.

“Personally solicit” means a direct request made by a judge or a judicial candidate for financial support or in-kind services, whether made by letter, telephone, or any other means of communication. *See* rule 51:4.1.

“Political organization” means a political party or other group sponsored by or affiliated with a political party or candidate, the principal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of candidates for political office. For purposes of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, the term does

not include a judicial candidate's campaign committee created as authorized by rule 51:4.4. *See* rules 51:4.1 and 51:4.2.

“Restricted donor” means

(1) a party or other person involved in a case pending before the donee.

(2) a party or a person seeking to be a party to any sale, purchase, lease or contract involving the judicial branch or any of its offices, if the donee has authority to approve the sale, purchase, lease or contract, or if the donee assists or advises the person with authority to approve the sale, purchase, lease or contract.

(3) a person who will be directly or substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the donee's official duties in a way that is greater than the effect on the public generally or on a substantial class of persons to which the donor belongs as a member of a profession, occupation, industry or region.

See rule 51:3.13.

“Third degree of relationship” includes the following persons: great-grandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew, and niece. *See* rule 51:2.11.

APPLICATION

The application section establishes when the various rules apply to a judge or judicial candidate.

I. Applicability of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct

(A) The provisions of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct apply to all full-time and senior judges. Parts II through IV of this section identify those provisions that apply to three distinct categories of part-time judges. Canon 4 applies to judicial candidates.

(B) A judge, within the meaning of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, is anyone who is authorized to perform judicial functions, including an officer such as a magistrate, special master, child support referee, probate referee, or judicial hospitalization referee. Administrative law judges are not judges within the meaning of the Code.

Comment

[1] The rules in the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct have been formulated to address the ethical obligations of any person who serves a judicial function and are premised upon the supposition that a uniform system of ethical principles should apply to all those authorized to perform judicial functions.

[2] The determination of which category and, accordingly, which specific rules apply to an individual judicial officer depends upon the facts of the particular judicial service.

[3] In Iowa, many districts have formed drug courts. Judges presiding in drug courts may be authorized and even encouraged to communicate directly with social workers, probation officers, and others outside the context of their usual judicial role as independent decision makers on issues of fact and law. When the law* specifically authorizes conduct not otherwise permitted under these rules, that law takes precedence over the provisions set forth in the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. Nevertheless, judges serving on drug courts and other “problem solving” courts shall comply with this Code except to the extent the law provides and permits otherwise.

II. Retired Justice or Judge Subject to Recall for Service under Iowa Code Section 602.1612

A retired justice or judge subject to recall for service, who by law is not permitted to practice law, is not required to comply:

(A) with rule 51:3.9 (Service as Arbitrator or Mediator), except while serving as a judge; or

(B) at any time with rule 51:3.8 (Appointments to Fiduciary Positions).

Comment

[1] For the purposes of this section, as long as a retired judge is subject to being recalled for service, the judge is considered to “perform judicial functions.” This provision does not supersede the restrictions applicable to retired judges participating in the senior judge program.

III. Magistrate and Other Continuing Part-Time Judge

A judge who serves repeatedly on a part-time basis or under a continuing appointment (“continuing part-time judge”),

(A) is not required to comply:

(1) with rules 51:2.10(A) and 51:2.10(B) (Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases), except while serving as a judge; or

(2) at any time with rules 51:3.4 (Appointments to Governmental Positions), 51:3.8 (Appointments to Fiduciary Positions), 51:3.9 (Service as Arbitrator or Mediator), 51:3.10 (Practice of Law), 51:3.11 (Financial, Business, or Remunerative Activities), 51:3.14 (Reimbursement of Expenses and Waivers of Fees or Charges), and 51:3.15 (Reporting Requirements);

(B) except as provided in paragraph (C), shall not practice law in the court on which the judge serves and shall not act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which the judge has served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto; and

(C) when not otherwise prohibited by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, may appear as counsel for a client in a matter that is within the jurisdiction of a magistrate so long as the matter is heard by a district judge or a district associate judge. Partners or associates of a magistrate may appear before a magistrate other than their partner or associate.

Comment

[1] When a person who has been a continuing part-time judge is no longer a continuing part-time judge, that person may act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which he or she has served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto only with the informed consent of all parties, and pursuant to Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.12.

IV. Special Master, Referee, and Other Pro Tempore Part-Time Judge

A special master, referee, and other pro tempore part-time judge who serves or expects to serve once or only sporadically on a part-time basis under a separate appointment for each period of service or for each case heard is not required to comply:

(A) except while serving as a judge, with rules 51:1.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary), 51:2.4 (External Influences on Judicial Conduct), 51:2.10 (Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases), or 51:3.2 (Appearances before Governmental Bodies and Consultation with Government Officials); or

(B) at any time with rules 51:3.4 (Appointments to Governmental Positions), 51:3.6 (Affiliation with Discriminatory Organizations), 51:3.7 (Participation in Educational, Religious, Charitable, Fraternal, or Civic Organizations and Activities), 51:3.8 (Appointments to Fiduciary Positions), 51:3.9 (Service as Arbitrator or Mediator), 51:3.10 (Practice of Law), 51:3.11 (Financial, Business, or Remunerative Activities), 51:3.13 (Acceptance of Gifts, Loans, Bequests, Benefits, or Other Things of Value), 51:3.15 (Reporting Requirements), 51:4.1 (Political and Campaign Activities of Judges and Judicial Candidates in General), and 51:4.5 (Activities of Judges Who Become Candidates for Nonjudicial Office).

V. Time for Compliance

A person to whom the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct becomes applicable shall comply immediately with its provisions, except that those judges to whom rules 51:3.8 (Appointments to Fiduciary Positions) and 51:3.11 (Financial, Business, or Remunerative Activities) apply shall comply with those rules as soon as reasonably possible, but in no event later than six months after the Code becomes applicable to the judge.

Comment

[1] If serving as a fiduciary when selected as judge, a new judge may, notwithstanding the prohibitions in rule 51:3.8, continue to serve as fiduciary, but only for that period of time necessary to avoid serious adverse consequences to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary relationship and in no event longer than six months. Similarly, if engaged at the time of judicial selection in a business activity, a new judge may, notwithstanding the prohibitions in rule 51:3.11, continue in that activity for a reasonable period but in no event longer than six months.

CANON 1***A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD AND PROMOTE THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY AND SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY*****Rule 51:1.1: COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW**

A judge shall comply with the law,* including the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:1.2: PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY

A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence,* integrity,* and impartiality* of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety* and the appearance of impropriety.

Comment

[1] Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct and conduct that creates the appearance of impropriety. This principle applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge.

[2] A judge should expect to be the subject of public scrutiny that might be viewed as burdensome if applied to other citizens and must accept the restrictions imposed by the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.

[3] Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary. Because it is not practicable to list all such conduct, the rule is necessarily cast in general terms.

[4] Judges should participate in activities that promote ethical conduct among judges and lawyers, support professionalism within the judiciary and the legal profession, and promote access to justice for all.

[5] Actual improprieties include violations of law, court rules or provisions of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge's honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.

[6] A judge should initiate and participate in community outreach activities for the purpose of promoting public understanding of and confidence in the administration of justice. In conducting such activities, the judge must act in a manner consistent with the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:1.3: AVOIDING ABUSE OF THE PRESTIGE OF JUDICIAL OFFICE

A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests* of the judge or others, or allow others to do so.

Comment

[1] It is improper for a judge to use or attempt to use his or her position to gain personal advantage or deferential treatment of any kind. For example, it would be improper for a judge to allude to his or

her judicial status to gain favorable treatment in encounters with traffic officials. Similarly, a judge must not use judicial letterhead to gain an advantage in conducting his or her personal business.

[2] A judge may provide a reference or recommendation for an individual based upon the judge's personal knowledge. The judge may use official letterhead for such reference or recommendation. Except as provided in comment 3 or as a member of a nominating commission under Iowa Code chapter 46, a judge should not provide a reference or recommendation for a person seeking appointment to judicial office. This rule does not prohibit an applicant from listing a judge as a reference when seeking appointment to judicial office.

[3] Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection by cooperating with appointing authorities and screening committees and by responding to specific inquiries from such entities concerning the professional qualifications of a person being considered for judicial office.

[4] Special considerations arise when judges write or contribute to publications of for-profit entities, whether related or unrelated to the law. A judge should not permit anyone associated with the publication of such materials to exploit the judge's office in a manner that violates this rule or other applicable law. In contracts for publication of a judge's writing, the judge should retain sufficient control over the advertising to avoid such exploitation.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

CANON 2

A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY

Rule 51:2.1: GIVING PRECEDENCE TO THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE

The duties of judicial office, as prescribed by law,* shall take precedence over all of a judge's personal and extrajudicial activities.

Comment

[1] To ensure that judges are available to fulfill their judicial duties, judges must conduct their personal and extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflicts that would result in frequent disqualification. *See* Canon 3.

[2] Although it is not a duty of judicial office unless prescribed by law, judges are encouraged to participate in activities that promote public understanding of and confidence in the justice system.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.2: IMPARTIALITY AND FAIRNESS

A judge shall uphold and apply the law,* and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.*

Comment

[1] To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a judge must be objective and open-minded.

[2] Although each judge comes to the bench with a unique background and personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in question.

[3] When applying and interpreting the law, a judge sometimes may make good-faith errors of fact or law. Errors of this kind do not violate this rule.

[4] It is not a violation of this rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure self-represented litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard. By way of illustration, a judge may: (1) provide brief information about the proceeding; (2) provide information about evidentiary and foundational requirements; (3) modify the traditional order of taking evidence; (4) refrain from using legal jargon; (5) explain the basis for a ruling; and (6) make referrals to any resources available to assist the litigant in the preparation of the case.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.3: BIAS, PREJUDICE, AND HARASSMENT

(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.

(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so.

(C) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice or engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including but not limited to race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, against parties, witnesses, lawyers, or others.

(D) The restrictions of paragraphs (B) and (C) do not preclude judges or lawyers from making legitimate reference to the listed factors, or similar factors, when they are relevant to an issue in a proceeding.

Comment

[1] A judge who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute.

[2] Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; insensitive statements about crimes against women; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias or prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.

[3] Harassment, as referred to in paragraphs (B) and (C), is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward a person on bases such as race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.

[4] Sexual harassment includes but is not limited to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that is unwelcome.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.4: EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT

(A) A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.

(B) A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment.

(C) A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression that any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge.

Comment

[1] An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases according to the law and facts, without regard to whether particular laws or litigants are popular or unpopular with the public, the media, government officials, or the judge's friends or family. Confidence in the judiciary is eroded if judicial decision making is perceived to be subject to inappropriate outside influences.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.5: COMPETENCE, DILIGENCE, AND COOPERATION

(A) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently and diligently.

(B) A judge shall cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of court business.

Comment

[1] Competence in the performance of judicial duties requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilities of judicial office.

[2] A judge should seek the necessary docket time, court staff, expertise, and resources to discharge all adjudicative and administrative responsibilities.

[3] Prompt disposition of the court's business requires a judge to devote adequate time to judicial duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in determining matters under submission, and to take reasonable measures to ensure that court officials, litigants, and their lawyers cooperate with the judge to that end.

[4] In disposing of matters promptly and efficiently, a judge must demonstrate due regard for the rights of parties to be heard and to have issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay. A judge should monitor and supervise cases in ways that reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays, and unnecessary costs.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.6: ENSURING THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD

(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.*

(B) A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute but shall not act in a manner that coerces any party into settlement.

Comment

[1] The right to be heard is an essential component of a fair and impartial system of justice. Substantive rights of litigants can be protected only if procedures protecting the right to be heard are observed.

[2] The judge plays an important role in overseeing the settlement of disputes, but should be careful that efforts to further settlement do not undermine any party's right to be heard according to law. The judge should keep in mind the effect that the judge's participation in settlement discussions may have, not only on the judge's own views of the case, but also on the perceptions of the lawyers and the parties if the case remains with the judge after settlement efforts are unsuccessful. Among the factors that a judge should consider when deciding upon an appropriate settlement practice for a case are (1) whether the parties have requested or voluntarily consented to a certain level of participation by the judge in settlement discussions, (2) whether the parties and their counsel are relatively sophisticated in legal matters, (3) whether the case will be tried by the judge or a jury, (4) whether the parties participate with their counsel in settlement discussions, (5) whether any parties are unrepresented by counsel, and (6) whether the matter is civil or criminal.

[3] Judges must be mindful of the effect settlement discussions can have, not only on their objectivity and impartiality, but also on the appearance of their objectivity and impartiality. Despite a judge's best efforts, there may be instances when information obtained during settlement discussions could influence a judge's decision making during trial, and, in such instances, the judge should consider whether disqualification may be appropriate. *See* rule 51:2.11(A)(1).

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.7: RESPONSIBILITY TO DECIDE

A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is required by rule 2.11 or other law.*

Comment

[1] Judges must be available to decide the matters that come before the court. Although there are times when disqualification is necessary to protect the rights of litigants and preserve public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, judges must be available

to decide matters that come before the courts. Unwarranted disqualification may bring public disfavor to the court and to the judge personally. The dignity of the court, the judge's respect for fulfillment of judicial duties, and a proper concern for the burdens that may be imposed upon the judge's colleagues require that a judge not use disqualification to avoid cases that present difficult, controversial, or unpopular issues.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.8: DECORUM, DEMEANOR, AND COMMUNICATION WITH JURORS

(A) A judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the court.

(B) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and shall require similar conduct of lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control.

(C) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict other than in a court order or opinion in a proceeding, but may express appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial system and the community.

Comment

[1] The duty to hear all proceedings with patience and courtesy is not inconsistent with the duty imposed in rule 51:2.5 to dispose promptly of the business of the court. Judges can be efficient and businesslike while being patient and deliberate.

[2] Commending or criticizing jurors for their verdict may imply a judicial expectation in future cases and may impair a juror's ability to be fair and impartial in a subsequent case.

[3] A judge who is not otherwise prohibited by law from doing so may meet with jurors who choose to remain after trial but should be careful not to discuss the merits of the case.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.9: EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS

(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending matter* or impending matter,* except as follows:

(1) When circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters, is permitted, provided:

(a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; and

(b) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication, and gives the parties an opportunity to respond.

(2) A judge may obtain the written advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the judge, if the judge gives advance notice to the parties of the person to be consulted and the subject matter of the advice to be solicited, and affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to object and respond to the notice and to the advice received.

(3) A judge may consult with court staff and court officials whose functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges, provided the judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record, and does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the matter.

(4) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending before the judge.

(5) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communication when expressly authorized by law* to do so.

(B) If a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing upon the substance of a matter, the judge shall make provision promptly to notify the parties of the substance of the communication and provide the parties with an opportunity to respond.

(C) A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.

(D) A judge shall make reasonable efforts, including providing appropriate supervision,

to ensure that this rule is not violated by court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control.

Comment

[1] To the extent reasonably possible, all parties or their lawyers shall be included in communications with a judge. *See, e.g.,* Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1507.

[2] Whenever the presence of a party or notice to a party is required by this rule, it is the party's lawyer or, if the party is unrepresented, the party who is to be present or to whom notice is to be given.

[3] The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding includes communications with lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted by this rule.

[4] A judge may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications expressly authorized by law, such as when serving on therapeutic or problem-solving courts, mental health courts, or drug courts. In this capacity, judges may assume a more interactive role with parties, treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and others.

[5] A judge may consult with other judges on pending matters, but must avoid ex parte discussions of a case with judges who have previously been disqualified from hearing the matter and with judges who have appellate jurisdiction over the matter.

[6] The prohibition against a judge investigating the facts in a matter extends to information available in all mediums, including electronic.

[7] A judge may consult ethics advisory committees, outside counsel, or legal experts concerning the judge's compliance with the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. Such consultations are not subject to the restrictions of paragraph (A)(2).

[8] Parties frequently present ex parte requests to a judge for routine scheduling matters. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.453 requires the clerk to provide notice of all orders entered by the court. A notice of orders entered in routine scheduling matters provided by the clerk satisfies the judge's obligation under paragraph (A)(1)(b).

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.10: JUDICIAL STATEMENTS ON PENDING AND IMPENDING CASES

(A) A judge shall not make any public statement that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a pending matter* or impending matter* in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.

(B) A judge shall not, in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial* performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.

(C) A judge shall require court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control to refrain from making statements that the judge would be prohibited from making by paragraphs (A) and (B).

(D) Notwithstanding the restrictions in paragraph (A), a judge may explain court procedures and may comment on any proceeding in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity.

(E) Subject to the requirements of paragraph (A), a judge may respond directly or through a third party to allegations in the media or elsewhere concerning the judge's conduct in a matter.

Comment

[1] This rule's restrictions on judicial speech are essential to the maintenance of the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.

[2] This rule does not prohibit a judge from commenting on proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity. In cases in which the judge is a litigant in an official capacity, such as a writ of mandamus, the judge must not comment publicly.

[3] Depending upon the circumstances, the judge should consider whether it may be preferable for a third party, rather than the judge, to respond or issue statements in connection with allegations concerning the judge's conduct in a matter.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.11: DISQUALIFICATION

(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality* might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:

(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge* of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.

(2) The judge knows* that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner,* or a person within the third degree of relationship* to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is:

(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party;

(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(c) a person who has more than a de minimis* interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or

(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary,* or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household,* has an economic interest* in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding.

(4) The judge knows or learns by means of disclosures mandated by law* or a timely motion that the judge's participation in a matter or proceeding would violate due process of law as a result of:

(a) campaign contributions made by donors associated* or affiliated* with a party or counsel appearing before the court, or

(b) independent campaign expenditures by a person* other than a judge's campaign committee, whose donors to the independent campaign are associated or affiliated with a party or counsel appearing before the court.

(5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate,* has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.

(6) The judge:

(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy or was associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association;

(b) served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy;

(c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or

(d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court.

(B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse or domestic partner and minor children residing in the judge's household.

(C) A judge subject to disqualification under this rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding.

Comment

[1] Under this rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (6) apply. The term "recusal" is used interchangeably with the term "disqualification."

[2] A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed.

[3] The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For example, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable.

[4] The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not itself disqualify the judge. If, however, the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under paragraph (A), or the relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be substantially affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(c), the judge's disqualification is required.

[5] A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification.

[6] "Economic interest," as set forth in the terminology section, means ownership of more than a de minimis legal or equitable interest. Except for situations in which a judge participates in the management of such a legal or equitable interest, or the interest could be substantially affected by the outcome of a proceeding before a judge, it does not include:

- (1) an interest in the individual holdings within a mutual or common investment fund;
- (2) an interest in securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization in which the judge or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a director, officer, advisor, or other participant;
- (3) a deposit in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge may maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or similar proprietary interests; or
- (4) an interest in the issuer of government securities held by the judge.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.12: SUPERVISORY DUTIES

(A) A judge shall require court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control to act in a manner consistent with the judge's obligations under the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.

(B) A judge with supervisory authority for the performance of other judges shall take reasonable measures to ensure that those judges properly discharge their judicial responsibilities, including the prompt disposition of matters before them.

Comment

[1] A judge is responsible for his or her own conduct and for the conduct of others, such as staff, when those persons are acting at the judge's direction or control. A judge may not direct court personnel to engage in conduct on the judge's behalf or as the judge's representative when such conduct would violate the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct if undertaken by the judge.

[2] Public confidence in the judicial system depends upon timely justice. To promote the efficient administration of justice, a judge with supervisory authority must take the steps needed to ensure that judges under his or her supervision administer their workloads promptly.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.13: ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS

(A) In making administrative appointments, a judge:

- (1) shall exercise the power of appointment impartially* and on the basis of merit; and**
- (2) shall avoid nepotism, favoritism, and unnecessary appointments.**

(B) A judge shall not approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.

Comment

[1] Appointees of a judge may include assigned counsel, mediators, officials such as district

associate judges, magistrates, referees, commissioners, special masters, receivers, guardians, and personnel such as clerks, secretaries, and court reporters. Consent by the parties to an appointment or an award of compensation does not relieve the judge of the obligation prescribed by paragraph (A).

[2] Unless otherwise defined by law, nepotism is the appointment or hiring of any relative within the third degree of relationship of either the judge or the judge's spouse or domestic partner*, or the spouse or domestic partner of such relative.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.14: DISABILITY AND IMPAIRMENT

A judge having a reasonable belief that the performance of a lawyer or another judge is impaired by drugs or alcohol, or by a mental, emotional, or physical condition, shall take appropriate action, which may include a confidential referral to a lawyer or judicial assistance program.

Comment

[1] "Appropriate action" means action intended and reasonably likely to help the judge or lawyer in question address the problem and prevent harm to the justice system. Depending upon the circumstances, appropriate action may include, but is not limited to, speaking directly to the impaired person, notifying an individual with supervisory responsibility over the impaired person, or making a referral to an assistance program.

[2] Taking or initiating corrective action by way of referral to an assistance program may satisfy a judge's responsibility under this rule. Assistance programs have many approaches for offering help to impaired judges and lawyers, such as intervention, counseling, or referral to appropriate health care professionals. Depending upon the gravity of the conduct that has come to the judge's attention, however, the judge may be required to take other action, such as reporting the impaired judge or lawyer to the appropriate authority*, agency, or body. *See* rule 51:2.15.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.15: RESPONDING TO JUDICIAL AND LAWYER MISCONDUCT

(A) A judge having knowledge* that another judge has committed a violation of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding the judge's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.*

(B) A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.

(C) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that another judge has committed a violation of this Code shall take appropriate action.

(D) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood a lawyer has committed a violation of this Code shall take appropriate action.

(E) This rule does not require disclosure of information gained by a judge while participating in an approved judges or lawyers assistance program.

Comment

[1] Taking action to address known misconduct is a judge's obligation. Paragraphs (A) and (B) impose an obligation on the judge to report to the appropriate disciplinary authority the known misconduct of another judge or a lawyer that raises a substantial question regarding the honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness of that judge or lawyer. Ignoring or denying known misconduct among one's judicial colleagues or members of the legal profession undermines a judge's responsibility to participate in efforts to ensure public respect for the justice system. This rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that an independent judiciary must vigorously endeavor to prevent.

[2] A judge who does not have actual knowledge that another judge or a lawyer may have committed misconduct, but receives information indicating a substantial likelihood of such misconduct, is required to take appropriate action under paragraphs (C) and (D). Appropriate action may include, but is not limited to, communicating directly with the judge who may have

violated this Code, communicating with a supervising judge, or reporting the suspected violation to the appropriate authority or other agency or body. Similarly, actions to be taken in response to information indicating that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct may include, but are not limited to, communicating directly with the lawyer who may have committed the violation or reporting the suspected violation to the appropriate authority or other agency or body.

[3] Information about a judge's misconduct or fitness may be received by a judge in the course of that judge's participation in an approved judges assistance program. In that circumstance, providing for an exception to reporting requirements of paragraphs (A) and (B) of this rule encourages judges to seek treatment through such a program. Conversely, without such an exception, judges may hesitate to seek assistance from these programs, which may then result in additional harm to their professional careers and additional injury to the welfare of the public. These rules do not otherwise address the confidentiality of information received by a judge participating in an approved judges assistance program; such an obligation, however, may be imposed by the rules of the program or other law.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:2.16: COOPERATION WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES

(A) A judge shall cooperate and be candid and honest with judicial and lawyer disciplinary agencies.

(B) A judge shall not retaliate, directly or indirectly, against a person known* or suspected to have assisted or cooperated with an investigation of a judge or a lawyer.

Comment

[1] Cooperation with investigations and proceedings of judicial and lawyer discipline agencies, as required in paragraph (A), instills confidence in judges' commitment to the integrity of the judicial system and the protection of the public.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

CANON 3

A JUDGE SHALL CONDUCT THE JUDGE'S PERSONAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF CONFLICT WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF JUDICIAL OFFICE

Rule 51:3.1: EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL

A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, except as prohibited by law* or the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. However, when engaging in extrajudicial activities, a judge shall not:

(A) participate in activities that will interfere with the proper performance of the judge's judicial duties;

(B) participate in activities that will lead to frequent disqualification of the judge;

(C) participate in activities that would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge's independence,* integrity,* or impartiality;*

(D) engage in conduct that would appear to a reasonable person to be coercive; or

(E) make use of court premises, staff, stationery, equipment, or other resources, except for incidental use for activities that concern the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, or the administration of justice, or unless such additional use is permitted by law.

Comment

[1] To the extent that time permits, and judicial independence and impartiality are not compromised, judges are encouraged to engage in appropriate extrajudicial activities. Judges are uniquely qualified to engage in extrajudicial activities that concern the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, and the administration of justice, such as by speaking, writing, teaching,

or participating in scholarly research projects. In addition, judges are permitted and encouraged to engage in educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic extrajudicial activities not conducted for profit, even when the activities do not involve the law. *See* rule 51:3.7.

[2] Participation in both law-related and other extrajudicial activities helps integrate judges into their communities and furthers public understanding of and respect for courts and the judicial system.

[3] Discriminatory actions and expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge's official or judicial actions, are likely to appear to a reasonable person to call into question the judge's integrity and impartiality. Examples include jokes or other remarks that demean individuals based upon their race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status. For the same reason, a judge's extrajudicial activities must not be conducted in connection or affiliation with an organization that practices invidious discrimination. *See* rule 51:3.6.

[4] While engaged in permitted extrajudicial activities, judges must not coerce others or take action that would reasonably be perceived as coercive. For example, depending upon the circumstances, a judge's solicitation of contributions or memberships for an organization, even as permitted by rule 51:3.7(A), might create the risk that the person solicited would feel obligated to respond favorably, or would do so to curry favor with the judge.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.2: APPEARANCES BEFORE GOVERNMENTAL BODIES AND CONSULTATION WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

A judge shall not appear voluntarily at a public hearing before, or otherwise consult with, an executive or a legislative body or official, except:

(A) in connection with matters concerning the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, or the administration of justice;

(B) in connection with matters about which the judge acquired knowledge or expertise in the course of the judge's judicial duties; or

(C) when the judge is acting pro se in a matter involving the judge's legal or economic interests, or when the judge is acting in a fiduciary* capacity.

Comment

[1] Judges possess special expertise in matters of law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, and the administration of justice and may properly share that expertise with governmental bodies and executive or legislative branch officials.

[2] In appearing before governmental bodies or consulting with government officials, judges must be mindful that they remain subject to other provisions of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, such as rule 51:1.3, prohibiting judges from using the prestige of office to advance their own or others' interests, rule 51:2.10, governing public comment on pending and impending matters, and rule 51:3.1(C), prohibiting judges from engaging in extrajudicial activities that would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality.

[3] In general, it would be an unnecessary and unfair burden to prohibit judges from appearing before governmental bodies or consulting with government officials on matters that are likely to affect them as private citizens, such as zoning proposals affecting their real property. In engaging in such activities, however, judges must not refer to their judicial positions and must otherwise exercise caution to avoid using the prestige of judicial office.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.3: TESTIFYING AS A CHARACTER WITNESS

A judge shall not testify as a character witness in a judicial, administrative, or other adjudicatory proceeding or otherwise vouch for the character of a person in a legal proceeding, except when duly subpoenaed.

Comment

[1] A judge who, without being subpoenaed, testifies as a character witness abuses the prestige of

judicial office to advance the interests of another. *See* rule 51:1.3. Except in unusual circumstances where the demands of justice require, a judge should discourage a party from requiring the judge to testify as a character witness.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.4: APPOINTMENTS TO GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS

A judge shall not accept appointment to a governmental committee, board, commission, or other governmental position, unless it is one that concerns the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, or the administration of justice.

Comment

[1] Rule 3.4 implicitly acknowledges the value of judges accepting appointments to entities that concern the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, or the administration of justice. Even in such instances, however, a judge should assess the appropriateness of accepting an appointment, paying particular attention to the subject matter of the appointment and the availability and allocation of judicial resources, including the judge's time commitments, and giving due regard to the requirements of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

[2] A judge may represent his or her country, state, or locality on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, or cultural activities. Such representation does not constitute acceptance of a government position.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.5: USE OF NONPUBLIC INFORMATION

A judge shall not intentionally disclose or use nonpublic information* acquired in a judicial capacity for any purpose unrelated to the judge's judicial duties.

Comment

[1] In the course of performing judicial duties, a judge may acquire information of commercial or other value that is unavailable to the public. The judge must not reveal or use such information for personal gain or for any purpose unrelated to his or her judicial duties.

[2] This rule is not intended, however, to affect a judge's ability to act on information as necessary to protect the health or safety of any individual if consistent with other provisions of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.6: AFFILIATION WITH DISCRIMINATORY ORGANIZATIONS

(A) A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. A judge's membership in a religious organization as a lawful exercise of the freedom of religion is not prohibited.

(B) A judge shall not use the benefits or facilities of an organization if the judge knows* or should know that the organization practices invidious discrimination on one or more of the bases identified in paragraph (A). A judge's attendance at an event in a facility of an organization that the judge is not permitted to join is not a violation of this rule when the judge's attendance is an isolated event that could not reasonably be perceived as an endorsement of the organization's practices.

Comment

[1] A judge's public manifestation of approval of invidious discrimination on any basis gives rise to the appearance of impropriety and diminishes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. A judge's membership in an organization that practices invidious discrimination creates the perception that the judge's impartiality is impaired.

[2] An organization is generally said to discriminate invidiously if it arbitrarily excludes from membership on the basis of race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation persons who would otherwise be eligible for admission. Whether an organization practices invidious discrimination is a complex question to which judges should be attentive. The answer cannot be determined from a mere examination of an organization's current membership rolls, but rather, depends upon how the organization selects members, as well as other relevant factors, such as whether the organization is dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic, or cultural values of legitimate common interest to its members, or whether it is an intimate, purely private organization whose membership limitations could not constitutionally be prohibited.

[3] When a judge learns that an organization to which the judge belongs engages in invidious discrimination, the judge must resign immediately from the organization.

[4] This rule does not apply to national or state military service.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.7: PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATIONAL, RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, FRATERNAL, OR CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

(A) Subject to the requirements of rule 51:3.1, a judge may participate in activities sponsored by organizations or governmental entities concerned with the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, or the administration of justice, and those sponsored by or on behalf of educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations not conducted for profit, including but not limited to the following activities:

(1) assisting such an organization or entity in planning related to fund-raising, volunteering goods or services at fundraising events, and participating in the management and investment of the organization's or entity's funds;

(2) soliciting* contributions* for such an organization or entity, but only from members of the judge's family,* or from judges over whom the judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate authority;

(3) appearing or speaking at, receiving an award or other recognition at, being featured on the program of, and permitting his or her title to be used in connection with an event of such an organization or entity, but if the event serves a fund-raising purpose, the judge may participate only if the event concerns the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, or the administration of justice;

(4) making recommendations to such a public or private fund-granting organization or entity in connection with its programs and activities, but only if the organization or entity is concerned with the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, or the administration of justice; and

(5) serving as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of such an organization or entity, unless it is likely that the organization or entity:

(a) will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge; or

(b) will frequently be engaged in adversary proceedings in the court of which the judge is a member, or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court of which the judge is a member.

(B) A judge may encourage lawyers to provide pro bono publico legal services.

(C) Subject to the requirements of rule 51:3.1, a judge may:

(1) provide leadership in identifying and addressing issues involving equal access to the justice system; developing public education programs; engaging in activities to promote the fair administration of justice and convening, participating or assisting in advisory committees and community collaborations devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, or the administration of justice.

(2) endorse projects and programs directly related to the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, and the administration of justice to those coming before the courts.

(3) participate in programs concerning the law or which promote the administration of justice.

Comment

[1] The activities permitted by paragraph (A) generally include those sponsored by or undertaken on behalf of public or private not-for-profit educational institutions, and other not-for-profit organizations, including law-related, charitable, and other organizations.

[2] Even for law-related organizations, a judge should consider whether the membership and purposes of the organization, or the nature of the judge's participation in or association with the organization, would conflict with the judge's obligation to refrain from activities that reflect adversely upon a judge's independence, integrity, and impartiality.

[3] Attendance at fundraising events and volunteering services or goods at or in support of fundraising events do not present an element of coercion or abuse the prestige of the judicial office and are not prohibited by this rule.

[4] In addition to appointing lawyers to serve as counsel for indigent parties in individual cases, a judge may promote broader access to justice by encouraging lawyers to participate in pro bono publico legal services, if in doing so the judge does not employ coercion or abuse the prestige of judicial office. Such encouragement may take many forms, including providing lists of available programs, training lawyers to do pro bono publico legal work, and participating in events recognizing lawyers who have done pro bono publico work.

[5] Judges, as parents, may assist their children in their fundraising activities if the procedures employed are not coercive and the sums nominal.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.8: APPOINTMENTS TO FIDUCIARY POSITIONS

(A) A judge shall not accept appointment to serve in a fiduciary* position, such as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, attorney in fact, or other personal representative, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the judge's family,* and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.

(B) A judge shall not serve in a fiduciary position if the judge as fiduciary will likely be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, or if the estate, trust, or ward becomes involved in adversary proceedings in the court on which the judge serves, or one under its appellate jurisdiction.

(C) A judge acting in a fiduciary capacity shall be subject to the same restrictions on engaging in financial activities that apply to a judge personally.

(D) If a person who is serving in a fiduciary position becomes a judge, he or she must comply with this rule as soon as reasonably practicable, but in no event later than six months after becoming a judge.

Comment

[1] A judge should recognize that other restrictions imposed by the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct may conflict with a judge's obligations as a fiduciary; in such circumstances, a judge should resign as fiduciary. For example, serving as a fiduciary might require frequent disqualification of a judge under rule 51:2.11 because a judge is deemed to have an economic interest in shares of stock held by a trust if the amount of stock held is more than de minimis.*

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.9: SERVICE AS ARBITRATOR OR MEDIATOR

A judge shall not act as an arbitrator or a mediator or perform other judicial functions apart from the judge's official duties unless expressly authorized by law.*

Comment

[1] This rule does not prohibit a judge from participating in arbitration, mediation, or settlement conferences performed as part of assigned judicial duties. Rendering dispute resolution services apart from those duties, whether or not for economic gain, is prohibited unless it is expressly authorized by

law.

[2] Senior judges can act as an arbitrator or a mediator as allowed by Iowa Court Rule 22.12.
[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.10: PRACTICE OF LAW

A judge shall not practice law. A judge may act pro se and may, without compensation, give legal advice to and draft or review documents for a member of the judge's family,* but is prohibited from serving as the family member's lawyer in any forum.

Comment

[1] A judge may act pro se in all legal matters, including matters involving litigation and matters involving appearances before or other dealings with governmental bodies. A judge must not use the prestige of office to advance the judge's personal or family interests. *See* rule 51:1.3.

[2] This rule does not prohibit the practice of law pursuant to military service.
[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.11: FINANCIAL, BUSINESS, OR REMUNERATIVE ACTIVITIES

(A) A judge may hold and manage investments of the judge and members of the judge's family.*

(B) A judge shall not serve as an officer, director, manager, general partner, advisor, or employee of any business entity except that a judge may manage or participate in:

- (1) a business closely held by the judge or members of the judge's family; or**
- (2) a business entity primarily engaged in investment of the financial resources of the judge or members of the judge's family.**

(C) A judge shall not engage in financial activities permitted under paragraphs (A) and (B) if they will:

- (1) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties;**
- (2) lead to frequent disqualification of the judge;**
- (3) involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing business relationships with lawyers or other persons likely to come before the court on which the judge serves; or**
- (4) result in violation of other provisions of this Code.**

Comment

[1] Judges are generally permitted to engage in financial activities, including managing real estate and other investments for themselves or for members of their families. Participation in these activities, like participation in other extrajudicial activities, is subject to the requirements of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. For example, it would be improper for a judge to spend so much time on business activities that it interferes with the performance of judicial duties. *See* rule 51:2.1. Similarly, it would be improper for a judge to use his or her official title or appear in judicial robes in business advertising, or to conduct his or her business or financial affairs in such a way that disqualification is frequently required. *See* rules 51:1.3 and 51:2.11.

[2] As soon as practicable without serious financial detriment, the judge must divest himself or herself of investments and other financial interests that might require frequent disqualification or otherwise violate this rule.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.12: COMPENSATION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES

A judge may accept reasonable compensation for extrajudicial activities permitted by the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct or other law* unless such acceptance would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge's independence,* integrity,* or impartiality.*

Comment

[1] A judge is permitted to accept honoraria as allowed by Iowa Court Rule 22.23, stipends, fees, wages, salaries, royalties, or other compensation for speaking, teaching, writing, and other extrajudicial activities, provided the compensation is reasonable and commensurate with the task performed. The judge should be mindful, however, that judicial duties must take precedence over other activities. *See* rule 51:2.1.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.13: ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS, LOANS, BEQUESTS, BENEFITS, OR OTHER THINGS OF VALUE

(A) A judge, a judge's spouse, a judge's domestic partner, or a judge's minor child shall not accept or solicit any gift, loan, bequest, benefit, or other thing of value, if acceptance is prohibited by law or would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge's independence,* integrity,* or impartiality.*

(B) Unless prohibited by paragraph (A), a judge, a judge's spouse, a judge's domestic partner*, or a judge's minor child may accept only the following gifts, loans, bequests, benefits, or other things of value if they are from a restricted donor:*

(1) items with little intrinsic value, such as plaques, certificates, trophies, and greeting cards;

(2) commercial or financial opportunities and benefits, including special pricing and discounts, and loans from lending institutions in their regular course of business, if the same opportunities and benefits or loans are made available on the same terms to similarly situated persons who are not judges;

(3) books, magazines, journals, audiovisual materials, and other resource materials supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official use;

(4) anything received from a person related within the fourth degree of kinship or marriage, unless the donor is acting as an agent or intermediary for another person not so related;

(5) an inheritance or bequest;

(6) nonmonetary items with a value of \$3 or less that are received from any one donor during one calendar day;

(7) items or services solicited by or given to a state, national or regional organization in which the state of Iowa or a political subdivision of the state is a member;

(8) items or services received as part of a regularly scheduled event that is part of a conference, seminar or other meeting that is sponsored and directed by any state, national or regional organization in which the judicial branch is a member;

(9) funeral flowers or memorials to a church or non-profit organization; and

(10) gifts which are given to an official or employee for the official's or the employee's wedding or twenty-fifth or fiftieth wedding anniversary.

(C) Unless prohibited by paragraph (A), a judge, a judge's spouse, a judge's domestic partner, or a judge's minor child may receive the following gifts, loans, bequests, benefits, or other things of value from a donor other than a restricted donor:

(1) gifts, loans, bequests, benefits, or other things of value from friends, relatives, or other persons, including lawyers, whose appearance or interest in a proceeding pending* or impending* before the judge would in any event require disqualification of the judge under rule 51:2.11;

(2) ordinary social hospitality;

(3) rewards and prizes given to competitors or participants in random drawings, contests, or other events that are open to persons who are not judges;

(4) scholarships, fellowships, and similar benefits or awards, if they are available to similarly situated persons who are not judges, based upon the same terms and criteria;

(5) gifts, awards, or benefits associated with the business, profession, or other separate activity of a spouse, a domestic partner,* or other family member of a judge residing in the judge's household,* but that incidentally benefit the judge;

(6) gifts incident to a public testimonial;

(7) invitations to the judge and the judge's spouse, domestic partner, or guest to attend without charge;

- (a) an event associated with a bar-related function or other activity relating to the law, the legal system, the provision of legal services, or the administration of justice; or
- (b) an event associated with any of the judge's educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic activities permitted by the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, if the same invitation is offered to nonjudges who are engaged in similar ways in the activity as is the judge;
- (8) contributions to the campaign committee of a judge, a judge's spouse, or a judge's domestic partner; and
- (9) anything that can be given by a restricted donor under paragraph (B).

Comment

[1] Whenever a judge accepts a gift or other thing of value without paying fair market value, there is a risk that the benefit might be viewed as intended to influence the judge's decision in a case. Rule 51:3.13 imposes restrictions upon the acceptance of such benefits, according to the magnitude of the risk. Paragraph (B) identifies the only gifts, loans, bequests, benefits, or other things of value a judge, a judge's spouse, a judge's domestic partner, or a judge's minor child may accept from a restricted donor. Paragraph (C) identifies gifts, loans, bequests, benefits, or other things of value that a judge, a judge's spouse, a judge's domestic partner, or a judge's minor child may accept from a donor other than a restricted donor. Rule 51:3.13 substantially complies with the gift law provisions of chapter 68B of the Iowa Code.

[2] Gift-giving between friends and relatives is a common occurrence, and ordinarily does not create an appearance of impropriety or cause reasonable persons to believe that the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality has been compromised. In addition, when the appearance of friends or relatives in a case would require the judge's disqualification under rule 51:2.11, there would be no opportunity for a gift to influence the judge's decision making. Paragraph (C)(1) places no restrictions upon the ability of a judge to accept gifts or other things of value from friends or relatives under these circumstances.

[3] Businesses and financial institutions frequently make available special pricing, discounts, and other benefits, either in connection with a temporary promotion or for preferred customers, based upon longevity of the relationship, volume of business transacted, and other factors. A judge may freely accept such benefits if they are available to the general public, or if the judge qualifies for the special price or discount according to the same criteria as are applied to persons who are not judges. As an example, loans provided at generally prevailing interest rates are not gifts, but a judge could not accept a loan from a financial institution at below-market interest rates unless the same rate was being made available to the general public for a certain period of time or only to borrowers with specified qualifications that the judge also possesses.

[4] Rule 51:3.13 applies to acceptance of gifts or other things of value by a judge's spouse, a judge's domestic partner, or a judge's minor child. If a gift or other benefit is given to the judge's spouse, domestic partner, or minor child, it may be viewed as an attempt to influence the judge indirectly. A judge should remind family members of the restrictions imposed upon judges and urge them to take these restrictions into account when making decisions about accepting such gifts or benefits.

[5] Rule 51:3.13 does not apply to contributions to a judge's retention election. Such contributions are governed by other rules of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, including rules 51:4.3 and 51:4.4.

[6] In deciding whether a gift, loan, benefit, or other thing of value constitutes ordinary social hospitality, relevant considerations include the cost of the event or gift, whether the benefits conferred are greater in value than that traditionally furnished at similar events sponsored by bar associations or similar groups, whether the benefits are greater in value than that which the judge customarily provides the judge's own guests, whether the benefits conferred are usually exchanged only between friends or relatives, whether there is a history or expectation of reciprocal social hospitality between the judge and the donor, whether the event is a traditional occasion for social hospitality, and whether the benefits received must be reported to any governmental entity.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:3.14: REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES AND WAIVERS OF FEES OR CHARGES

- (A) Unless otherwise prohibited by rules 51:3.1 and 51:3.13(A) or other law,* a judge may

accept reimbursement of necessary and reasonable expenses for travel, food, lodging, or other incidental expenses, or a waiver or partial waiver of fees or charges for registration, tuition, and similar items, from sources other than the judge's employing entity, if the expenses or charges are associated with the judge's participation in extrajudicial activities permitted by the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.

(B) Reimbursement of expenses for necessary travel, food, lodging, or other incidental expenses shall be limited to the actual costs reasonably incurred by the judge and, when appropriate to the occasion, by the judge's spouse, domestic partner*, or guest.

Comment

[1] Educational, civic, religious, fraternal, and charitable organizations often sponsor meetings, seminars, symposia, dinners, awards ceremonies, and similar events. Judges are encouraged to attend educational programs, as both teachers and participants, in law-related and academic disciplines, in furtherance of their duty to remain competent in the law. Participation in a variety of other extrajudicial activity is also permitted and encouraged by the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.

[2] Not infrequently, sponsoring organizations invite certain judges to attend seminars or other events on a fee-waived or partial-fee-waived basis, and sometimes include reimbursement for necessary travel, food, lodging, or other incidental expenses. A judge's decision whether to accept reimbursement of expenses or a waiver or partial waiver of fees or charges in connection with these or other extrajudicial activities must be based upon an assessment of all the circumstances. The judge must undertake a reasonable inquiry to obtain the information necessary to make an informed judgment about whether acceptance would be consistent with the requirements of this Code.

[3] A judge must assure himself or herself that acceptance of reimbursement or fee waivers would not appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality. The factors that a judge should consider when deciding whether to accept reimbursement or a fee waiver for attendance at a particular activity include:

(a) whether the sponsor is an accredited educational institution or bar association rather than a trade association or a for-profit entity;

(b) whether the funding comes largely from numerous contributors rather than from a single entity and is earmarked for programs with specific content;

(c) whether the content is related or unrelated to the subject matter of litigation pending or impending before the judge, or to matters that are likely to come before the judge;

(d) whether the activity is primarily educational rather than recreational, and whether the costs of the event are reasonable and comparable to those associated with similar events sponsored by the judiciary, bar associations, or similar groups;

(e) whether information concerning the activity and its funding sources is available upon inquiry;

(f) whether the sponsor or source of funding is generally associated with particular parties or interests currently appearing or likely to appear in the judge's court, thus possibly requiring disqualification or recusal of the judge under rule 51:2.11;

(g) whether differing viewpoints are presented; and

(h) whether a broad range of judicial and nonjudicial participants are invited, whether a large number of participants are invited, and whether the program is designed specifically for judges.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

CANON 4

A JUDGE OR CANDIDATE FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN POLITICAL OR CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, OR IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY

Rule 51:4.1: POLITICAL AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF JUDGES AND JUDICIAL CANDIDATES IN GENERAL

(A) Except as permitted by law,* or by rules 51:4.2, 51:4.3, and 51:4.4, a judge or a judicial candidate* shall not:

(1) act as a leader in, or hold an office in, a political organization;*

(2) make speeches on behalf of a political organization;

- (3) publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for any public office;**
 - (4) solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a contribution* to a political organization, a candidate for judicial retention, or a candidate for public office;**
 - (5) attend or purchase tickets for dinners or other events sponsored by a political organization or a candidate for public office;**
 - (6) publicly identify himself or herself as a candidate of a political organization;**
 - (7) seek, accept, or use endorsements from a political organization;**
 - (8) personally solicit* or accept campaign contributions other than through a campaign committee authorized by rule 51:4.4;**
 - (9) use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of the judge, the judicial candidate, or others;**
 - (10) use court staff, facilities, or other court resources in a campaign for judicial office;**
 - (11) knowingly,* or with reckless disregard for the truth, make any false or misleading statement;**
 - (12) make any statement that would reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a pending matter* or impending matter* in any court; or**
 - (13) in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial* performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office,**
 - (14) participate in a precinct caucus; or**
 - (15) solicit or accept any campaign contributions from any judicial branch employee.**
- (B) A judge or judicial candidate shall take reasonable measures to ensure that other persons do not undertake, on behalf of the judge or judicial candidate, any activities prohibited under paragraph (A).**

Comment

General Considerations

[1] Even when subject to a retention election, a judge plays a role different from that of a legislator or executive branch official. Rather than making decisions based upon the expressed views or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes decisions based upon the law and the facts of every case. Therefore, in furtherance of this interest, judges and judicial candidates must, to the greatest extent possible, be free and appear to be free from political influence and political pressure. This Canon imposes narrowly tailored restrictions upon the political and campaign activities of all judges and judicial candidates.

[2] When a person becomes a judicial candidate, this Canon becomes applicable to his or her conduct.

Participation in Political Activities

[3] Public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary is eroded if judges or judicial candidates are perceived to be subject to political influence. Although judges and judicial candidates may register to vote as members of a political party, they are prohibited by paragraph (A)(1) from assuming leadership roles in political organizations.

[4] Paragraphs (A)(2) and (A)(3) prohibit judges and judicial candidates from making speeches on behalf of political organizations or publicly endorsing or opposing candidates for public office, respectively, to prevent them from abusing the prestige of judicial office to advance the interests of others. *See* rule 51:1.3. These rules do not prohibit judicial candidates from campaigning on their own behalf. *See* rule 51:4.2(B)(2).

[5] Although members of the families of judges and judicial candidates are free to engage in their own political activity, including running for public office, there is no “family exception” to the prohibition in paragraph (A)(3) against a judge or judicial candidate publicly endorsing candidates for public office. A judge or judicial candidate must not become involved in, or publicly associated with, a family member’s political activity or campaign for public office. To avoid public misunderstanding, judges and judicial candidates should take, and should urge members of their families to take, reasonable steps to avoid any implication that they endorse any family member’s

candidacy or other political activity.

[6] Judges and judicial candidates retain the right to participate in the political process as voters in both primary and general elections. For purposes of this Canon, participation in a caucus-type election procedure does constitute public support for or endorsement of a political organization or candidate, and is prohibited by this Code. In Iowa, a precinct caucus is organized and held by a political party in order to elect delegates to a party's county convention and, thus, serves a purely political purpose. *See* Iowa Code § 43.4.

Statements and Comments Made during a Campaign for Judicial Office

[7] Judicial candidates must be scrupulously fair and accurate in all statements made by them and by their campaign committees. Paragraph (A)(11) obligates judicial candidates and their committees to refrain from making statements that are false or misleading or that omit facts necessary to make the communication considered as a whole not materially misleading.

[8] Judicial candidates are sometimes the subject of false, misleading, or unfair allegations made by third parties or the media. For example, false or misleading statements might be made regarding the identity, present position, experience, qualifications, or judicial rulings of a judicial candidate. In other situations, false or misleading allegations may be made that bear upon a judicial candidate's integrity or fitness for judicial office. As long as the judicial candidate does not violate paragraphs (A)(11), (A)(12), or (A)(13), the judicial candidate may make a factually accurate public response.

[9] Subject to paragraph (A)(12), a judicial candidate is permitted to respond directly to false, misleading, or unfair allegations made against him or her during a campaign, although it is preferable for someone else to respond if the allegations relate to a pending case.

[10] Paragraph (A)(12) prohibits judicial candidates from making comments that might impair the fairness of pending or impending judicial proceedings. This provision does not restrict arguments or statements to the court or jury by a lawyer who is a judicial candidate, or rulings, statements, or instructions by a judge that may appropriately affect the outcome of a matter.

Pledges, Promises, or Commitments Inconsistent with Impartial Performance of the Adjudicative Duties of Judicial Office

[11] The role of a judge is different from that of a legislator or executive branch official, even when the judge is subject to a retention election. Campaigns for retention must be conducted differently from campaigns for other offices. The narrowly drafted restrictions upon political and campaign activities of judicial candidates provided in Canon 4 allow candidates to conduct campaigns that provide voters with sufficient information to permit them to make informed electoral choices.

[12] Paragraph (A)(13) makes applicable to both judges and judicial candidates the prohibition that applies to judges in rule 51:2.10(B) relating to pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.

[13] The making of a pledge, promise, or commitment is not dependent upon, or limited to, the use of any specific words or phrases; instead, the totality of the statement must be examined to determine if a reasonable person would believe that the candidate for judicial office has specifically undertaken to reach a particular result. Pledges, promises, or commitments must be contrasted with statements or announcements of personal views on legal, political, or other issues, which are not prohibited. When making such statements, a judge should acknowledge the overarching judicial obligation to apply and uphold the law, without regard to his or her personal views.

[14] A judicial candidate may make campaign promises related to judicial organization, administration, and court management, such as a promise to dispose of a backlog of cases, start court sessions on time, or avoid favoritism in appointments and hiring. A judicial candidate may also pledge to take action outside the courtroom, such as working toward an improved jury selection system, or advocating for more funds to improve the physical plant and amenities of the courthouse.

[15] Judicial candidates may receive questionnaires or requests for interviews from the media and from issue advocacy or other community organizations that seek to learn their views on disputed or controversial legal or political issues. Paragraph (A)(13) does not specifically address judicial responses to such inquiries. Depending upon the wording and format of such questionnaires, judicial candidates' responses might be viewed as pledges, promises, or commitments to perform the adjudicative duties of office other than in an impartial way. To avoid violating paragraph (A)(13), therefore, judicial candidates who respond to media and other inquiries should also give assurances that they will keep an open mind and will carry out their adjudicative duties faithfully and impartially.

if retained. Judicial candidates who do not respond may state their reasons for not responding, such as the danger that answering might be perceived by a reasonable person as undermining a retained judge's independence or impartiality, or that it might lead to frequent disqualification. *See* rule 51:2.11.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:4.2: POLITICAL AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF JUDICIAL CANDIDATES IN RETENTION ELECTIONS

(A) A judicial candidate* in a retention election shall:

(1) act at all times in a manner consistent with the independence,* integrity,* and impartiality* of the judiciary;

(2) comply with all applicable election, election campaign, and election campaign fund-raising laws, regulations of Iowa, and this Code;

(3) review and approve the content of all campaign statements and materials produced by the candidate or his or her campaign committee, as authorized by rule 51:4.4, before their dissemination; and

(4) take reasonable measures to ensure that other persons do not undertake on behalf of the judicial candidate activities, other than those described in rule 51:4.4, that the candidate is prohibited from doing by rule 51:4.1.

(B) A judicial candidate in a retention election may, unless prohibited by law*:

(1) establish a campaign committee pursuant to the provisions of rule 51:4.4;

(2) speak on behalf of his or her candidacy through any medium, including, but not limited to, advertisements, websites, or other campaign literature; and

(3) seek, accept, or use endorsements from any person or organization other than a partisan political organization.

Comment

[1] Paragraph (B) permits judicial candidates in retention elections to engage in some political and campaign activities otherwise prohibited by rule 51:4.1.

[2] Despite paragraph (B), judicial candidates for retention election remain subject to many of the provisions of rule 51:4.1. For example, a candidate continues to be prohibited from soliciting funds for a political organization, knowingly making false or misleading statements during a campaign, or making certain promises, pledges, or commitments related to future adjudicative duties. *See* rule 51:4.1(A), paragraphs (4), (11), and (13).

[3] In retention elections, paragraph (B)(3) prohibits a candidate from seeking, accepting, or using nominations or endorsements from a partisan political organization.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:4.3: ACTIVITIES OF CANDIDATES FOR APPOINTIVE JUDICIAL OFFICE

A candidate for appointment to judicial office may:

(A) communicate with the appointing or confirming authority, including any selection, screening, or nominating commission or similar agency; and

(B) seek endorsements for the appointment from any person or organization other than a partisan political organization.

Comment

[1] When seeking support or endorsement, or when communicating directly with an appointing or confirming authority, a candidate for appointive judicial office must not make any pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office. *See* rule 51:4.1(A)(13).

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:4.4: CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES

(A) A judicial candidate* subject to a retention election may establish a campaign committee to manage and conduct a campaign for the candidate, subject to the provisions of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. The candidate is responsible for ensuring that his or her campaign committee complies with applicable provisions of this Code and other applicable law.*

(B) A judicial candidate subject to a retention election shall direct his or her campaign committee:

- (1) to solicit and accept only such campaign contributions* as are permissible by law;**
- (2) to not solicit or accept any campaign contributions from other judicial officers or any judicial branch employee;**
- (3) to contribute all surplus contributions held by the committee after the election without public attribution to the Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account Program (IOLTA).**
- (4) to comply with all applicable statutory requirements under the Iowa Code and all applicable rules of the Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board; and**
- (5) to comply with all applicable requirements of this Code.**

Comment

[1] Judicial candidates are prohibited from personally soliciting campaign contributions or personally accepting campaign contributions. *See* rule 51:4.1(A)(8). This rule recognizes that in Iowa, judges standing for retention must raise campaign funds to support their candidacies, and permits judicial candidates, other than candidates seeking appointment to judicial office, to establish campaign committees to solicit and accept reasonable financial contributions or in-kind contributions.

[2] Campaign committees may solicit and accept campaign contributions, manage the expenditure of campaign funds, and generally conduct campaigns. However, campaign committees may not solicit or accept campaign contributions from other judicial officers or from any judicial branch employee. Candidates are responsible for compliance with the requirements of election law and other applicable law, and for the activities of their campaign committees.

[3] At the start of a campaign, the candidate must instruct the campaign committee to solicit or accept only such contributions as are in conformity with Iowa election laws. Although lawyers and others who might appear before a successful candidate for judicial office are permitted to make campaign contributions, the candidate should instruct his or her campaign committee to be especially cautious in connection with such contributions, so they do not create grounds for disqualification if the candidate is retained in his or her judicial office. *See* rule 51:2.11.

[4] Iowa has adopted a system whereby judges periodically must stand for retention during the general election. *See* Iowa Code ch. 46. Iowa Code chapter 68A permits a judicial candidate to establish a candidate's committee to support that individual's candidacy, while section 68A.102(4) defines "candidate" so as to include "any judge standing for retention in a judicial election." The Iowa Code, thus, envisions and creates a system allowing a judge to establish campaign committees when involved in a judicial retention election. The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct merely implements this system, albeit in a more restrictive fashion than for those seeking political or other office.

[Court Order April 30, 2010, effective May 3, 2010]

Rule 51:4.5: ACTIVITIES OF JUDGES WHO BECOME CANDIDATES FOR NONJUDICIAL OFFICE

(A) Upon becoming a candidate for a nonjudicial elective office, a judge shall resign from judicial office, unless permitted by law* to continue to hold judicial office.

(B) Upon becoming a candidate for a nonjudicial appointive office, a judge is not required to resign from judicial office, provided that the judge complies with the other provisions of this Code.

Comment

[1] In campaigns for nonjudicial elective public office, candidates may make pledges, promises, or commitments related to positions they would take and ways they would act if elected to office.

Although appropriate in nonjudicial campaigns, this manner of campaigning is inconsistent with the role of a judge, who must remain fair and impartial to all who come before him or her. The potential for misuse of the judicial office, and the political promises that the judge would be compelled to make in the course of campaigning for nonjudicial elective office, together dictate that a judge who wishes to run for such an office must resign upon becoming a candidate.

[2] The “resign to run” rule set forth in paragraph (A) ensures that a judge cannot use the judicial office to promote his or her candidacy, and prevents post-campaign retaliation from the judge in the event the judge is defeated in the election. When a judge is seeking appointive nonjudicial office, however, the dangers are not sufficient to warrant imposing the “resign to run” rule.

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